Fiscal stimulus through state and local governments by Feiveson, Laura (Laura Judith)
Fiscal Stimulus Through State and Local Governments
by
Laura Feiveson
B.S., Yale University (2002)
Submitted to the Department of Economics
ARCHIVES
IMASSACHUSETTS INST E
OF TECHNOLOGY
SEP 2 0 2012
LJIRARI ES
in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy in Economics
at the
MASSACHUSETTS INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY
September 2012
@ 2012 Laura Feiveson. All rights reserved.
The author hereby grants to Massachusetts Institute of Technology permission to
reproduce and
to distribute copies of this thesis document in whole or in part.
Signature of Author.. (
Certified by .....................
C.
Certified by .......... ..........
Accepted by................
..........
Department of Economics
11 August 2012
. . . . . . . . . . . . .- . .- . .- . .- . .- . .- . .- . .- . .- .
James Poterba
Mitsui Professor of Economics
Thesis Supervisor
Michael Greenstone
3M Professor of Environmental Economics
Thesis Supervisor
...................................
Michael Greenstone
3M Professor of Environmental Economics
Chairman, Departmental Committee on Graduate Studies
Fiscal Stimulus Through State and Local Governments
by
Laura Feiveson
Submitted to the Department of Economics
on 11 August 2012, in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy in Economics
Abstract
State and local governments in the United States make up more than half of total government
consumption and investment and almost 90 percent of total government employment. Despite
these facts, the debates surrounding fiscal policy during business cycles have usually been
limited to the actions of the federal government. This is in large part due to two reasons. First,
there are 50 state governments and more than 60,000 local governments, making coordinated
responses very difficult. Second, because state and local governments are bound by balanced
budget rules, their hands are tied, to some degree, in their ability to enact countercyclical
spending policies. However, their dramatic expenditure and employment cuts in the recent
recession have made it increasingly clear how much their actions affect the economy as a whole
and have motivated new research surrounding their budget mechanisms and the broader impacts
of their fiscal policy. This dissertation consists of three chapters, each seeking to illuminate a
specific issue within this area of research. In the first chapter, I examine how the impact of
federal intergovernmental grants on local economies may be mediated by public sector unions.
In the second chapter, I explore the impact of revenue structure on city government revenue
and expenditure fluctuations. Finally, the third chapter (co-authored with Gabriel Chodorow-
Reich, Zachary Liscow, and William Woolston) estimates the fiscal multiplier associated with
federal transfers to state governments in the recent recession.
Thesis Supervisor: James Poterba
Title: Mitsui Professor of Economics
Thesis Supervisor: Michael Greenstone
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Introduction
State and local governments in the United States make up more than half of total government
consumption and investment and almost 90 percent of total government employment. Despite
these facts, the debates surrounding fiscal policy during business cycles have usually been limited
to the actions of the federal government. This is in large part due to two reasons. First,
there are 50 state governments and more than 60,000 local governments, making coordinated
responses very difficult. Second, because state and local governments are bound by balanced
budget rules, their hands are tied, to some degree, in their ability to enact countercyclical
spending policies. However, their dramatic expenditure and employment cuts in the recent
recession have made it increasingly clear how much their actions affect the economy as a whole
and have motivated a new research surrounding their budget mechanisms and the broader
impacts of their fiscal policy. This dissertation consists of three chapters, each seeking to
illuminate a specific issue within this area of research.
In the first chapter, I examine how the impact of federal intergovernmental grants on local
economies may be mediated by local government institutions. The United States federal gov-
ernment implemented a large general revenue sharing program from 1972 to 1986, in which it
transferred nearly 300 billion (2009) dollars to over 35,000 state and local governments. I exam-
ine whether large city governments spent the funds that they received and how the strength of
public sector bargaining affected whether the funds were spent on new employment or increased
wages. I find that, on average, city governments spent the transfers completely, in contrast to
the findings of some of the recent "flypaper" literature; and that cities in states with pro-union
collective bargaining laws spent more than half of the transfers on increased wages while cities
in states without such laws spent a greater fraction of the funds on new employment. These
findings suggest that local institutions, in this case public sector unions, play an important role
in determining the way intergovernmental grants translate into spending outcomes. They high-
light the potential heterogeneity in the way such grants may be spent in different jurisdictions.
Moreover, if raising the wages of existing workers has a different macroeconomic stimulative ef-
fect than hiring new workers, they may also suggest differences across places in the "multiplier"
associated with federal transfers to state and local governments. I find suggestive, though
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weak, evidence that the output multiplier on spending on new employment is larger than the
multiplier on increased government wages.
In the second chapter, I explore the sources of municipal government revenue and expendi-
ture fluctuations. Due to a large variation across local governments in their revenue structure,
the elasticity of total revenues with respect to the business cycle varies substantially. I docu-
ment the extent to which revenue structure impacts the revenue responses across city govern-
ments in downturns. I then exploit the differences in revenue structure to explore the effects
that "revenue shocks" have on expenditures. I find that city governments cut expenditures
about one for one in response to a revenue shock, suggesting that the balanced budget rules
are binding. These results suggest that the structure of revenue can have important effects
on local revenue and spending dynamics, which, in turn, raises questions on the variation in
infrastructure spending over the business cycle, on the nature of programs that are cut when
county income declines, and on the long-term impacts of cyclical government investment dis-
ruptions. Furthermore, to examine the short-term impacts of the local government expenditure
fluctuations, I propose a method in which the revenue structure can be used to estimate the
size of the multipliers associated with balanced budget shocks.
Finally, the third chapter (co-authored with Gabriel Chodorow-Reich, Zachary Liscow, and
William Woolston) explores the fiscal multiplier associated with federal transfers to state gov-
ernments in the recent recession. The American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA) of
2009 included $88 billion of aid to state governments administered through the Medicaid reim-
bursement process. We examine the effect of these transfers on states' employment. Because
state fiscal relief outlays are endogenous to a state's economic environment, OLS results are
biased downward. We address this problem by using a state's pre-recession Medicaid spending
level to instrument for ARRA state fiscal relief. In our preferred specification, a state's receipt
of a marginal $100,000 in Medicaid outlays results in an additional 3.8 job-years, 3.2 of which
are outside the government, health, and education sectors.
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Chapter 1
General Revenue Sharing and Public
Sector Unions
1.1 Introduction
One of the largest components of the 2009 American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA)
consisted of more than 200 billion dollars in transfers to state and local governments. The pas-
sage of the ARRA along with countercyclical measures worldwide have led to renewed interest in
the estimation of the government spending multipliers associated with the various components
of stimulus packages.1 Work by Chodorow-Reich, et al (2012) used inter-state heterogeneity
to find significant and positive employment effects associated with the ARRA transfers to state
governments, at the same time that Cogan and Taylor (2010) used aggregate time series to
argue that the transfers to state and local governments had little to no macroeconomic effect.
Even as President Obama's new budget plan calls for countercyclical aid to state governments,
there remains considerable debate surrounding the macroeconomic effects of intergovernmental
transfers. Ultimately, any hope of understanding the stimulative effects of transfers to state
and local governments relies on understanding the mechanisms through which the funds affect
the state and local government budgeting decisions.
A relatively unexamined possibility is that heterogeneity at the local government level leads
'For recent examples of empirical work on fiscal multipliers see Nakamura and Steinssen (2011), Shoag (2010),
and Ramey (2011).
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to substantial variation in the response of state and local governments to federal transfers. 2
Despite the focus on labor markets in recent years, their interaction with local government
budgeting has generally been neglected in the public finance literature. At the same time that
policy debates surrounding federal intergovernmental transfers have rippled through Washing-
ton, protesters and politicians in Wisconsin, Indiana, and Ohio have brought the role of public
sector unions to the forefront of public consciousness. The theoretical underpinnings of research
on public sector unions suggest that there may be a good reason to link the two debates.
In this paper, I seek to address this connection by examining how the strength of public
sector labor unions affects the response of local governments to intergovernmental transfers.
To approach this analysis, I revisit a general revenue sharing program put in place from 1972
to 1986 in which the federal government transferred a total of nearly 300 billion (2009) dollars
to state and local governments. Although the stated goal of the law was to move the deci-
sions about government spending "closer to the people", it simultaneously helped to alleviate
liquidity crises at the state and local government level during a time period in which many
local governments were facing budget deficits. Furthermore, the passage of the general revenue
sharing legislation came at the end of a fifteen year period in which a rapid series of new state
laws enabled or required local governments to collectively bargain with their employees. I use
the diversity of the collective bargaining laws across states to examine how the laws affected
city governments' use of the intergovernmental transfers and, in particular, I focus on whether
they had influence over whether the transfers were spent on higher wages for existing employ-
ees or on new employment. I present an initial empirical estimate of the differential impacts
on the private economy generated by these different types of government spending, providing
motivation for future research.
The general revenue sharing program is a suitable program with which to study the effect of
intergovernmental transfers on local government expenditure decisions for three main reasons.
First, it significantly impacted the revenues of local governments. At its peak, general revenue
sharing made up to 20 percent of total revenues of the large city governments studied in this
paper.
2For instance, one well-studied example of a characteristic that has been shown to have significant effects at
the state government level is the stringency of the balanced budget rules (Poterba (1994), Clemens and Miran
(2011)).
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Second, there was substantial and plausibly exogenous variation in the amounts that city
governments received. Although the general revenue sharing formula depended on three factors
that would be expected to have a separate effect on government expenditure decisions (per
capita income, tax-to-income ratio, and population), a "geographic tiering" element to the
formula led to variation in the general revenue sharing receipts of city governments that were
housed in different counties and states, but were otherwise very similar. Furthermore, the three
factors entered the allocation formula in highly nonlinear ways, making it possible to control
for them directly. Since the magnitude of transfers to a local government is often correlated
to its economic conditions, it can be difficult to disentangle the effects of the transfers from
the effects of the economy. Because of the eccentricities in the formula, the general revenue
sharing program provides variation that is plausibly immune to this concern.
Finally, the general revenue sharing program led to transfers to over 35,000 state and local
governments including all state, county, city, town and township general-purpose governments.
It was one of the most comprehensive general purpose transfer programs in the history of the
United States and provides a test case for possible future general revenue sharing designs.
Although private sector unions were granted full legislative protection in the first half of
the twentieth century, public sector unions did not achieve significant legislative gains until the
late-1950s and 1960s. However, starting with Massachusetts in 1958 and Wisconsin in 1959, a
series of state laws were passed in rapid succession. By the time that the State and Local Fiscal
Assistance Act instituted the first wave of general revenue sharing in 1972, 30 states had passed
laws enabling or requiring collecting bargaining by local governments within their state. By
the mid-1970s, more than 40% of public sector workers across the country were represented by
unions, with substantial variation across the states.3 Since public sector collective bargaining
was pervasive by the time that general revenue sharing was put in place, it is possible to study
how the strength of collective bargaining affected the local governments' use of the transfers.
The empirical analysis of this paper is organized into three main parts. First, the general
revenue sharing program provides an opportunity to revisit the much-studied research question
of whether governments used the transfers to increase expenditures or to reduce taxes. An
SThese statistics are from the Survey on Labor-Management Relations in State and Local Governments (U.S.
Bureau of the Census, Multiple Years) and www.unionstats.com (Hirsch and Macpherson, 2003).
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influential paper by Bradford and Oates (1971) theorized that lump-sum intergovernmental
transfers should have the same effect on government expenditures as an equivalent increase in
personal income of the voting citizens. An extensive empirical literature has emerged since
this paper, which has found that intergovernmental transfers, at times, lead to a much higher
increase in government expenditures that would plausibly result from an equivalent rise in
personal income. This phenomenon has been dubbed the "flypaper effect" because the transfer
funds appear to stick where they hit.4 The flypaper effect remains an important policy issue;
as the federal government considers transferring funds to local governments, the question of
whether they will spend the funds is crucial to the policy evaluation. I find that the large cities
I study in this paper increased expenditures by roughly one dollar for every dollar received in
intergovernmental transfers. 5
Second, I examine how the strength of public sector collective bargaining laws affects the
expenditure decisions of the recipient governments. Theories of public sector unions conjecture
that union leaders seek to maximize an objective function in which wages and employment
are positive inputs. These theories suggest that bargaining in cities in states with pro-union
bargaining laws may lead to different uses of transfers than in cities in states with no such
laws. I find that the cities with strong collective bargaining laws convert more of the transfers
into increased wages than those with no bargaining laws, and, furthermore, that those with no
bargaining laws instead spent a significant amount of funds on new or retained employment.
Lastly, I study one way in which the two types of spending by bargaining and no-bargaining
cities may have different effects on the private economy. Starting with Wynne (1992), a distinc-
tion in the theoretical and empirical literature has been made between the stimulative effects
4As summarized by Gramlich (1977) and Hines and Thaler (1995), the empirical literature in the latter half
of the century had shown the existence of a strong flypaper effect. Explanations of the flypaper effect range
from discussions of a mis-specified model of citizen behavior (see Filimon, Romer and Rosenthal (1982) or Hines
and Thaler (1995)) to a repeated game element in the grant process (Chernick (1979)). Inman (2008) provides
a comprehensive discussion of other possible explanations. More recent empirical studies have shown more
ambiguous results; the flypaper effect seems to at least crucially depend on factors such as the type of democracy
(Lutz (2006)) and the strength of collective interest groups (Singhal (2008)). Furthermore, Knight (2002) argued
that the possible endogeneity of grant assignment due to differential preferences for government spending may
have led to econometric issues in previous studies, and finds a negligible flypaper effect in transportation grants
to state governments when appropriately accounting for legislative bargaining power.
5 fBecause the general revenue sharing program did include some minor price effects, they were not pure lump
sum transfers and thus do not directly address the traditional flypaper effect. Details of the general revenue
sharing program and how they relate to the flypaper effect will be discussed in Sections 2 and 6.2.
16
on the private economy of government consumption of private goods and government com-
pensation of employees. 6 A similar distinction can be made between government spending on
increased government wages and increased government employment, due to differential marginal
propensities to consume between the two types of recipient employees. Because the strength
of collective bargaining laws determines the type of government spending produced, I use this
institutional friction to explore the hypothesis that the multipliers on spending on increased
wages and on spending on new employment would be different. I find suggestive, though weak,
evidence that the multiplier on increased government employment is larger than the multi-
plier on increased government wages for existing employees. These results are presented as
motivation for future research.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 discusses the program details of the general
revenue sharing transfers, Section 3 reviews the background and literature of public sector
unions, Section 4 introduces the empirical strategy, Section 5 explains the data that are used,
and Section 6 discusses the main results. Section 7 introduces the macroeconomic hypothesis
and empirical analysis. Finally, Section 8 concludes.
1.2 General Revenue Sharing
The policy debates surrounding the growing roles of local governments in the late 1960s and
early 1970s ultimately led to the passage of the State and Local Fiscal Assistance Act in October
of 1972. This act put in place the largest general revenue sharing scheme in the history of the
United States. With this policy, the federal government initially committed to transferring over
30 billion dollars to more than 35,000 general purpose governments-state, county, city, town,
and township governments-over a period of 4 years. In 1976, the act was extended for another
period of 4 years for state and local governments, and then extended for only local governments
from 1980 to 1983 and again from 1983 to 1986 when it finally expired. By the end of the act,
over 83 billion dollars (almost 300 billion in 2009 dollars) had been transferred to state and local
governments. The motivations for the act were both philosophical and practical; the official
goal was to have decisions about government spending "closer to the people", while the act
6 See Finn (1998), Pappa (2009), and Ramey (2011).
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simultaneously served the purpose of providing support to local governments at a time in which
many budgets were strained. Although some evidence implies that the Nixon administration
had the intention of using the general revenue sharing funds to replace various federal categorical
grant programs to local governments, in practice, it acted as a supplement to the programs that
already existed. 7 The most binding requirement surrounding the use of the funds was that
they were not to be used for operational education expenses; no general revenue sharing funds
were transferred to school districts. Otherwise, the governments had almost complete freedom
to use the funds as they desired.8 The governments did have to fill out a "statement of use" in
which they described how they used the funds.9 Furthermore, after the first extension of the
funds, the local governments were required to hold public hearings in which the potential uses
of the funds were discussed.
Table 1 shows the size of the program throughout the 14 years of its existence. At the
peak of the program's impact, in 1974, general revenue sharing (GRS) made up about 15% of
total federal intergovernmental transfers to state and local governments, and composed almost
3% of state government budgets and over 3.5% of local government budgets. As Table 1
shows clearly, the size of the program in real dollars decreased substantially over its tenure
due to relatively high inflation in the 1970s and the 1980s combined with stagnant nominal
amounts. By 1984, the program only amounted to 0.12 percent of GDP and less than 2
percent of local government budgets. Despite the ramp-down, the general revenue sharing
program had a substantial effect on the revenues of the 837 cities in my sample. Figure 1 plots
7 In fact, the Nixon administration promised that the general revenue sharing program would be an "add-on"
to existing programs in order to get the support for the passage of the act (Dommel, 1974). However, after the
act was passed and Nixon was re-elected in 1972, the administration began to push for the elimination of many
block grant programs, claiming that the general revenue sharing funds would make up for the reduced transfers.
The Watergate scandal ultimately interfered with the implementation of this policy push, and the grant programs
remained largely unscathed, reinforcing the "add-on" nature of the general revenue sharing program (Markusen
et al, 1981).
8Specifically, the "priority" categories on which the funds could be spent were: all "ordinary and necessary"
capital expenditures, and "ordinary and necessary" maintenance and operating expenses for public safety, en-
vironmental protection (including sewerage and sanitation), public transportation, health, recreation, libraries,
social services for the poor or aged, and financial administration (Joint Committee on Internal Revenue Taxation,
1973). In practice, the only major binding requirement was that the funds were not to be used for education
operating expenses.
9 The specific requirements were the the funds had to be appropriated within 24 months of the entitlement
period. Local governments had to fill out planned use and actual use reports and make them available to the
public. The planned use reports were to be filled out within each entitlement period while the actual use reports
were to be filled out within 60 days of June 30th of each year.
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both the total federal intergovernmental funds as well as the total general revenue sharing funds
received by the city governments. The figure demonstrates that the movements in total federal
intergovernmental transfers appeared to reflect the jump in general revenue sharing funds in
the early-1970s as well as the ramp-down in the early- to mid- 1980s.
1.2.1 GRS Allocations
As with any large federal program, there was a significant amount of negotiation involved with
the allocation of the general revenue sharing funds. The compromise finally reached between
the members of the Congress led to rich variation in the amount that local governments received.
One of the key features of the allocation formula is that the funds were allocated with a method
of "geographic tiering"; first the funds were allocated to state areas using a federally-mandated
formula; then, after removing a portion for state governments, the funds were apportioned to
county areas using a federally-mandated formula; then, again after removing funds for county
governments and Native American tribes they were divided amongst city, town, and township
general purpose governments using the same federally-mandated formula. The diagram below
demonstrates this allocation process.
1/3 to State Governments
(until 1980)
State Area Allocations Native American tribes
(Best of 2 formulas) (population)
2/3 to County Areas (3- County governments
factorformula & min/max (adjusted taxes)
requirements)
Non-county government Local non-county
portion (adjusted taxes) governments (3-factorformula)
This "geographic tiering" led to a wide dispersion of general revenue sharing funds across
cities that were similar, but that were housed in counties and states with different characteristics.
The formulas are described in detail in the next three subsections.
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Allocations to States The funds were first allocated to the state areas using one of two
formulas. The first, called the three-factor formula-or the Senate formula-allocated money to
states in proportion to a factor, F:
F, = *opi Taxi PerCapitaIncomeus
PersonalIncomej PerCapitaIncomei
The first term of this factor was geared towards equalizing the per capita funds transferred
to states. The second component was to address the concern that states may lower taxes in
response to the increased federal funds; to try to reduce the incentives to do this, high taxation
rates were rewarded. Finally, the third term transferred more funds to states that had lower
per capita income. Under this allocation formula, each state i was awarded, Sl:
SF G * (1.2)E Fk
States
where G was the total amount of general revenue sharing funds available for distribution.
In the second, five-factor (House) formula, the allocation was divided into five parts which
were each distributed using a different formula as shown in the table below:
Under this formula, the total GRS allocation was divided into parts and then distributed
according to the factors discussed in the table above. Each state was awarded S?:
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Fraction of Funds Factor used for Allocation
0.25 Popi
0.25 UrbanPopi
025 P * (PerCapitaIncomeus)
.2 opi PerCapitaIncomei
0.125 IncomeTaxi
0.125 Taxi * ( Taxi )
"Personae Incomei
0.25* POPFP+
States
0.25 * UrbanPopi +0 UrbanPopk
Popi
0.5 PerCapitaIncomei
S2 = - * 0.25 * _ p__i -± (1.3)E escapit a~ncomek
IncomeTaxi0.125 * ZIncomeTaxk
Tax
2
0.125 * PerCapitalncome
k
PerCapitaIncomek 
.
The final allocation was reached by first calculating the distribution of funds, Si and Si,
for all of the states under each of the three-factor and the five-factor formulas, and then taking
the larger of the two amounts for each state. These final amounts were then proportionately
adjusted so that the total amount summed to the total GRS funds available. The final allocation
for each state area was then:
F max(S , S?)S.=G * maX(S, 2) (1.4)
Zmax(S,Sj)
Ultimately, 31 states received their revenue-sharing allotment based on the three-factor formula
and 19 states and DC received their revenue-sharing allotment based on the five-factor formula.
Figure 2 shows the distribution of the 1977 state area allocations.
Allocations to local governments Of the amount allocated to states, one-third was desig-
nated for the state government and two-thirds was designated for the local governments within
the states. The path for the funds to reach local governments went first through county area
allocations. The funds were allocated to counties using the three-factor formula from above so
that each county, c, in a state, s, received funds proportional to:
NonSchoolTaxe PerCapitalncomes
PersonalIncomec PerCapitaIncomee
where NonSchoolTaxc are the total taxes raised in local governments in the county less the
taxes dedicated for educational expenses." After a population-based amount was removed for
"The details of the legislation actually gave states some freedom to change the formula with which the state
area allocations were divided amongst local governments. However, none of the state governments chose to take
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Native American tribes within the county, the county area allocation was then divided into three
parts designating funds for the county government, the city and town governments, and the
township governments based on their relative non-school tax collection. Finally, the city and
town governments and the township governments within a county each split their group's total
allocation amongst the individual governments according to proportions once again determined
by the three-factor formula. The final allocation formula to a city, i, in county, c, and state,
s, was:
F 2 (1a Taxk Pop?*(TaxGRSics= SS-p * j * PoTx(Tax-] (1.6)
Znc Pgo* 1 ~ In
.countieses vtsEc .citiesec .
where SF is the state-area allocation."
Minimum and Maximum Requirements Minimum and maximum requirements further
distorted the funds received by local governments. There were three main limits. The first
requirement was that no local government was allowed to receive a grant that constituted
more than 50 percent of its total nonschool taxes and intergovernmental transfers. When the
amount allocated to a city or town exceeded this limit, the excess amount was reallocated to
the corresponding county government. When the amount allocated to the county government
exceeded this amount, the funds went back to the state government. Because of this restriction,
more than 10 state governments received more than one-third of their state's allocation, with
West Virginia, Kentucky, and Delaware receiving substantially more than the one-third initially
allocated (45%, 41%, and 40% respectively).
The second limit was that no county area or local government was permitted to receive more
than 145 percent of the state per capita amount, and the third limit was that no county area
or local government was permitted to receive less than 20% of the state per capita amount. At
the county area level, those funds that were in excess of the 145 percent limit were distributed
up this option and the federal formula was used in all cases.
S1 The allocation amount would be slightly less than implied by the formula in Equation (6) for cities in counties
that included a Native American population.
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to the non-binding county areas proportionate to the three-factor formula. Similarly, funds
were reduced proportionately in non-binding county areas to meet the 20 percent limit for those
areas that needed extra funds. Similar adjustments occurred for those local governments that
were constrained at the 20 percent or the 145 percent limits.
To be clear, I will map out the steps in which city governments were received funds from their
county-wide allocations. Suppose that a county area received GRSoc through the allocation
process. A city government, i, within the county would initially receive12 :
* ( NonSchoolTaxi PerCapitalncome
GRSo - PersonalIncome1969 )* (PerCapitaIncomec
0 P( NonSchoolTax- Per CapitaIncome
cities P Personallncomel969j "* PerCapitaIncomec
E NonSchoolTaxk
*GRSc*( Cities ) (1.7)Z NonSchoolTaxj
GovernmentsInCounty
The first additional requirement was that the city government did not receive more than fifty
percent of its total nonschool taxes and intergovernmental transfers. Thus, in the second step
of the allocation, the city government received GRSis:
GRS11 = min (GRSoi, 0.5 * (NonSchoolTaxi + IGRi)) (1.8)
Any excess amounts generated in this step, GRSi - GRS1i, were assigned to the county gov-
ernments within the county. The second and third limits were then applied such that:
S_____RS, 1 G RS5Q 19GRS2i = min max GRSi, 0.2 * ( ), 1.45 * ( ) (1.9)Pops POPS
Any excess amounts generated in this step, GRS1i - GRS 2i, were added to the initial county-
wide allocation, GRSc, and any shortage of funds generated, GRS 2i - GRSi were subtracted
from GRSc. At this point, the steps represented in Equations (7) - (9) would be repeated again
until all binding requirements were met.13 Note that, due to the iteration of these steps, the
2 1f there were Native American Tribes in the county, a portion of GRSc would be removed before the allocation
in Equation (6).
13 If, at any step, the amount allocated to the county government exceeded 50 percent of the sum of its nonschool
taxes and intergovernmental transfers, the excess would be allocated to the state government.
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maximum and minimum requirements ended up affecting the allocations of governments that
were not at the limits of the requirements. In the first year of the GRS program, 6.6 percent of
the GRS funds were redistributed through limits and only 74 out of the 38,000 recipients had
allocations which were unaffected by the limit requirements.
1.2.2 Variation in GRS receipts
Any examination of the GRS aggregates will mask the significant variation in the per capita
funds received by local governments due to the geographic tiering and other nuances of the
allocation process. The variation is especially large at the city level, which is the unit of
observation in this paper. To give a sense of the variation, in Figure 3, I plot a histogram of
the de-meaned per capita general revenue sharing transfers in 1977. Although the variation in
Figures 3 is useful to observe, the variation that I will use in future regressions is the residual
left once I control for smooth functions of all of the variables that appear in the allocation
formulas in Equations (1) - (9). Figure 4 shows the residuals from a regression of per capita
general revenue sharing receipts on cubic polynomials of all of the allocation variables in 1977.14
Due to the geographic tiering and the non-linearity of the allocation formulas, this figure shows
that substantial cross-sectional variation in the general revenue sharing funds remain even after
controlling for flexible functions of the allocation variables.
1.3 The Study of Public Sector Unions
In this section, I review the theoretical and empirical underpinnings of the public sector union
literature in order to set the framework for the empirical analysis.
Background
The policy push for public sector collective bargaining significantly lagged that of the private
sector. The landmark laws supporting the right to unionize, strike, and collectively bargain
in the private sector, i.e. the National Labor Relations act in 1935 and the Taft-Hartley Act
in 1947, specifically left out public sector workers. It was not until the late 1950s that public
4 The detailed list of controls will be discussed in Section 5.7.
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sector labor gained some legislative traction. In 1959, Wisconsin was the first state to pass
a "1strong" collective bargaining law requiring that public sector employers collectively bargain
with their employees. Around the same time, Massachusetts, Arkansas, and Idaho also passed
laws acknowledging the public sector labor in their states. These laws paved the way for the
passage of a series of state laws enabling or requiring collective bargaining on the part of state
and local governments. The laws covered topics such as the allowed focus of the bargaining (i.e.
wages, benefits, firing practices), who the laws would cover (police, fire, teachers, and other),
whether strikes were allowed, and whether union dues could be automatically subtracted from
employee payrolls. By 1977, 35 states had passed a public sector collective bargaining law, 6
of which explicitly required bargaining and 18 of which implicitly required bargaining.
The laws passed in the 1960s and the 1970s led to a strengthening of public sector unions
at the same time that private sector unions declined in importance. Figure 5 plots the number
of workers and the percent of workers covered by private and public sector unions from 1977 to
2010. The percent of public sector workers covered by unions has remained roughly constant
at 40 percent for the period shown. On the other hand, the percent of private sector workers
covered by unions declined precipitously from over 23 percent in 1977 to less than 8 percent in
2010. The number of public sector workers covered by unions exceeded the number of private
sector workers for the first time in 2009.
The strong bargaining legislation required that public employers bargain in "good faith".
If there was a concern that the employers did not abide by the "good faith" doctrine, organized
labor could take them to court after which a judge usually ruled with binding arbitration. In
practice, this gave labor a significant amount of power; the laws certainly appeared to have bite.
In Section 4.1, I will discuss the evidence that the laws had a causal effect on unionization.
Private versus Public Unions
Private sector unions have gained more research attention than public sector unions. The
bargaining table consists of the employer and the labor representation. The scope of the bar-
gaining may include wages (and benefits), and employment. The objective functions of the
employer are clear; he wants to choose employment and wages to maximize profit. Outside
competition and consumer demand determines the choice of price (and employment, if not in
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the scope of bargaining) given profit maximization. Although there is debate surrounding the
objectives of the labor representation, a simplified assumption is that the union has a well-
defined utility function over wages and employment, increasing in both (Dunlop (1944), Farber
(1986)).15 Market discipline plays a large role in the negotiations; because negative profits lead
to financial distress and ultimate firm shut-down, the existence of product competition leads to
a necessary link between productivity and wage growth.
Although in some ways public sector bargaining mirrors that of the private sector, there
are distinct differences. First, the politicians and bureaucrats who participate in the collective
bargaining are no longer concerned about profits. Instead, they worry about the prospects of re-
election and the perceived welfare of the citizens they represent, both of which can be influenced
by public sector unions. By voting in high numbers and staffing campaigns, public sector
unions can significantly impact local elections (Bennet and Orzechowski, 1983). Furthermore,
public sector unions can actually shift out the demand for public goods by forming special
interest groups to advertise their services (Freeman (1986), Marlow and Orzechowski, 1996)).
Second, the objective functions of public sector unions may include more than just wages and
employment; in particular, because public sector employees have influence over the provision
of public goods, they may also include the welfare of citizens in their utility function. For
example, one reason that public sector unions may lobby for more public funds is that they
have an in-depth understanding of how to supply services in the most effective way (Zax and
Ichniowski, 1988).
Finally, the public sector is guided by political discipline rather than the market discipline
of the private sector (Gregory and Borland, 1999). At times in which there are large gaps
between wages and productivity, public employers are able to resort to a "tax push" to fund
the difference; a luxury that private employers do not have. A negative revenue shock in the
private sector will either lead to a firm shut-down or a concession by labor to reduce wages
or employment. In contrast, a negative revenue shock to a government could be financed by
1 5This is a simplification of a very large literature. Starting with Ross (1948), there has been debate over the
value of assigning a well-defined utility function to the labor representation. In particular, political motivations
of union leadership and heterogeneous membership make the objectives difficult to summarize. Ashenfelter and
Johnson (1969) propose an alternative bargaining model in which there are three parties: the firm management,
the union leadership, and the union "rank and file". In this spirit, many recent papers stress the political
motivation of the union leadership in their models of union behavior.
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increased taxes or debt rather than concessions by labor. Reder (1975) theorized that the
tumultuous economic times of the 1970s led to a decrease in the employment and power of
private sector unions, initiating their decline. On the other hand, public sector unions, which
are less vulnerable to negative revenue shocks, retained and even gained power over the same
time period.
Employment versus Wages
As mentioned above, the objective function of unions is often considered to be a function of
wages and employment, and increasing in both. The intuition of why wages are in the utility
function is clear; we generally think that an increase in income, given the same amount of
work, yields in increase in utility. However, the idea that the union leadership (at the bar-
gaining table) would also value higher levels of employment is less obvious. The theories that
advocate for having employment in the utility function mostly rely on the idea that higher
levels of employment increase the negotiating power of the public sector union members. In
addition, some economists have argued that public sector unions put greater weight on employ-
ment than private sector unions because numbers boost the political power of the union itself
(Courant, Gramlich, and Rubinfeld (1979), Freeman (1986)). On the other hand, advocates of
the "insider-outsider" theory conjecture that the current members care only about their own
wages and job security without any direct desire to increase employment (Blanchard and Sum-
mers, 1986). The key feature of the utility functions in the insider-outsider literature is their
dependence on the wages of the current members rather than the employment of possible future
members. 16
Empirical Findings
Most studies of the effect of public sector unions on wages find a positive effect on the
wages of unionized workers. In a comprehensive summary of the literature through 1986,
Lewis (1990) reported that the union-nonunion public sector wage gap was in the range of 8 to
" By limiting the discussion of the objective function to only employment or wages, I am skimming over other
variables that have been included in the utility functions of unions. For instance, in the utility function posited
by Blanchard, Summers (1986), the union members valued wages and the probability of retaining their job in
the next period.
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12 percent. He also reported that the wage gap tended to be negatively correlated with the
level of government; local government employees experienced larger gaps than federal employees.
Zax and Ichniowski (1988) find a significant union-nonunion wage gap as well as finding that
high levels of unionization lead to increased government expenditures. More recently, using the
passage of the state-level bargaining laws as exogenous events, Hoxby (1996) finds a positive
effect of teacher unionization on teacher salaries and Frandsen (2011) finds a positive effect of
collective bargaining laws on the wages of police and firefighters, although a negligible effect on
teachers.
The results on the effect of unionization of public sector workers on employment have been
more mixed. While Zax and Ichniowski (1988) found a significant effect of unionization on
employment supporting the view that public sector unions push out the labor demand curve
for public services, others have found that omitted variables may have biased naive regressions
of employment on unionization. Trejo (1991) argued that economies of scale led to more
union formation in larger municipalities, leading to a natural correlation between unionization
and employment that could be deceptively interpreted causally. Valletta (1993) argued that
unions may be less likely to form in municipalities with high levels of volunteerism (for example,
in the fire departments) or privatization; since these municipalities tend to have lower public
employment, this phenomenon would also lead to a deceptive correlation between the union
level and employment. Ultimately, the question of whether public sector unions are able to
push out the public's demand for public services so as to increase both wages and employment
simultaneously remains unresolved.
Public Sector Unions and Intergovernmental Transfers
This paper examines the role of public sector unions in determining how intergovernmental
transfers are spent. To my knowledge, there have been no previous papers that deal with this
particular question. In a related topic, Allen (1988) addresses the question of how public sector
unions affect employment in the presence of negative revenue shocks. He finds that, contrasting
with the dynamics in the private sector, union workers in the public sector face lower rates of
unemployment than nonunion workers. He theorizes that this occurs because of the union's
ability to use their power to prevent budget cuts, while in the private sector, where cuts cannot
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be avoided, union contracts tend to protect the wages of the most senior workers at the expense
of the new hires. Using this logic, when budget cuts cannot be avoided in the public sector in
extreme times, it would be expected that the public sector layoffs would look similar to those
of the private sector as long as the layoff policies in the contracts were similar.
My research, however, has to do with the union's effect on employment in the presence of
positive transfers. If unions were aware of the general revenue sharing transfers during their
collective bargaining processes-which is likely, as this was a highly publicized policy-one may
expect that the use of the marginal dollars would be included in their bargaining. The theory
above gives reason to think that the transfers may be "captured" by the unions in increased
wages or increased employment or both.
1.4 Empirical Strategy
I estimate how cities respond to intergovernmental transfers, and how the strength of public
sector collective bargaining affects that response. The main estimation equation is:
Eit = 00 + # 1 IGRit + #21GRjt * Uit + # 3URt + Xitr + A + Wt ± &s (1.10)
where Eit is a per capita government finance component in government i and year t, IGRit
are the per capita intergovernmental transfers, Uit is an indicator for the strength of collective
bargaining laws, Ai are city fixed effects, and wt are time fixed effects. Xit is a set of control
variables including cubic polynomials of population, lagged per capita tax revenue, lagged tax
effort, lagged own-source revenue, lagged per capita county income, lagged state-level total
taxes, lagged state per capita income, and lagged state government individual income taxes.
Although I show the results for a number of finance components, the outcome variables that I
particularly focus on are total real expenditures, public employee real wages, and the number
of public employees. The effect of the transfers on total expenditures will demonstrate whether
governments spend the funds transferred to them (i.e. the expenditure effect), while the latter
two outcome variables will speak to the quality of the public spending. Later in the paper, I
discuss how the quality of public spending might impact the stimulative effectiveness of transfers
to city governments, particularly during recessions.
29
An issue with the estimation of Equation (10) is that the federal and state governments
target some of their funds to cities or areas that are in particular need. This could bias 1
and #2 either downward or upward if there is a systematic difference in how city governments
"in need" and other cities respond to the transfers. For example, if funds are transferred to
cities with high unemployment, reversion to the mean may mistakenly attribute an improve-
ment in economic conditions (and thus an increase in government expenditures) to the transfers
received. On the other hand, if funds are transferred to cities that are beginning to experi-
ence budgetary problems, the continuation of the negative trend (leading to a contraction in
government expenditure) may be wrongly attributed to the transfers, biasing the 3 coefficient
downwards.
1.4.1 A 2SLS Approach
To address the problem of potential bias, I use the general revenue sharing transfers as an
instrument for total intergovernmental transfers. In particular, I have two instruments, GRSit,
per capita general revenue sharing receipts, and GRSit * Uit, per capita general revenue sharing
receipts interacted with the indicator for bargaining strength, for the two endogenous variables,
IGRit and IGRit * Uit. Because I control for the cubic polynomials of all of the GRS-correlated
variables, my instruments are essentially the GRSit and the GRSit * Uit after conditioning for
these variables. I estimate using 2SLS estimation, in which the second stage is represented by
Equation (10), and the two first-stage regressions are:
IGRi = + G + ,OAGS t Pi UIt + XitaA + A + [A + vA (1.11)
IGRit * Uit= + 4jGRSit + 42GRSit * Uit+ 3 X + i (1.12)
The exclusion restriction of the IV estimation is that GRSit and GRSit * Uit are independent
of the error term in Equation (10). As described above, the nonlinearities in the general revenue
sharing formula ensured that similar cities received different amounts of funds. However, the
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three-factor and five-factor formulas imply that the GRS transfers were correlated to per capita
income, non-school "tax effort", and population of the city governments, as well as the higher-
level variables used for the allocation to their encompassing counties and states. Assuming that
the expenditures are independent of all of these variables would be implausible; in particular,
the city-level tax effort, taxes and population as well as the county-level per capita income seem
likely to have an effect on city government expenditure decisions in perhaps a nonlinear way.17
To satisfy the exclusion restriction given my assumptions, I include a flexible cubic polynomial
of the lags of each of the variables that are used in the general revenue sharing calculation. 18
Details on the sources of the controls are described in the next section.
Given the independence of GRSie, I argue that GRSit * Uit is also independent of the error
term in Equation (10). Since most of the law changes to Uit occurred before the estimation
time period, the city fixed effects will largely pick up the city characteristics that may have
been correlated to Uit. However, there is a concern that the controls included to ensure the
independence of the GRSit, i.e. the city-level tax effort, taxes, and population, and county
income, may affect "no-bargaining" cities in a different way than "bargaining" cities. To
account for this possibility, I also interact each control with the bargaining indicator, Uit, in
my preferred specification.
Finally, for those cities that were parts of states that instituted bargaining laws within the
sample studied, there is the concern that factors present within the cities (and reflected in city
government finance decisions) affected the timing of the passage of the laws. If this were the
case, than it is possible that Uit is correlated with Eit in Equation (10). As is shown in Figure 7,
8 states passed laws during the period studied, changing their value of Uit. Extensive research
on the collective bargaining laws carried out in the late 1980s found that, given that the change
was ultimately going to occur, the timing of the law passages were largely exogenous, having
more to do with the superficial political environment of the state legislature than the political
or public will towards collective bargaining. Ohio is a good example of this; although Ohio
1 7Because the city-level per capita personal income is only released every 10 years, the (annual) county-level
per capita income is the variable in the GRS formula that best proxies fluctuations in local-area personal income.
18The general revenue sharing allocations were updated quarterly with the most current data available. In
practice, this meant that the data used in the GRS formula were lagged at least 2 to 4 quarters. To best
approximate this lag with annual variables, I include all controls with a one-year lag. Furthermore, I do not
include county-level controls or the state-level urban population, since these variables were not updated on an
annual basis.
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had some of the strongest private sector unions in the country, they were one of the last states
to pass a public sector bargaining law in 1985. Although the will of labor and the public had
been behind the law for many years, haggling over the details of the law lead to a long delay.
Saltzman (1988) documents this delay, and also argues convincingly that the passage of the
law in Ohio had a significant effect on the strength of its public sector unions. Freeman and
Valletta (1988) also provide evidence that the state laws were a major factor in determining
whether public sector employees were covered by collective bargaining contracts. Given this
research surrounding the timing of the laws, it may be reasonable to assume that the city fixed
effects will pick up any political or public will toward collective bargaining so that the timing
of the law change and Uit, and GRSit * Uit, remain independent of the error term.
1.4.2 Further Assumptions
To ensure the validity of the empirical strategy outlined above, I must make two more as-
sumptions. First, I assume that the dependent varible in Equation (10) depends only on
contemporaneous general revenue sharing funds, and not on lagged or future general revenue
sharing funds. Since GRSit can affect future values of itself through macroeconomic effects
on it or any of the other correlates, changes to GRSit may be correlated over time. By only
including the contemporaneous change, I introduce an omitted variables problem if the true
relationship actually consisted of the dependent variables depending on future or past values of
GRSit. I test this by including past and future values of GRSit in the estimation equation. I
find that the results are little changed, although the standard errors increase.
Second, I assume that the coefficients on GRS-correlated cubic controls are constant over
time. This would not be true, for example, if different governors or mayors weigh personal
income differently when determining budgeting policies. If the coefficients are not constant over
time, the cubic controls as described in Section 4.1 would not appropriately account for that
portion of the general revenue sharing variation that was due to fluctuations in its correlates.
To deal with this possibility, in a robustness check, I interacted all of the controls with year
dummies and include them in the main specification. I find that the direction of the main
results are little changed. In my preferred specification, however, I do not include the control-
time interactions.
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Further robustness measures are reported in Section 6.
1.5 Data
In this section, I describe the sample used for the analysis, the data sources, and the summary
statistics. In the appendix, I include an additional explanation of the adjustment I make to
account for the variation in the fiscal years covered by the Annual Survey of Governments.
1.5.1 The Sample
State and local governments are often under-emphasized in analyses of the government spending
in the United States. In the 2000s, federal nondefense consumption and investment made up
only about 2 percent of GDP in comparison to that of state governments which made up 4
percent of GDP and that of local governments which comprised 8 percent of GDP. 19 Federal
defense spending is more volatile, making up more than 10 percent of GDP in the 1960s and
less than 4 percent of GDP at its trough in 2000. Figure 6 shows this breakdown of government
spending and highlights the particular importance of local governments to GDP.
Despite its limited direct effect on GDP, federal policy does play a significant role in the
path of government consumption and investment through its control over intergovernmental
grants to state and local governments as well as regulation of their activities. In this paper, I
focus on the effect of intergovernmental grants to large city governments over the period 1971
to 1989. This time period comes at the tail end of a fifteen-year period of rapid growth in
local governments; as seen in Figure 6, the local government contribution to GDP grew from
5.9 percent in 1959 to 8.2 percent by 1974 after which it roughly leveled off. I specifically focus
on city governments that had a population of 25,000 or greater in 1972. Collectively, these 837
city governments accounted for roughly 30 percent of all local government expenditure. 2 0
1 9 Each of these estimates came from averaging over the years 2000-2007, which are the seven most recent
years in which the government GDP data were broken up between state and local governments. During the
same time period, federal defense consumption and investment made up 4.4 percent of GDP. All components of
government together made up 18.6 percent of GDP.
2 0 In 1972, the number of governments (with the percent of the local government expenditure that they made
up in parentheses) was: 3044 county governments (20%), 18,517 city and town governments (36%), 16,991
township governments (3%), 23,885 special district governments (7%), and 15,779 school districts (33%).
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City governments provide a broad range of services including police and fire protection,
highway construction, sewerage, solid waste management, and utility provision. Their revenues
come mainly from a combination of property taxes, intergovernmental revenues, charges and
fees, and utility payments. Table 2 shows the breakdown of expenditures and revenues for the
837 cities studied in this paper.
It is worth noting that although education expenditures made up 13 percent of the total
expenditures of all of the cities in the sample (see Column (2) of Table 2), less than half of the
cities have a positive amount of education expenditures (Column (3) of Table 2). In fact, only
131 of the city governments in the sample are responsible for the K-12 school systems within
their city. In the other 706 cities, school districts with separate revenue streams are responsible
for funding and organizing K-12 education. When including school districts in the universe
of all city, town, and township governments, education made up more than 50 percent of total
expenditures in 1977.
1.5.2 The Annual Survey of Governments
Since many of the variables used in the estimation are directly from the Annual Survey of
Governments (ASG) produced by the Bureau of the Census, it is worth mentioning a few facts
about this survey. In years ending in -2 and -5, the Census conducts a complete survey of
all state, county, city, town, and township governments and school districts. In the inter-
mediate years, they only survey a random sample in which local governments are assigned a
probability depending on the area population and other characteristics. Because most large
cities are included in the yearly sample with 100% probability, most of the cities in my sam-
ple are represented in every year from 1971-1989.21 The exact variables used from the survey
will be described in the sections below. All of the finance variables used from the ASG are
deflated using the state and local GDP deflator (from the Bureau of Economic Analysis) and
are normalized by the city population (from the ASG).
2
'The sample consists of 837 cities that had a population of greater than 25,000 in 1972. All of the cities
appear in the sample for the following years: 1972, 1974, 1975, 1976, 1977, 1978, and 1979. For the rest of the
years, the number of cities in the sample is shown in parentheses: 1971 (806), 1973 (805), 1980 (834), 1981 (835),
1982 (830), 1983 (830), 1984 (830), 1985 (829), 1986 (829), 1987 (830), 1988 (828), 1989 (803).
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1.5.3 Outcome Variables
The three outcome variables that I will focus on are total city government expenditures, nor-
malized employment, and normalized government employee annual wages. Total expenditures
come directly from the ASG and are deflated using the state and local GDP deflator and nor-
malized by the city population. To calculated normalized annual wages, the annual wages are
first computed by dividing deflated salaries and wages by total government employment. Mul-
tiplying this annual wage by the number of government employees in 1972 gives the normalized
wage. The normalized employment variable is arrived at in a similar manner, from multiplying
total government employment by the 1972 annual wage. The purpose of these normalizations
is to convert the employment and wage variables into expenditure statistics such that the #1
and #2 coefficients in Equation (10) can be used to answer the question: How much of each
dollar transferred to local governments goes towards employment, and how much goes toward
increased wages? I use these normalized variables for ease of interpretation; the message and
significance are unchanged when I use non-normalized employment and annual wages in the
estimations.
I show results for other outcome variables. Capital outlays, expenditures on employee
retirement programs, and own source revenues are taken directly from the ASG. Net new debt
issued is calculated by subtracting retired debt from new debt issues, the change in cash and
security holdings is calculated from subtracting the previous year's holdings from the current
year holdings, and the change in retirement fund cash and security holdings is also calculated
by subtracting a lag of total holdings from the holdings in the current year.
1.5.4 Union Variables
The variables used to represent the collective bargaining strength of the public sector come
from a dataset collected by Richard Freeman and Robert Valletta at the National Bureau of
Economic Research for the years 1959 to 1986, and then extended by Kim Rueben through
1996. In my preferred specification, I use an indicator variable that is equal to zero if the
city resides in a state in which there is no provision for public sector collective bargaining or
in which collective bargaining is explicitly prohibited. In the cities that reside in a state with
an indicator of one, it is either the case that there is a "weak" bargaining provision in which
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public sector labor has a right to present proposals or to meet and confer or the employer is
authorized but not required to bargain, or a "strong" bargaining provision in which the public
sector employers have an implied or explicit duty to bargain "in good faith". Figure 7 shows
the timing of the legislation passage for this indicator variable.
Figure 8 shows the geographic variation across states in the collective bargaining laws in
the year 1972. Expectedly, there appears to be a high correlation between the existence of
collective bargaining laws and the party preference of a state. In the robustness section, I will
show that controlling for the party of the state governor does not alter the estimated effects of
the collective bargaining indicator term.
The Freeman-Valletta dataset and the Rueben extension distinguish between bargaining
laws for state employees, municipal police, municipal fire fighters, noncollege teachers, and
other local employees. I use the "other local employees" category for the creation of the union
indicator variable. The correlation between the legislation for different employee groups is
high.2 2
In the robustness section, I explore the results with two different possible union variables.
First, I examine an indicator as to whether union dues are allowed to be subtracted directly
from the paychecks of government employees. Second, I create an indicator which represents
whether there exists legislation which specifically includes wages in the scope of bargaining.
1.5.5 Endogenous Variables
In all of the instrumental variable regressions, the two endogenous variables are per capita in-
tergovernmental transfers and per capita intergovernmental transfers interacted with the union
variable described above. 23 Intergovernmental transfers are from the ASG.
2 2 Over the time period 1970 to 1989, the correlation between the indicator representing a weak bargaining
provision for "other local employees" and each of the indicators for police employees and fire protection employees
is greater than 70 percent. The correlation with the bargaining provisions for noncollege teachers (which is less
relevant for the study of general revenue sharing) is 50 percent.
231 choose total intergovernmental transfers rather than just federal intergovernmental transfers because of a
correlation between general revenue sharing funds and state intergovernmental transfers. The source of this
correlation is described in Section 6.1.
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1.5.6 Instruments
The two instruments used are the general revenue transfers received by the city, and the general
revenue sharing funds interacted with the union variable. Because the ASG included a general
revenue sharing variable for the years in which the program was in place, I have the exact
amounts that the city governments received through the program (as reported in the Census
survey by the city governments).
1.5.7 Controls
In almost all regressions, I include city and year fixed effects. Because of this, any city
characteristics that are immutable over time cannot be included in the regressions as they are
collinear with the government fixed-effects. The baseline controls that I choose to use are those
that validate the instrument, as discussed in Section 4.1. The controls that I use are a flexible
cubic polynomial in each of the following variables: population, lagged per capita tax revenue,
lagged "tax effort" (non-school taxes divided by 1969 per capita personal income), lagged per
capita county income, lagged state-level total taxes, lagged state per capita income, and lagged
state government individual income taxes.24  Tax revenue is from the ASG, 1969 per capita
personal income is from the 1970 Dicennial Census, and county personal income is from the
Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) regional accounts. I also include a cubic polynomial of
lagged own source revenue as a baseline control variable. Although the GRS formula relied on
own source taxes, there is evidence that some of the local governments were able to count other
types of revenue (fees, for example) in the tax base when the formula was calculated. To fully
capture this, I include total own-source revenues as a control.
1.5.8 Summary Statistics
Table 3 shows the summary statistics for the variables used in the estimation equations for the
year 1977. On average, cities employeed over 2,000 workers and paid them almost 37,000 (2005)
dollars each, although the variation across cities for both of these statistics was substantial. The
2 4 For areas smaller than counties, per capita income is released every ten years as a part of the Decennial
Census. The measure of local per capita income used in the general revenue sharing formulas through 1982 was
therefore the 1969 per capita income published in the 1970 Decennial Census.
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average city population in my sample was about 100,000, again with considerable variation.
1.6 Results
In this section, I present the baseline results. I first show that the IV regressions have a strong
first-stage. I then examine the flypaper effect and find that the city governments increased
expenditures by one dollar for every dollar of intergovernmental transfers received. In the next
subsection, I explore what the city governments spent the funds on; in particular I examine the
employment/wage decision and find that the no-bargaining cities used a significant portion of
the transfers to fund new employment whereas the bargaining cities spent on increased wages
instead. Finally, I explore the robustness of the results.
1.6.1 First-Stage Regressions
Table 4 displays the first-stage regressions in specifications that do not yet include the indi-
cator for bargaining. The first three columns of Table 4 show OLS regressions of per capita
intergovernmental transfers against per capita general revenue sharing receipts, as well as a set
of controls including city fixed effects, year fixed effects, and state-time trends. In the first
column, I include the full set of baseline controls (without the interactions with the bargaining
indicator), in the second column, I exclude the quadratic and cubic polynomials of the alloca-
tion variables, and in the third column I do not weight by population. Columns (4) and (5)
split the effect on total intergovernmental transfers into the effect on federal intergovernmental
transfers in Column (4) and state intergovernmental transfers in Column (5).
The first-stage is strong. The coefficient of 1.5 in Column (1) implies that each dollar
of per capita general revenue sharing receipts to the city governments led to an increase in
per capita intergovernmental transfers of 1.5 dollars. There are two main reasons that the
coefficient exceeds one. First, as shown in Column (5), a large part of the excess is due to
a positive (albeit insignificant) correlation between the general revenue sharing transfers and
state intergovernmental transfers. Because the geographic tiering led to a high correlation
between the state government general revenue sharing funds and the local government general
revenue sharing funds, one would expect that the state intergovernmental transfers would be
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correlated with the city general revenue sharing receipts if the state governments "passed on" a
certain percentage of revenue that they received from the federal government. Furthermore, it is
possible that state governments piggy-backed on the general revenue sharing formula to disperse
some of their own intergovernmental transfers, which would also lead to a positive coefficient
in Column (5). The positive correlation between the state intergovernmental transfers and the
general revenue sharing funds is the primary reason that I chose the endogenous variable to be
total intergovernmental transfers rather than just federal intergovernmental transfers.
Second, a reason that the coefficient on federal intergovernmental transfers in Column (4)
slightly exceeds one is that a countercyclical revenue sharing program implemented from July 1,
1976 through September 30, 1978 was based on the general revenue sharing formula. Through
this program, a total of 3.1 billion dollars was distributed by the federal government to all
governments in areas that experienced unemployment rates greater than 4.5 percent. 25  In
the ASG 1978, 733 out of the 837 cities studied in this sample had an unemployment rate
of less than 4.5 percent, representing more than 90 percent of the total population in the
sample cities. Because the countercyclical revenue sharing funds were positively correlated to
the GRS allocations, it is expected that a regression of total intergovernmental transfers on
general revenue sharing funds would be greater than 1, albeit not substantially so; at its peak
in 1977, the countercyclical program made up roughly only one-quarter of the GRS transfers.
Although the size of the countercyclical revenue sharing program was too small to have a
significant macroeconomic impact-research at the time estimated only very small budgetary
responses (Gramlich, 1979 and General Accounting Office, 1977)-the structure could be used
as a starting point for future countercyclical revenue sharing designs.
Table 5 shows the first-stage results when the indicator for bargaining power is interacted
2 The funds were only made available if the national unemployment rate, lagged two quarters, was above 6
percent-a constraint that did not bind for the duration of the program. From July 1, 1976 through September
30, 1977, a baseline allocation of $125 million per quarter was made available for this program, with an additional
$62.5 million for each complete one-half percentage point that lagged national unemployment rate was over 6
percent. From July 1, 1977 through September 30, 1978, the baseline allocation continued to be $125 million
but with an addition $30 million per quarter for each one-tenth of a percentage point that the lagged national
unemployment rate was above 6 percent. The distribution of these funds were as follows: for each government
an index was created by mutliplying the amount that the unemployment rate exceeded 4.5 percent by the
government's general revenue sharing allocation. Governments that resided in areas with an unemployment rate
less than 4.5 percent were assigned an index of zero. The quarter's allocations were then distributed across
governments based on their index. For more details of the formulas see the U.S. Budget (1978), the U.S. Budget
(1979), and Government Accounting Office (1977).
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with the intergovernmental and general revenue sharing transfers, increasing both the number
of endogenous variables and the number of instruments to two. Column (1) shows the results
with the total intergovernmental transfers as the dependent variable, and Column (3) shows the
regression with the dependent variable as the interaction of total intergovernmental transfers
with the bargaining indicator variable. The first-stage for both endogenous variables remains
strong, with F-statistics above 45 for total intergovernmental transfers, and above 16 for the
interacted endogenous variable. For both endogenous variables, the coefficient on its corre-
sponding instrument is roughly 1.5 as in Table 4, Column (1), for the same reasons discussed
above.
1.6.2 The Expenditure Response
Table 6 shows the OLS and the IV results for total expenditures with five different specifications.
All regressions shown include city fixed effects, year fixed effects, fiscal year interacted with
year dummies, and are population weighted. Specification (1) does not include the union
variable, the union variable interaction with the endogenous variable, state-time trends, or
union interaction terms. Specification (2) adds in the state-time trend to the first specification.
Specification (3) includes the bargaining variable and the bargaining interaction term without
state-time trends or the controls interacted with the bargaining indicator variable, Specification
(4) adds in state-time trends, and finally Specification (5) adds in the bargaining interactions
with the baseline controls. The coefficients on the interaction terms in Specifications (3)-(5)
are measures of the difference between bargaining and no-bargaining cities. To be clear about
the interpretation, the coefficients in the OLS panel of Column (3) suggest that for every dollar
of intergovernmental revenues, governments in no-bargaining cities spent 97 cents (from the
coefficient on the IGR term), and governments in bargaining cities spent 62 cents (which is
achieved by adding the coefficient on IGR, 0.97, and the coefficient on IGR * Bargaining,
-0.35). The coefficient on the IGR * Bargaining term suggests that the difference between the
two city types in Specification (3) was significantly different from zero at the 1% level.
Examination of both panels in Specifications (3) through (5) show that the OLS coefficients
are quite similar to the IV coefficients for the no-bargaining cities. However, the coefficients for
the bargaining cities are higher in the IV regressions than in the OLS regressions, suggesting
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that there was a downward bias in the OLS results for bargaining cities. A downward bias is
unsurprising if the intergovernmental transfers were targeted toward struggling city governments
that were in the process of cutting expenditures. The difference between the OLS and the IV
results emphasize the need for instrumental variables in this analysis.
The IV coefficients in all of the specifications above are suggestive of a strong expenditure
response to the intergovernmental transfers. In the preferred Specification (5), the results imply
that for every one dollar of increased intergovernmental transfers, no-bargaining cities increased
their expenditures by 0.96 dollars and bargaining cities increased their expenditures by 0.88
dollars. The difference between the expenditure response in bargaining and no-bargaining
cities is not significant.
One concern with a policy of intergovernmental transfers during recessions is that the recip-
ient governments will use the funds to reduce debt or pad their balances rather than to increase
expenditures. Furthermore, although a legislated decrease in taxes might have a stimulative
effect, it is often argued that the multiplier is much lower than the multiplier attached to gov-
ernment spending. Thus, it is important to understand whether any of the transfers went
towards reduced taxes, reduced debt, or increased savings. To fully map the passage of each
dollar received by the city governments, I consider the identity describing the possible effect of
IGR on four broad government finance components: total expenditures, own-source revenues,
net debt issued, and savings. Equation (13) displays this identity.
IGR = Expenditure + Savings - (Own Re venue + NetDebtIssued) (1.13)
Table 7 maps the effects of a dollar of IGR on these components of government finance;
from the identity above, one would expect that the coefficients in the first row should sum to
one dollar, and that the coefficients in the second row should sum to zero. The first column
of Table 7 shows the effect of IGR on total expenditures, the second on own-source revenue,
the third on net debt issued, and the last column on the change in cash and security holdings,
an imperfect proxy for savings. Even given this imperfect proxy, the identity of Equation
(13) roughly holds. For non-bargaining cities, I find that an increase of one dollar per capita
intergovernmental transfers leads to an increase of 0.96 dollars in expenditures, an increase of
0.20 dollars in own source revenues, a decrease of 0.35 dollars in net debt issued, and no change
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in savings. For bargaining cities, I find that expenditures increase by 88 cents and that own
source revenues only increase by 10 cents for each dollar received of intergovernmental transfers.
Furthermore, there appears to be a negligible affect on debt issuance and a slightly positive,
but insignificant, effect on savings for bargaining cities.
Although the increase in own-source revenue is not significantly positive, it is meaningfully
non-negative; i.e. the results comfortably rule out any substantial decrease in taxes in response
to the intergovernmental transfers. In fact, it may be puzzling that the response of own-
source revenue appears to be positive, albeit with large standard errors. A positive response
of own-source revenue would be consistent with an upturn in the economy due to the increase
in government spending, a theory that I will touch upon later in the paper. It would also
be consistent with any legislated tax increases that occurred coincidentally with the general
revenue sharing transfers. For the moment, the most telling aspect of the result in Column (2)
is that I find no evidence that any of the transfers were used to alleviate taxes.
In summary, I find that throughout the 1970s and the 1980s, intergovernmental transfers
led to a one-for-one increase in city expenditures and did not lead to any decrease in own-source
revenues. Although these results agree with much of the earlier flypaper literature (see Hines
and Thaler, 1995), they are at odds with some of the more recent work on the flypaper effect
(see Lutz (2006) and Knight (2002)).
The setting in which an intergovernmental program is studied is crucial to the examination
of the expenditure responses of the local governments. For instance, Lutz (2006) found a
negligible expenditure response to a large grant increase to New Hampshire school districts in
1999, a time when the unemployment rate in New Hampshire was 2.8 percent. Certainly, the
effect of transfers on government expenditures should depend on the type of local government,
the geographic location in which the "experiment" occurred, and the state of the economy.
Because of this, any evaluation of a policy of intergovernmental transfers ought to rely on
analysis conducted over similar settings to the one in which the policy would be implemented.
The setting of the general revenue sharing program makes it particularly suitable for the
evaluation of a broad-based federal transfer stimulus policy. First, with federal transfers to all
general-purpose governments, the general revenue sharing program is the most comprehensive
transfer program in the history of the United States. Second, it was conducted at a time
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when state and local government budgets were suffering and over a period in which two large
recessions occurred. As Figures 9 and 10 show, the national and local unemployment rates
were relatively high throughout the entire duration of general revenue sharing; in fact, from
1972 to 1986 the national unemployment rate never fell below 5.7 percent, its average in the
post-war period.
There are other reasons that the expenditure effect may have been larger with the general
revenue sharing funds than with other transfer programs. The general revenue sharing amounts
did depend on the tax-effort of the recipient government. This measure was put in particularly
to mute the incentive for the local governments to use the transfers to reduce taxes. Although
analysis at the time did not find a relationship between the strength of these incentives and
legislated tax decreases, 26 the prospect that these incentives prevented tax offsets is worth ex-
ploring more. The fact that the general revenue sharing funds did have a price effect means
that the results in this section do not directly test the Bradford-Oates hypothesis that underlies
most flypaper discussions. Furthermore, the general revenue sharing program was highly pub-
licized and governments had to fill out statement of use forms. Starting in 1976, governments
also had to hold town meetings to discuss the spending of the funds. Although one might argue
that the public awareness should have led to a greater tax offset (under the Bradford-Oates
paradigm), another possibility is that the public awareness led to newly publicized programs
that would not have been funded otherwise.
1.6.3 Employment and Wage Responses
Table 8 shows the results for the key outcome variables of this paper. Columns (1) and (2) are
of particular interest. In bargaining cities, a one dollar increase of intergovernmental transfers
leads to a 0.77 dollar increase in wages of existing employees (the sum of 0.21 and 0.56), whereas
in non-bargaining cities there is only a 0.21 dollar increase in wages (and insignificant from zero).
On the other hand, in bargaining cities, only 0.12 dollars go towards increased employment,
while in non-bargaining cities, 0.41 dollars goes to increased employment. For both wage
and employment expenditures, the difference between the bargaining and the no-bargaining
amounts are significantly different from one another. There is mild evidence in Column (3)
2 6 Reischauer, 1975.
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that higher transfers lead to more capital outlays in no-bargaining cities. Column (4) shows
the effect on retiree expenditures and Column (5) shows the effect on the change in the cash
and securities of the retirement funds (a proxy for retirement fund contributions). Neither
of these two variables appears to be significantly affected by an increase in intergovernmental
transfers in either type of city.
To build a framework in which to think about these results, it is useful to consider a
taxpayer-imposed public sector labor demand curve. Taking the expenditure response as given
(as discussed in the above section), the demand curve for public employment is shifted out
when an intergovernmental transfer is received. Suppose that in cities in states with pro-union
laws, the unions have strong bargaining power and are able to choose their position on the labor
demand curve.2 7  The unions would choose the point on the demand curve that is tangent to
their indifference curve. The first plot in Figure 11 shows the point AU that the unions would
initially choose, and the point BU is the point that the unions would choose once the demand
curve had shifted out to D'. In the example shown in the figure, the change in wages would be
large, and the change in employment would be small. On the other hand, in the cities in states
without bargaining laws, the labor market supply can be thought of as following an elastic
labor supply curve; without the unions to impose employment, wage, and hiring restrictions,
the market for labor would be more competitive than in their bargaining counterparts. In
this case, one sees that a shift in the demand curve would yield a relatively large change in
employment and only a small increase in wages.
2 7 Note that if unions bargained over wages and employment, they may not end up on a wage-employment
point on the demand curve. The question of what unions bargain over is debated in the literature. I assume
that the unions bargain over only wages for illustrative reasons.
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The examples drawn in Figure 11 are illustrative of how the bargaining might lead to
a higher wage increase and a smaller employment increase than what would occur in cities
without bargaining.
These results shed light onto the role of actors in the public sector labor markets in affecting
the use of intergovernmental transfers. They also emphasize that the study of intergovernmen-
tal transfers should not be limited to the expenditure effect (i.e. whether the funds are spent),
but also to the type of spending induced by the transfers. If increased wages did not lead to
greater hours or higher productivity, the results would be suggestive that the quality of the
spending (i.e. the "bang for the buck") increased more in the cities that were not subject to
collective bargaining laws. However, with these data it is impossible to determine decisively
whether or how services were affected unequally in the two types of cities. Because the hours
of employees are not measured in these data (or in any available data at the city level over
that time period), I cannot test whether the increased wages in bargaining cities funded an
equivalent increase in hours to the rise in hours coming from the increased employment in the
no-bargaining cities. Furthermore, even if hours were not increased, higher wages may lead to
higher productivity or service provision. This is demonstrated in Mas (2006) which shows that
New Jersey police officers that won in wage arbitration exhibited higher workplace productivity.
Although these caveats make it impossible to determine which type of city increased services
more in response to the transfers, the results of this section strongly suggest that there is a
difference in the way in which the funds were used.
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Interactions with Unemployment Rate Table 9 shows the results when the intergov-
ernmental transfers are interacted with an indicator representing the state of the economy.
Specifically, the measure I use in the table below is whether the state unemployment rate is
more than 2 percentage points above the period average. Other measures of "bad economic
times" yield similar results. The first and second rows represent the response to IGR in no-
bargaining cities to "bad times" and "good times", respectively, while the third and the fourth
rows show the difference between the response in bargaining cities and no-bargaining cities in
"bad times" (Row 3) and "good times" (Row 4). Columns (1) and (3) show that the ex-
penditure and the wage responses do not appear to change substantially in either time frame.
However, the difference in the transfer-induced employment increase between bargaining and
no-bargaining cities appears to shrink during "good" times (when unemployment is less than
two percentage points above the period average). The standard errors in Column (4) are too
large to draw any firm conclusions about the effect on capital outlays.
The fact that the difference between the employment response in bargaining and the no-
bargaining cities shrinks in times when the unemployment rate is lower than average is par-
ticularly interesting. To explain why this might occur, I consider the theory in the public
sector union literature that public sector unions can use their political strength to shift out
the demand for public employment (Freeman (1986), Marlow and Orzechowski, 1996)), but I
assume that their ability to do so depends on the state of the economy. This could occur if
the union's political voice is drowned out by the many disgruntled voices of citizens at times
when the city government is losing revenues and cutting expenditures. In "good" times, when
the union succeeds in shifting out the demand curve (and for simplicity, I assume they achieve
this goal after the collective bargaining negotiations are carried out), city governments will see
a larger rise in employment than they would otherwise. This is pictured in Figure 12.
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1.6.4 Robustness
Table 10 explores the robustness of the total expenditure, normalized wage, and normalized
employment results. The first column shows the results of the preferred specification shown
in Table 5, Column (5) and Table 8, Columns (1) and (2). Columns (3) and (4) show the
results with the different measures of bargaining strength: Column (3) uses an indicator for
whether the bargaining laws (if they exist) specifically include wages in the scope of bargain-
ing, and Column (4) uses an indicator for whether union dues can be automatically deducted
from employee payrolls. The fourth column drops the five largest cities in 1972.28 Finally,
Column (5) shows the unweighted results. The expenditure results are robust to all of these
changes. The normalized wage and normalized employment results are fairly robust to chang-
ing the measure of bargaining strength, but are not robust to dropping the five largest cities or
running unweighted regressions. Together, the five most populous cities make up 20 percent
of the sample population in 1972; it is unsurprising that removing them could have substantial
effects on the coefficient estimates or that these would move the results in the direction of the
unweighted results. Since I seek to find the effect of the bargaining on large cities, conceptually
these cities do belong in the sample. Furthermore, to the extent that there may exist fixed
costs to unionization (see Trejo (1991)), there is not an a priori reason that one would expect
that the effect of bargaining would be the same in a population-weighted regression as in an
2 8 These cities, their populations, and their population percent of the total 1972 sample population are: New
York (7.9 million, 8.9%), Chicago (3.4 million, 3.8%), Los Angeles (2.8 million, 3.2%), Philadelphia (2.0 million,
2.2%), and Detroit (1.5 million, 1.7%).
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unweighted regression. In fact, Columns (4) and (5) provide suggestive evidence that Trejo's
argument of fixed costs in union power is correct; the bargaining laws appear to have less power
in smaller cities.
In Table 11, I explore the possibility that the union variable is actually capturing political
views rather than collective bargaining strength, as well as the possibility that the dependence
of the general revenue sharing on higher order interactions of its correlates may be driving the
results. In Column (1), I show the results of the preferred specification. In Column (2), I add
as a control an indicator variable for whether a democratic governor is in office, and in Column
(3) I also interact this indicator variable with the general revenue sharing funds. Columns
(2) and (3) specifically address the concern that the bargaining indicator variable is capturing
the politics of a state (and its cities) rather than the strength of public sector unions within
the state. The results show that the coefficients on the interaction of general revenue sharing
with the bargaining indicator variable are little changed, even when I include the indicator of
the party of the governor interacted with the general revenue sharing funds, as in Column (3).
Legislation such as that surrounding public sector collective bargaining is often politically hard
to change once in place, leading to legislative persistence over time even as the party preferences
of the states change.
In Column (4), I include the "three-factor" formula at the city level; i.e. the product of
population, tax effort, and inverse per capita income. 29  In Column (5), I also include the
"three-factor" formula at the state level. These last two columns deal with the concern that
the cubic polynomials of the GRS-correlated variables do not fully capture their direct impact
on the outcome variables. Including more interactions of these variables yields almost no
difference in the estimation of the coefficients of interest. These results are supportive of the
conclusion that the flexible cubic polynomials absorbed an appropriate amount of the general
revenue sharing variation.
2 9 Because per capita income is not annually available at the city level, I interact with per capita income at a
county level.
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1.7 Intergovernmental Transfers and Aggregate Economic Ac-
tivity
My results above show that the general purpose transfers in the 1970s and the 1980s led to
approximately one-for-one increases in local government expenditure. At first blush, these
findings of a strong expenditure effect are supportive of a stimulative policy of transferring
funds to local governments; at least the highly debated question of whether the funds would
be spent appears to be resolved for the context I study in this paper. Any complete evaluation
of a transfer policy, however, would have to include a consideration of the output multipliers
attached to local government spending. Since the results of Section 6.3 find that there exists
an institutional friction, public sector bargaining, that determines whether federal transfers are
applied to higher wages or new employment in large cities, the question of whether these two
types of spending could have different effects on the surrounding private economy is crucial.
In this section, I explore the possibility that the types of spending produced by transfers to
bargaining and no-bargaining cities are associated with different output multipliers.
A clear connection has been shown between an individual's income and their marginal
propensity to consume (Parker, Souleles, Johnson, McClelland, 2011). If government spending
on employment gives income to a person who would have otherwise been unemployed as opposed
to increasing the wages of an already employed individual, one would expect that the marginal
propensity to consume of the former would be greater than the latter. If this is the case, theory
would suggest that the multiplier would be higher when the spending is on employment rather
than wages.30 This argument depends on the idea that increasing the number of government
jobs would actually reduce unemployment in the local economy. At times of full employment,
this is an unreasonable assumption; government spending on increased employment would crowd
out employment in the private sector. However, when the unemployment rate is above the
natural rate of unemployment and there is excess capacity in the economy and slack demand,
government job creation is more likely to have an immediate effect on unemployment. This
description is a much closer approximation to the time period in which the general revenue
3 OThe connection between the marginal propensity to consume and the output multiplier is discussed exten-
sively in the New-Keynesian literature (see, for example, Gali, Lopez-Salido, Valles, 2007).
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sharing was carried out.
1.7.1 Empirical Strategy and Results
In this section, I explore the possibility that the multiplier on the types of expenditures gen-
erated in bargaining and no-bargaining cities differ from one another. Note that although
the theory above focuses on the distinctions that might arise due to differential spending on
new employment versus existing wages, my methodology only allows me to test the difference
between bargaining and no-bargaining city spending. To the extent that the spending differs
in other ways (such as the suggestive evidence that no-bargaining cities spend more of the
transfers on capital outlays), I will not be able to determine which particular differences are
affecting any divergence in multipliers.
Because city-level private employment and income data are not available, I use annual
county employment and income data from the Bureau of Economic Analysis regional accounts.
The data used are from BEA Table CA04. As described above for non-ASG variables, I adjust
these data to match the timing of the fiscal years in each city, and I deflate the income data
using the GDP deflator.
I examine the effect of intergovernmental transfers on private employment and income. The
government finance data are not ideally suited to study the effects on the private economy. Be-
cause the macroeconomic data are only available at the county level while the intergovernmental
transfer data are at the city level, I cannot simply replace the outcome variables in Equation
(10) with the county BEA data.3 1  I deal with the city and county disparities in three ways.
First, I limit my analysis to cities that make up at least 50 percent of their corresponding
county, which dramatically shrinks the sample from 837 cities to 206 cities. Second, I normal-
ize the county variables by county population rather than city population. Finally, to account
for city-county differences in per capita intergovernmental transfers, I scale the endogenous
variables, IGRit and IGRit * Uit, by the county-city IGR ratio in the most recent government
census year (i.e. 1972, 1977, 1982, or 1987).
Table 12 shows the crosswalk from the city employment results initially reported in Table
County area data are only available in the Annual Survey of Governments in the Census years ending in -2
and -7.
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8 to the macroeconomic total employment results. Column (1) shows the results achieved
when using the normalized employment variable as shown in Table 8. Column (2) changes the
dependent variable to employment per 1000 population, and the results imply that a transfer
of 1,000,000 (2005) dollars led to an increase of 10.8 jobs in no-bargaining cities, and 2.6
government jobs in bargaining cities. Column (3) limits the sample to cities that make up at
least 50 percent of their county. The findings are similar to that of Column (2), although the
standard errors have increased due to the smaller sample size.
Finally, Columns (4) and (5) have per capita total county employment as the dependent vari-
able and scale the endogenous variables as discussed above. Column (4) implies that 1,000,000
dollars of general revenue sharing receipts to all of the local governments in a county yield an
increase of 9.9 government jobs in no-bargaining cities and a decrease of 2.8 jobs in bargaining
cities. If the response of all of the governments mirrors the response of the city government,
one would expect that the coefficients in Columns (3) and (4) should match. Indeed, they
are within the same range, and a difference of zero cannot be rejected. It is concerning that
the county government employment data appears to predict a decrease in government employ-
ment in response to the intergovernmental transfers. However, wide standard errors make it
impossible to reject zero or a positive response. The most significant result in Column (4) is
the difference between the government employment produced in bargaining and no-bargaining
cities.
Column (5) shows the main test of interest, which is the effect of the intergovernmental
transfers on total employment within the county. There appears to be a large response in
no-bargaining cities, and a slightly negative response (although zero cannot be rejected) in
bargaining cities. Again, the most significant result is the difference between bargaining and
no-bargaining cities, which is significant at the five percent level.
The level of the coefficients in Table 12 Column (5) implies that 1,000,000 of (2005) dollars
of transfers led to an increase of 32 total jobs in no-bargaining counties, and a decrease of
13 jobs in bargaining counties. One way to interpret these coefficients is to assume that the
employee compensation is equal to the employee's marginal product and to multiply the jobs
created by the average employee compensation in 1977 (to take an intermediate year), which
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was 39,000 dollars. 32 This yields a relative increase in GDP of about 1,200,000 (2005) dollars
for every 1,000,000 received in transfers, which would imply a multiplier of roughly 1.2 in no-
bargaining cities (and a slightly negative multiplier-insignificant from zero-in bargaining cities).
These multiplier estimates are within the bounds calculated in recent empirical work; however,
the large standard errors around the point estimates prevent the possibility of firm conclusions
about the levels of multipliers in this exercise.33 Indeed, the key result is the difference between
the multipliers in bargaining and no-bargaining cities.
Table 13 explores the robustness of the total employment results in Table 11, Column (5).
In Column (2), the sample is expanded to include cities that make up at least 30 percent of
the counties in which they reside, and in Column (3), the sample is restricted to only include
those cities that make up at least 85 percent of their counties. In Column (4), the state-time
trend is removed, and in Column (5), the largest five cities are removed from the preferred
specification. The results are not robust to all of these changes. In particular, the standard
errors are too large in Columns (3) and Columns (5) to infer anything meaningful from the
difference in the response in bargaining and no-bargaining locales, although it is notable that
the sign of the difference in the multipliers switches in Column (5). In Columns (2) and (4),
the difference between the two types of city remains significantly negative at at least the 10
percent level. Overall, the (mostly) negative point estimates in the second row are suggestive
of the idea that the multipliers on intergovernmental transfers to no-bargaining cities are higher
than those to bargaining cities, which would be consistent with the hypothesis that spending
on new employment stimulates the private economy more successfully than spending on wages.
However, due to large standard errors and fluctuations across specifications, these data are
not able to fully weigh in on this hypothesis. I present these employment results to motivate
further exploration into how the public sector labor markets may affect the stimulative output
multipliers associated with federal government transfers to state and local governments.
3 2 To arrive at this average compensation number, I used figures from the Bureau of Economic Analysis NIPA
accounts. Specifically, I divided the total compensation of employees in 1977 from Table 6.2B by the total
number of full-time equivalent employees in Table 6.5B. Lastly, I multiplied by the GDP price index from Table
1.1.4.
3 3 I also examined the effect of the general revenue sharing transfers on per capita personal income. However,
the standard errors in these calculations were too large to draw any meaningful conclusions; neither the multiplier
levels nor the differences between bargaining and no-bargaining cities were significantly different from zero in
any specification.
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1.8 Conclusion
In this paper, I revisit a large intergovernmental grant program in which the federal government
transferred funds to all general-purpose state and local governments. I find, contrary to some
recent research, that the recipient city governments spent almost all of the funds that they
received. This finding, on the face, is supportive of a stimulative policy of transferring funds to
city governments, at least during tumultuous economic times similar to those of the 1970s and
the 1980s. However, I discuss the possibility that the "type" of government spending produced
by the transfers may be as important as the fact of the spending itself when evaluating a
policy of intergovernmental transfers. Motivated by the literature on public sector unions, I
explore whether the type of spending is affected by the existence of public sector collective
bargaining legislation. I find that the cities subject to state-level pro-union bargaining laws
spent a significant portion of the transfers on increased wages of existing employees, while cities
without such laws spent a larger fraction of the funds on new employment. Finally, I explore
the possibility that these two types of spending have differential effects on the private economy.
This paper brings together a combination of macroeconomics and public finance topics that
have rarely been linked in previous research. The public finance literature on intergovernmen-
tal grants has tended to focus on the impacts of grants on the hiring and spending behavior
of the government bodies without considering the implications that this changed behavior may
have on the private economy. This issue becomes particularly important in a recessionary en-
vironment when national governments are weighing their countercyclical options at the same
time that their subnational governments are responding to their own fiscal pressures. Subna-
tional governments play a substantial role in most advanced and emerging countries; the ratio
of their expenditures to total government expenditures hovers between 30 to 50 percent for
many countries, and exceeds 50 percent in at least Canada, Denmark, Switzerland, and the
United States (Rodden, 2004). Yet, there has been little work done to understand the effec-
tiveness of leveraging these subnational governments to stimulate the economy. More broadly,
the general connection between subnational budgets and the business cycle warrants further
investigation. While there has been some work using aggregate time series on the extent to
which subnational government variables move with or against the business cycle (Hines, 2010,
Rodden and Wibbels, 2010), this paper highlights the fact that aggregate time series may mask
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some interesting heterogeneity at the local government level. Exploring this set of questions
using disaggregated data will be fruitful for future research.
From the macroeconomics side, the literature on the effect of government spending tends
to ignore the political economy frictions that influence the "quality" or type of government
spending that is feasible. The institutional frictions that influence the direction of spending
may have a large impact on the ultimate effectiveness of a temporary expansion of government.
The findings of this paper suggest a natural path for future exploration; namely, probing into
the possible multiplier differences that may arise from government spending on new employment
versus government spending on increased wages. Furthermore, although this paper focuses on
the local government sector of the United States, the large size of public sector unions in other
advanced economies suggests that the relevance of this line of future research may apply to
other countries.
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1.9 Appendix
In this appendix, I describe the adjustments that I make to account for the fact that the Annual
Survey of Governments covers a variation of fiscal years across cities.
City governments vary substantially in the timing of their fiscal years reported in the ASG.
Naively using year fixed effects corresponding to the years in the ASG to pick up macroeconomic
events would be incorrect. Local governments filling out the ASG in a particular year are
instructed to report on their fiscal year that ended between July of the previous year and June
of the survey year. For example, in the 1973 ASG, the finance variables of cities that have
fiscal years from July to June will cover the fiscal year July 1972 to June 1973. On the other
hand, cities with fiscal years from August to July will cover August 1971 to July 1972 in the
same 1973 survey. The ASG year fixed effect will therefore not capture the macroeconomic
events corresponding to a particular year. Furthermore, other variables such as the price index
used to deflate the nominal finance figures must correspond to the time period of the cities'
finance variables.
The figure below shows the timing of the initial general revenue sharing fund disbursements
as well as the timing of the fiscal years covered by the 1973 and the 1974 ASGs. The numbers
in the left column underneath the timeline represent the number of cities in the sample with
the corresponding fiscal year timing to the right of the number. There are 339 cities that have
a fiscal year that end in December, and 308 cities that have a fiscal year that end in June. As
shown in the figure, the initial funds were disbursed in December 1972. This disbursement
should show up in the 1973 ASG for cities that have fiscal years ending in December through
June, and will show up in the 1974 ASG for all other cities.
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There are two main issues that need to be addressed in this analysis. The first is that the
year fixed effects need to be adjusted so as to correctly capture the timing of the nationwide
macroeconomic events. The second is that the non-ASG variables must be adjusted to match
the fiscal years represented by the cities.
Accomplishing the first task is easy; rather than only including year fixed effects, I also
include an indicator for the fiscal year timing interacted with year dummies-which means that,
in essence, I allow the year fixed effect to depend on the fiscal year timing of the particular
government. For instance, if there was a macroeconomic event that occurred in January 1973
that caused a significant drop in city government revenue, we would expect to observe that
drop in the 1973 ASG for all cities that have a fiscal year ending in the months from January
to June, and in the 1974 ASG for cities that have a fiscal year ending in a month after June.
Allowing the year fixed effect to depend on the fiscal year ending month will allow this drop to
be distributed as it should be.
To accomplish the second task, I must adjust all non-ASG variables to match the timing of
the specific city to which the variable is "applied". All non-ASG variables are adjusted in the
following way:
Yit = Yit-2 * (1 - f) + Yit-1 * (fy) if fy > 6
(1.14)
Yit = Yit-i * (1 - f) + Yit * (f) if fy < 6
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where fy is the fiscal year ending month, and Yat is the non-ASG variable to be adjusted. The
non-ASG variables described in the data sections above that are adjusted are the GDP deflators
and the BEA per capita county income.
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Tables
Table 1: Federal Funds Transferred through the GRS program
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Percent of Gov't Expenditures
Year Millions of Millions of Percent of Per Capita,
current dollars 2005 dollars GDP State Local 2005 Dollars
Governments Governments
1972 5,300 25,364 0.43% 2.79% 3.56% 120.8
1974 6,125 24,529 0.41% 2.62% 3.25% 114.7
1976 6,500 22,326 0.36% 2.23% 2.80% 102.4
1978 6,850 20,731 0.30% 2.02% 2.48% 93.1
1980 6,279 15,697 0.23% 1.19% 2.06% 69.1
1982 4,567 9,761 0.14% 0.00% 1.79% 42.1
1984 4,567 8,948 0.12% 0.00% 1.55% 37.9
1986 3,425 6,276 0.08% 0.00% 0.95% 26.1
Notes: Government expenditures in Columns (4) and (5) exclude intergovernmental transfers. The GDP state and local
price deflator are used to deflate data in Columns (2) and (6). General revenue sharing data are from Maguire (2009). GDP
data are from the Bureau of Economic Analysis NIPA Tables 1.1.4, 1.1.5, 3.20, and 3.21.
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Table 2: City Finance Statistics
Total Median Percent of
(Millions of $) Total
(1) (2) (3)
Expenditures
Total Expenditures 57,507 100 100
General Expenditures 47,007 81.7 88.2
Salaries and Wages 23,041 40.1 42.1
Capital Outlays 8,685 15.1 16.1
COMPONENTS
Education 7,279 12.7 0
Police 5,011 8.7 11.2
Welfare 4,561 7.9 0
Fire Protection 2,903 5 7.5
Sewerage 2,850 5 4.4
Interest Payments 2,885 5 3.7
Highways 2,844 4.9 8.3
Parks 2,012 3.5 4.4
Housing and Community Dev. 1,700 3 0.1
Solid Waste Management 1,526 2.7 3.2
Central Staff Services 930 1.6 2.6
Health 871 1.5 0.3
Financial Administration 767 1.3 1.7
Public Buildings 687 1.2 1.1
Libraries 570 1 1
Air Transportation 559 1 0
Utilities (Non-General) 8,323 14.5 10.1
Insurance Trust (Non-General) 2,144 3.7 0.3
Revenues
Total Revenue 59,933 100 100
Property Tax 12,942 21.6 21.6
State IGR 12,614 21.0 13.3
Charges and Misc. Revenue 8,026 13.4 15.5
Federal IGR 7,556 12.6 8.3
Sales and Gross Receipts Tax 4,749 7.9 5.3
Income Tax 2,880 4.8 0.0
Utilities (Non-General) 7,243 12.1 9.0
Insurance Trust (Non-General) 1,135 1.9 0.0
Notes: Data from the 1977 Census of Governments.
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Table 3: Summary Statistics - 1977
Mean St Dev Min Median Max
Dependent Variables
Total Expenditure (pc) 1,451 938 203 1,148 8,098
Total Revenue - Own Sources (pc) 1,040 658 119 828 4,629
Net Debt Issued (pc) 89 347 -742 -15 3,540
Change in Cash Securities (pc) 129 377 -1,849 73 3,925
Salaries and Wages (pc) 579 402 35 441 3,728
Annual Wage 36,984 9,694 2,819 36,130 95,243
Total Employees 2,208 12,788 24 664 350,302
Capital Outlays (pc) 270 277 0 179 2,126
Retirement Expenditures (pc) 19 38 0 3 405
Change in Ret Securities (pc) 69 163 -1,339 0 1,781
Endogenous Variables
IGR (pc) 438 530 28 296 10,191
Fed IGR (pc) 174 216 0 104 3,425
State IGR (pc) 240 429 0 151 9,693
Instrument and Control Variables
GRS (pc) 53 27 0 48 174
Total Taxes (pc) 516 390 46 396 3,402
Tax Effort (%) 4 2 0 3 19
County Income (pc) 19,326 3,303 9,528 19,152 32,482
Population 105,516 322,489 21,042 48,327 7,481,613
State Income (pc) 18,810 2,335 12,593 18,565 31,779
State Total Taxes (pc) 2,001 469 1,184 1,972 3,152
State Income Taxes (pc) 323 219 0 367 856
Notes: All dollar terms are expressed in 2005 dollars; the government finance terms were deflated using the state and
local GDP deflator, while the county income was deflated using the GDP deflator.
Table 4: First Stage Regressions I
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Total IGR Federal IGR State IGR
GRS 1.50*** 1.36*** 1.59*** 1.12*** 0.39
(0.24) (0.24) (0.16) (0.08) (0.25)
Cubic baseline controls X X X X
Linear baseline controls X
Population Weighted X X X X
Observations 14,378 14,378 14,378 14,378 14,378
Adjusted R2 0.346 0.313 0.197 0.377 0.387
Partial R2 0.021 0.018 0.016 0.037 0.002
F-Stat 38.3 31.9 94.9 185.3 2.4
Notes: Each column represents the results from an OLS regression in which the dependent variable is regressed
against the per capita general revenue sharing receipts (GRS), the baseline controls, city and year fixed effects,
interactions between the year and the city fiscal year timing, and state-time trends. The dependent variable is total per
capita intergovernmental revenues (IGR) in Columns (1)-(3), federal intergovernmental revenues in Column (4), and
state intergovernmental revenues in Column (5). The baseline controls are city population, lagged per capita tax
revenue, lagged "tax effort", lagged per capita county income, lagged state-level total taxes, lagged state per capita
income, and lagged state government individual income taxes. In Column (2), the baseline controls are entered
linearly; otherwise, they are entered as cubic polynomials. The population-weighting is shown in the table. All ASG
finance variable are deflated using the state and local GDP deflator, and all non-ASG variables are adjusted for the
city fiscal years as discussed in the text. Standard errors are clustered at the city level.
* p<0.10, **p<0.5, ***p<0.01
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Table 5: First Stage Regressions II
(1) (2)
Total IGR IGR*Bargain
GRS 1.48*** 0.06
(0.22) (0.19)
GRS*Bargain 0.01 1.47***
(0.39) (0.35)
Union Interactions X X
Observations 14,378 14,378
Adjusted R2 0.354 0.439
Partial R2 0.020 0.023
F-Stat 45.7 16.6
Notes: Each column represents an OLS regression in which the dependent variable is regressed against the per capita general
revenue sharing receipts (GRS), the interaction of GRS with the bargaining indicator variable (GRS*Bargaining), the baseline
controls, the baseline controls interacted with the bargaining indicator, city and year fixed effects, interactions between the year
and the city fiscal year timing, and state-time trends. The dependent variable is total per capita intergovernmental transfers
(IGR) in Column (1), and IGR interacted with the bargaining indicator variable in Column (2). The baseline controls are cubic
polynomials of city population, lagged per capita tax revenue, lagged "tax effort", lagged per capita county income, lagged state-
level total taxes, lagged state per capita income, and lagged state government individual income taxes. All regressions are
population-weighted. All ASG finance variable are deflated using the state and local GDP deflator, and all non-ASG variables
are adjusted for the city fiscal years as discussed in the text. Standard errors are clustered at the city level.
* p<0.10, **p<0.5, ***p<0.01
Table 6: Total Expenditures Regressions
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
OLS Results
Total IGR 0.66*** 0.66*** 0.97*** 0.94*** 1.01***
(0.17) (0.18) (0.11) (0.09) (0.07)
Total IGR*Bargain -0.35*** -0.31** -0.40**
(0.12) (0.14) (0.17)
IV Results
Total IGR (per capita) 0.83*** 0.89*** 1.03*** 0.92*** 0.96***
(0.16) (0.16) (0.23) (0.22) (0.21)
Total IGR*Bargain -0.22 -0.03 -0.08
(0.19) (0.18) (0.27)
Government FE X X X X X
Year Fixed Effects X X X X X
State*Time Trend X X X
Fiscal Year Dummies X X X X X
Union Interactions X
Population Weighted X X X X X
Observations 14,378 14,378 14,378 14,378 14,378
Notes: The dependent variable in all regressions is total per capita city expenditures. The top panel shows OLS regressions and
the bottom panel shows 2SLS IV regressions. In Columns (1) and (2) of the bottom panel, total per capita intergovernmental
revenues (IGR) are instrumented by per capita general revenue sharing receipts (GRS). In Columns (3)-(5), IGR and IGR
interacted with the bargaining indicator (IGR*Bargaining) are instrumented by GRS and GRS interacted with the bargaining
indicator. The additional regressors in each column include the baseline controls, city and year fixed effects, and interactions
between the year and the city fiscal year timing. Columns (2), (4), and (5) also include state-time trends, and Column (5) includes
the baseline controls interacted with the bargaining indicator. The baseline controls are cubic polynomials of each of: city
population, lagged per capita tax revenue, lagged "tax effort", lagged per capita county income, lagged state-level total taxes,
lagged state per capita income, and lagged state government individual income taxes. All regressions are population-weighted. All
ASG finance variable are deflated using the state and local GDP deflator, and all non-ASG variables are adjusted for the city fiscal
years as discussed in the text. Standard errors are clustered at the city level.
* p<0.10, **p<0.5, ***p<0.01
61
Table 7: Finance Components
(1) (2) (3) (4)
TotalExp RevOwnSource DebtIssue DCashSec
Total IGR 0.96*** 0.20 -0.35 -0.02
(0.21) (0.14) (0.27) (0.31)
Total IGR*Bargain -0.08 -0.10 0.32 0.16
(0.27) (0.13) (0.42) (0.32)
Observations 14,378 14,378 14,378 14,378
Notes: Each column represents the results from a 2SLS IV regression in which total per capita intergovernmental revenues
(IGR) and IGR interacted with the bargaining indicator (IGR*Bargaining) are instrumented by per capita general revenue
sharing receipts (GRS) and GRS interacted with the bargaining indicator. The dependent variables in Columns (1)-(4) are,
respectively, per capita total expenditures, per capita own source revenue, per capita net debt issued, and the per capita annual
change in the city's cash and security holdings. In addition to IGR and IGR*Bargaining, the regressors in each column include
the baseline controls, the baseline controls interacted with the bargaining indicator, city and year fixed effects, interactions
between the year and the city fiscal year timing, and state-time trends. The baseline controls are cubic polynomials of city
population, lagged per capita tax revenue, lagged "tax effort", lagged per capita county income, lagged state-level total taxes,
lagged state per capita income, and lagged state government individual income taxes. All regressions are population-weighted.
All ASG finance variable are deflated using the state and local GDP deflator, and all non-ASG variables are adjusted for the
city fiscal years as discussed in the text. Standard errors are clustered at the city level.
* p<0.10, **p<0.5, ***p<0.01
Table 8: Expenditure Components
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Wage Norm Emp Norm CapOutlays RetExp DRetCashSec
Total IGR 0.21 0.41 *** 0.26* -0.03 0.00
(0.13) (0.11) (0.16) (0.02) (0.14)
Total IGR*Bargain 0.56*** -0.29** -0.26 0.03 -0.17
(0.20) (0.14) (0.20) (0.02) (0.20)
Observations 14,378 14,378 14,378 14,378 14,378
Notes: The dependent variables in Columns (1)-(5) are, respectively, the normalized wage of government employees, the
normalized government employment, per capita capital outlays, per capita retirement expenditures, and the per capita annual
change in the city's retirement cash and security holdings. For more details on the specifications, see notes to Table 7.
* p<0.10, **p<0.5, ***p<0.01
Table 9: Recession Effects
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Total Expenditures Emp Norm Wage Norm Capital Outlays
Total IGR*(UR-URAVE > 2) 0.77** 0.55*** 0.17 -0.08
(0.30) (0.15) (0.21) (0.37)
Total IGR*(UR-UR AVE < 2) 0.96*** 0.41*** 0.17 0.23
(0.22) (0.11) (0.15) (0.15)
Total IGR*Bargain*(UR-URAVE > 2) 0.16 -0.43** 0.65** 0.11
(0.35) (0.18) (0.31) (0.40)
Total IGR*Bargain*(UR-URAVE < 2) -0.06 -0.21 0.77*** -0.17
(0.30) (0.14) (0.28) (0.25)
Observations 14,181 14,181 14,181 14,181
Notes: Each column represents the results from a 2SLS IV regression in which there are four endogenous variables of
interactions with total per capita intergovernmental transfers (IGR) as shown in the table, and four corresponding instruments of
the equivalent interactions with per capita general revenue sharing receipts (GRS). "UR" refers to the state unemployment rate
of the city, and "UR_AVE" refers to the average of the state unemployment rate from 1972 to 1989. All "recession indicators"
interacted with IGR are also includes as controls. The dependent variables in Columns (1)-(4) are, respectively, per capita
expenditures, normalized employment, normalized wage, and per capita outlays. For more details on the specifications, see
notes to Table 7.
* p<0.10, **p<0.5, ***p<0.01
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Table 10: Robustness I
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Total Expenditures
Total IGR 0.96*** 1.03*** 0.92*** 0.87*** 0.81***
(0.21) (0.19) (0.21) (0.22) (0.20)
Total IGR*Bargain -0.08 0.02 0.10 0.03 0.04
(0.27) (0.27) (0.26) (0.25) (0.20)
Normalized Wages
Total IGR 0.21 0.37* 0.36** 0.17 0.18
(0.13) (0.20) (0.16) (0.10) (0.15)
Total IGR*Bargain 0.56*** 0.40 0.38* 0.14 0.08
(0.20) (0.25) (0.23) (0.15) (0.14)
Normalized Employment
Total IGR 0.41*** 0.47*** 0.33*** 0.42*** 0.16
(0.11) (0.18) (0.10) (0.12) (0.17)
Total IGR*Bargain -0.29** -0.37** -0.15 -0.00 0.03
(0.14) (0.14) (0.14) (0.18) (0.17)
Population Weighted X X X X
Pop Cutoff No Top 5
Bargain Measure Standard Union Dues Scope: Wages Standard Standard
Observations 14,378 14,378 14,360 14,288 14,378
Notes: Each column represents the results from a 2SLS IV regression in which total per capita intergovernmental
revenues (IGR) and IGR interacted with the bargaining indicator (IGR*Bargaining) are instrumented by per capita
general revenue sharing receipts (GRS) and GRS interacted with the bargaining indicator. The dependent variables in
the top, middle, and bottom panels are, respectively, per capita expenditures, normalized wages, and normalized
employment. Alternative bargaining measures are used in Columns (2) and (3) as described in the text. In Column (4),
the top 5 largest cities are dropped, and in Column (5), the regression is not population-weighted. For more details on
the specifications, see notes to Table 7.
* p<0.10, **p<0.5, ***p<0.01
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Table 11: Robustness II
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Total Expenditures
Total IGR 0.96*** 0.96*** 0.90*** 0.98*** 1.02***
(0.21) (0.21) (0.29) (0.21) (0.20)
Total IGR*Bargain -0.08 -0.07 -0.07 -0.17 -0.13
(0.27) (0.27) (0.27) (0.26) (0.28)
Normalized Wages
Total IGR 0.21 0.22 0.21 0.22* 0.22
(0.13) (0.13) (0.22) (0.13) (0.14)
Total IGR*Bargain 0.56*** 0.55*** 0.55*** 0.56*** 0.56**
(0.20) (0.20) (0.21) (0.21) (0.22)
Normalized Employment
Total IGR 0.41*** 0.41*** 0.31** 0.41*** 0.42***
(0.11) (0.11) (0.15) (0.11) (0.11)
Total IGR*Bargain -0.29** -0.29** -0.29** -0.32** -0.27*
(0.14) (0.14) (0.13) (0.14) (0.14)
Baseline Controls X X X X X
Party of Governor X X
Party of Governor*GRS X
City 3-Factor Formula X X
State 3-Factor Formula X
Observations 14,378 14,378 14,378 14,378 14,378
Notes: Each column represents the results from a 2SLS IV regression in which total per capita intergovernmental
revenues (IGR) and IGR interacted with the bargaining indicator (IGR*Bargaining) are instrumented by per capita
general revenue sharing receipts (GRS) and GRS interacted with the bargaining indicator. The dependent variables in
the top, middle, and bottom panels are, respectively, per capita expenditures, normalized wages, and normalized
employment. Column (2) includes as a control an indicator for whether the city was residing in a state with a
democratic governor. Data were received from Professor Jim Snyder. Column (2) includes the interaction of this
indicator with GRS. Column (4) includes the product of city-level population, tax effort, and inverse per capita
income. Column (5) includes, in addition, the product of state-level population, tax effort, and inverse per capita
income. For more details on the specifications, see notes to Table 7.
* p<0.10, **p<0.5, ***p<0.01
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Table 12: Macroeconomics Crosswalk
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
BEA Gov't BEA Private and
Emp Norm City Gov't Employees (1000) Epoes Gv mlye
-Employees ov't E ployees
Scaled IGR 0.41*** 10.83*** 14.52*** 9.87* 31.99*
(0.11) (2.87) (5.28) (5.53) (17.98)
Scaled IGR*Bargain -0.29** -8.27*** -15.54*** -12.65** -45.04**
(0.14) (3.18) (4.66) (5.47) (22.25)
City-County Population 0 0 0.5 0.5 0.5
Ratio Cutoff
Observations 14,379 14,379 3,705 3,705 3,705
Notes: Each column represents the results from a 2SLS IV regression in which total per capita intergovernmental revenues
(IGR) and IGR interacted with the bargaining indicator (IGR*Bargaining) are instrumented by per capita general revenue
sharing receipts (GRS) and GRS interacted with the bargaining indicator. The dependent variables in Columns (1)-(5) are,
respectively, per capita normalized city government employment, city government employment per 1000 in the city population,
city government employment per 1000 in the city population, total government employment per 1000 in the county population,
and total employment per 1000 in the county population. Columns (3)-(5) limit the sample to cities that make up at least 50
percent of their counties. To scale appropriately in Columns (4) and (5), the per capita city intergovernmental transfers are
scaled by the county area to city IGR ratio from the most recent government census year. This scaling is discussed and
explained in the text. For more details on the specifications, see notes to Table 7.
* p<0.10, **p<0.5, ***p<0.01
Table 13: Macroeconomic Effects
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Total Employment (1000 per capita)
Scaled IGR 31.99* 14.84 5.50 52.59* 33.76*
(17.98) (15.98) (40.53) (26.85) (18.19)
Scaled IGR*Bargain -45.04* -29.62* -15.79 -50.56** 23.51
(22.25) (17.47) (25.12) (19.70) (30.03)
State*Time Trend X X X X
Union Interactions X X X X X
Population Cutoff No Top 5
City-County Population 0.5 0.3 0.85 0.5 0.5
Ratio Cutoff
Observations 3,705 6,308 631 3,705 3,515
Notes: Each column represents the results from a 2SLS IV regression in which total per capita intergovernmental
revenues (IGR) and IGR interacted with the bargaining indicator (IGR*Bargaining) are instrumented by per capita
general revenue sharing receipts (GRS) and GRS interacted with the bargaining indicator. The dependent variable
is total employment per 1000 in the county population. In Columns (1), (4), and (5), the sample is limited to cities
that make up at least 50 percent of their counties, in Column (2), the sample is limited to cities that make up at
least 30 percent of their counties, and in Column (3), the sample is limited to cities that make up at least 85 percent
of their counties. In Column (4), state-time trends are not included, and in Column (5), the top 5 largest cities are
dropped. For more details on the specifications, see notes to Table 7.
* p<0.10, **p<0.5, ***p<0.01
65
Figures
Figure 1: Federal IGR and General Revenue Sharing Funds
Billions of 2005 dollars
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Notes: From the 1971-2000 Annual Surveys of Government Finance.
Figure 2: State Area Allocations
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Notes: Data are from the 1977 Annual Survey of Governments. Amounts are per capita amounts in 2005 dollars.
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Total Federal Intergovernmental Transfers
General Revenue Sharing Funds
Figure 3: 1977 General Revenue Sharing Transfers
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Notes: Data are from the 1977 Census of Governments, and are de-meaned.
Figure 4: 1977 General Revenue Sharing Variation
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Notes: Th is h istogram shows the residuals produced by the regression of per capita general revenue sharing againstcubic
polynomials of all of the allocation variables as described in the text.
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Figure 5: Public and Private Union Coverage
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Notes: From Unionstats.com, Hirsch, Macpherson (2011).
Figure 6: Government Consumption and Investment
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Notes: Bureau of Economic Analysis N IPA Tables 1.15, 3.20, and 3.21.
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Figure 7: Timing of Bargaining Law Passage
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Notes: Bargaining legislation data from Freeman and Valletta, 1987. The year marked represents the first full year after
which the law was changed.
Figure 8: 1972 Bargaining Laws
Notes: Dark red represents the existence of a pro-union collective bargaining law in 1977. Light red indicates either the
absence of such a law, or the existence of a law specifically prohibiting collective bargaining.
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Figure 9: National Unemployment Rate
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Figure 10: Unemployment Rates
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Note: This graph shows a scatterplot of the unemployment rates of the states (1970 to 2000) and the counties (1977 to 1989)
in which the cities in the sample studied reside. The solid line shows the population -weighted average of the state
unemployment rates across all cities in the sample. The state data for 1970 and 1971 are from the BLS and are only
available for27 of the 50 states. The state data from 1972 to 1976 are from Wayne Vroman. Post-1976 county and state
data were received upon special requestfrom the BLS.
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1948 to 2010 average (5.7)
Chapter 2
City Government Revenues and
Business Cycles
2.1 Introduction
Hartford must cut expenses big and small.1 Pittsburgh Public Schools sends 285 layoff no-
tices.2 Montebello may face insolvency if it doesn't close budget deficit.3 In the recent recession,
headlines such as these have become commonplace in local newspapers around the country.
In response to revenue shortfalls, local governments have reduced local services and cut over
500,000 jobs since the employment peak in August 2008.4 The broader implications of these
local budget cuts are not well understood, although it has become increasingly clear that the
impacts on the economy are likely to be large. The magnitude of the cuts warrants a close
examination of the source of the local government revenue fluctuations and their effects on
expenditures in terms of scale and scope.
Due to a large variation across local governments in their revenue structure, the elasticity of
total revenues with respect to the business cycle varies substantially. For instance, some cities
rely heavily on property taxes which are relatively stable through booms and busts, whereas
other cities rely more on the volatile sales tax. In this paper, I document the extent to which
'Hartford Courant, February 27, 2011.
2Chute, Eleanor. The Pittsburgh Post-Gazette. May 31, 2012.
3Garrison, Jessica and Hector Becerra, Los Angeles Times, April 23, 2011.
4 Figures from the BLS Current Employment Statistics Survey.
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revenue structure impacts the revenue responses across city governments in downturns. I then
exploit the differences in revenue structure to explore the effects that "revenue shocks" have on
expenditures. I find that city governments cut expenditures about one for one in response to a
revenue shock, suggesting that the balanced budget rules are binding. Furthermore, I find that
these fluctuations disproportionately affect capital expenditures and, specifically, spending on
transit (including highways) and hospitals. These results suggest that the structure of revenue
can have important effects on local revenue and spending dynamics, which, in turn, raises
questions on the variation in infrastructure spending over the business cycle, on the nature of
programs that are cut when county income declines, and on the long-term impacts of cyclical
government investment disruptions.
The short-term impacts on the private economy of an expenditure cut are captured by the
size of an associated "fiscal multiplier". The spending shocks generated by the variation in the
revenue structure are "balanced budget" shocks, as distinct from deficit-financed expenditure
shocks, which are those typically studied in the literature on fiscal stimulus. Therefore, the
estimates of fiscal multipliers that already exist are not typically appropriate to apply to the
shocks to spending experienced by state and local governments in the recent recession. In-
stead, I propose that the revenue structure can be further exploited to estimate the multipliers
associated with the balanced budget shocks.
To study these issues, I use a panel data set of city government finance data from 1972
to 2006. By combining these finance data with county-level personal income data, I am able
to estimate the elasticity of each large revenue component (property taxes, sales taxes, indi-
vidual income taxes, state intergovernmental revenues, federal intergovernmental revenues, and
charges and fees) with respect to personal income. Armed with these elasticity estimates along
with the 1972 revenue structure for each city in the sample (i.e. the fraction of total revenue
raised from each component), I create a variable that captures the responsiveness of an indi-
vidual city's revenue stream to the business cycle that is due only to the differences in their
revenue decomposition. I argue that this variable can be used to instrument for revenues to
determine how revenues affect expenditures, overcoming the econometric problem that revenues
and expenditures are jointly determined.
The paper is organized as follows: The second section discusses balanced budget expenditure
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shocks. The third section lays out the revenue structure of city governments and then focuses on
measuring the elasticity of each of the revenue components with respect to changes in personal
income. In the fourth section, I use the elasticity estimates to explore the impact of revenue
structure on revenues and expenditures. In the fifth section, I propose a method to estimate
balanced budget multipliers. In the sixth section, I discuss caveats and concerns, and, in the
final section, I conclude.
2.2 Balanced Budget Shocks
A recent surge in the public finance and macroeconomics literature has produced a number of
estimates of local fiscal multipliers using regional data in the United States. Each "experiment"
has measured slightly different forms of the multipliers. For example, Chodorow-Reich (2012),
Wilson (2011), and Feiveson (2012) use the variation in federal transfers to state or local
governments to estimate the impact of federal intergovernmental grants on local employment.
Shoag (2011) uses state pension "windfalls" to instrument for increases in state spending and
Nakamura-Steinsson (2011) exploit differences in direct federal spending across states, both
estimating what Nakamura and Steinsson dub an "open economy relative multiplier". What
these estimates have in common is that the "shock" to the local economy is not financed by
the local economy itself.5 The estimates of the papers mentioned are designed to shed light on
the standard deficit-financed central government fiscal multiplier.
An equally important, but understudied, multiplier is the balanced budget multiplier, which
measures the change in output or employment associated with an expenditure shock that is
attached to a revenue shock of equal magnitude. This multiplier is important for two reasons.
First, as the size of the deficit has become a polarizing issue, there is a political interest in
finding a way to stimulate the economy without increasing the deficit. Second, because state
and local governments almost all face balanced budget rules, their expenditures are constrained,
to some extent, to move with revenues. Therefore, learning about the effects of a balanced
5 To be more precise, in all of these studies, the expenditure or transfer "shocks" are financed by taxpayers or
borrowers across the country, some of which could be in the local economy that experiences the shock. However,
the studies are designed so that the variation in expenditures or transfers is independent of any regional variation
in financing. Thus, the relative multiplier measured will reflect the variation on the expenditure/transfer side,
and not the financing side.
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budget shock would help to understand the private sector implications of the balanced budget
contractions experienced by state and local governments throughout the recent recession.
In this paper, I am concerned with the second motivation, although the results may shed
light onto the first. When a local government loses revenue, balanced budget rules require
that they cut expenditures, increase taxes, or do a combination of the two. Any cut to
expenditures will, therefore, be roughly matched by an equivalent loss of revenue. Generally,
taxes that fall during a recession are a form of automatic stabilizer in that they leave funds in
the hands of taxpayers at a time when they need it most. However, the concurrent contraction
of expenditures will also have a contractionary effect by directly reducing total output and by
reducing the incomes of the recipients of the government spending.
In the early Keynesian framework, the "balanced-budget multiplier theorem" suggests that
the multiplier associated with a balanced budget shock should be exactly one; i.e. for every
dollar of expenditures and revenues cut, one might expect that total output in the economy
will contract by exactly one dollar. This occurs because, under the simple assumptions of the
theory, while total pre-tax income falls by the equivalent amount of the expenditure decline,
the taxes fall by exactly the same amount. Therefore, consumer behavior stays constant at
the same time that the government output declines. However, in a more complex world, the
multiplier could be greater or smaller than one. If the consumers who bear the income brunt of
the government expenditure cuts have a higher marginal propensity to consume than the ones
whose taxes are reduced, the multiplier may exceed one. On the other hand, the multiplier
may be less than one if government expenditures crowd out private consumption or investment
through price changes, or if consumers expect that the government expenditure changes will
persist and adjust their behavior accordingly.
In this paper, I use local government data to examine the size of the balanced budget shocks
produced by the variation in revenue structure; i.e. for a shock to revenue, how much do expen-
ditures actually respond? Because the balanced budget multiplier should be expected to vary
by the type of expenditure, I also explore the response of individual expenditure components.
Finally, I propose that the variation in the revenue structure may be exploited to actually
measure the size of the balanced budget multiplier.
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2.3 City Revenue Components and their Elasticities
2.3.1 The Revenue Structure of Local Governments
My analysis focuses on the cities that contained more than 25,000 people in 1972. These 837
cities are included in the Annual Survey of Governments annually, almost without exception.
The largest sources of revenue for these cities are property taxes, charges and fees, utility fees,
and state intergovernmental transfers. The rest of revenues are composed of sales taxes, federal
intergovernmental transfers, and, in some cases, individual income taxes. As shown in Table
1, there is substantial variation in the revenue structure across the sample.
Table 2 shows the 20 largest cities in 1972 and their respective revenue structures. As can
be seen in the table, the dependence on property taxes varies from 10 percent in Memphis to 54
percent in Boston; 17 percent of New Orleans revenues come from sales tax at the same time
that many cities do not have sales taxes at all; and the dependence on state intergovernmental
transfers varies from 0 percent to 48 percent. The revenue structure varies quite dramatically
even in the largest cities.
The large variation across city governments in their revenue structure leads to the obvious
question: what is driving these different structures across city governments? For one, city
government revenue structure is highly affected by state-level laws which regulate what taxes
city level governments have the authority to levy. Figure 1 shows the taxes that each state
authorizes their local governments to levy. Twenty-five states do not allow their local govern-
ments to levy sales tax at all. Although the average reliance on sales tax shown in Table 1 is
only 7 percent, the average reliance on sales tax in cities in states that allow sales tax to be
levied at the municipal level is 15 percent, making clear that the cities in the states that allow
municipal sales tax do make use of that tax source.
The other state level laws that can affect the municipal level tax structure are the state-
level tax and expenditure limitations (TELs), which often put a limit on the revenue growth
associated with property taxes. Figure 2 shows the geographic distribution of TEL laws (in
2006). The states in red are states that have a "binding" property tax limit and a general limit
for expenditure increases. In the TEL literature, a "binding" property tax limit means that
there are limits on the property tax growth or that there is a combination of a property tax
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rate limit along with an assessment limit, which together mean that a local government cannot
circumvent the law to increase property taxes. Many of these laws were passed post-1972,
and therefore could not have affected the revenue structure at the beginning of my sample.
However, a few of the states did have early passage of the laws. 6 For example, in Colorado,
who passed a property tax levy growth limit in 1913, the average reliance on property taxes in
1972 is 7 percent, while the sample mean is 20 percent. Because the Colorado governments
cannot rely on property taxes, they had to find other sources of revenue; in the same cities, the
fraction of the revenue that comes from charges and fees is 31 percent, while the overall average
is 25 percent. 7
Beyond these state-level laws, there remains significant variation in the reliance on different
taxes at the local government level as well as the discretion the cities are able to use in setting
rates. For instance, when in some states, such as California, the sales tax is automatically
split between the state government and the municipal governments, the city governments in
other states have the authority to choose the sales tax rate. 8 Furthermore, there is quite a
bit of discretion in the user fees set on recreation, utility services, public works, planning and
economic development, health, and transportation. The income tax rates of large cities are
chosen by the city or in negotiation between the city and the state. All of this added variation
is decided at the local government level and reflects the preferences of voters, the preferences
of the city legislators, and the laws that were already in place.
Ideally, a revenue structure will produce a revenue stream that will both grow with income
and population as well as having the property of being relatively stable over time. As Groves
and Kahn (1952) first discussed, these two goals can often be at odds; taxes that grow long-
term with income may also be more responsive to short term fluctuations that occur with the
business cycle. A progressive income tax is a great example of such a tax; as incomes rise
in a given population, the per person revenues will also rise. However, when income takes
a hit in a recession, the income tax revenues will also fall especially since the incomes at the
6 Arizona, Colorado, Oregon, Utah, Kansas, Iowa, Minnesota, and Washington all passed TEL laws prior to
1972.
7 Because both the laws and the reliance on property taxes reflect voter preferences, one needs to be careful
in assuming that the law causes the lower reliance on property taxes. Previous estimates using instruments for
the TEL laws confirmed that the laws resulted in a lower reliance on property taxes and a higher reliance on
charges and fees. See Shadbegian (1999).
8 see Bland (2005).
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top end of the distribution are often particularly affected during a recession.9 The common
linkage between short-term and long-term elasticities in revenue sources is an example of the fact
that lawmakers (and citizens) have multiple dimensions over which to "optimize" their revenue
structure, many of which may conflict with one another. Since state laws and preferences over
different revenue sources vary in many more dimensions than just their short-run elasticities,
the revenue structures are generally not designed to minimize their responsiveness to business
cycles. The variation in the revenue structure yields a large variation in the elasticities of
revenues with respect to the state of the local economy. In the next subsection, I explore the
differences in the short-term elasticities of the various revenue sources.
2.3.2 Elasticity Estimates
My goal is to understand how the business cycle affects the percent change in each revenue
component. I approximate "business cycles" by fluctuations in personal income in the county
in which the city resides.10 Because counties and cities may have very different levels and growth
rates of revenues and personal income, I include both city fixed effects and a city-specific time
trend in the estimation equations." The regression that I run is:
In R' = # Iln Iit +r/it + pi + Eit (2.1)
where Rt is the real amount of funds from revenue source j in city i and time t, and It is
real personal income in the county containing city i in time t. 1 2  The Of estimates represent
the elasticity of the revenue component j with respect to personal income. For every one
percent that personal income is above its trend, the revenue component will be above trend by
#3 percent. Table 3 shows the results of this exercise.
I find that all revenue components other than federal intergovernmental transfers are highly
9 The trade-off may not always be in effect. In particular, Sobel and Holcombe (1996) explore the fact that
the short-run and long-run elasticities are not necessarily linked.
"My data sources are detailed in the data appendix.
" The city-specific time trend allows for the time trends to vary in the components included. (For instance,
personal income and revenues are allowed to grow at different rates with this specification.)
1 2 Note that I only have data from BEA at the county-level, which is why I use county level income. Finance
variables are deflated using the state and local GDP deflator, and personal income is deflated using the GDP
deflator.
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cyclical. However, property taxes, utility revenues, and the "other" category respond to changes
in personal income less than sales taxes, income taxes, state intergovernmental transfers, and
charges and fees. For every one percent that personal income is above trend, property taxes
will increase by 0.53 percent whereas sales taxes will increase by 0.78 percent. This difference
is substantial; if a ten percent income shock hit two cities, one of which depended only on
property taxes and the other of which depended only on sales tax, the difference in the revenue
shocks to the two cities would be 2.5 percent of total revenue. Charges and fees are the most
responsive revenue component, probably because the demand for costly local services such
as parking facilities, air transportation, and parks and recreation is procyclical. There is a
surprising amount of variation in the amount that local governments depend on charges and
fees (see Table 1), and this ends up playing a large role in determining the differences in the
elasticity of total revenues with respect to personal income.
It is important to note that the intergovernmental transfers deserve special attention when
considering their elasticities with respect to changes in personal income. While the other
sources of revenue are affected either directly by changes in personal income (like the income
tax) or by the resulting changes to individual behavior (like the sales tax or the charges and
fees), the intergovernmental transfers are decided by state legislatures. While the individual
responses to losses in personal income are likely to be consistent across the country, the response
of legislatures need not be; some states may tend to decrease grants during downturns, while
others might increase grants during downturns. Indeed, when I estimate the per-state state
intergovernmental grant elasticities, I get a large variation across states in the measurement,
with some not responsive at all, and some very responsive to the business cycle. Figure 3
shows a bar chart of the elasticity estimates for state intergovernmental transfers for the 26
states that contain at least 10 cities in my sample. 13 The state elasticities do vary substantially
across state governments (although the standard errors of the estimates are quite large due to
small sample size for each state). In Section 4.1, I will discuss what this variation means for
my empirical strategy.
The assumption that elasticities are constant over time may be misguided. In particular,
3 For each state, I estimated the equation: In IGRIt = IGR In it +it i 0i S+ it, where IGRit represents the
state intergovernmental transfers for city i within the state. I used the data from all of the cities in my sample
within the state, and weighted by population.
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one possibility, explored in Bruce et al (2006), is that is that the revenue components may
respond in an asymmetric way to movements in the business cycle leading to different elasticity
measurements in "booms" and "downturns". In Table 4, I explore this possibility by interacting
the income variable with a dummy for whether there is a local downturn.14 The regression is:
In Rit = / m "In 'It * (1 - I(downturn)) + 3 o"t In Iit * I(downturn) + rit +i j + Eit (2.2)
In property taxes, sales taxes, income taxes, and state intergovernmental transfers, there
is no obvious asymmetry in the elasticity measurements. The main components that are
substantially different over the business cycle are charges and fees and utilities, which are
significantly more responsive to income during booms. These findings are consistent with the
existence of luxury government services and utilities that exhibit a high income elasticity of
demand, but are only demanded in "good" times.
I also explore whether the elasticities have changed over the time period that my sample
covers. In particular, I compare the elasticity coefficient in the pre-1990 years to the one
estimated post-1990. I find that property taxes have gotten significantly less responsive, while
sales taxes have become significantly more responsive over time.15 The property tax result is
consistent with the gradual adoption of TEL laws; with these laws, property taxes are limited
in their ability to respond positively to increases in income. The sales tax result may reflect
the greater proportion of luxury goods in the tax base spurred by the overall increase in real
income per capita.
The results of these exercises show that the elasticity estimates shown in Table 3 are average
estimates; actual elasticities may vary from city to city and over time. While keeping this fact
in mind, I purposefully will be using the average elasticity estimates later in the analysis to
construct a "total elasticity" measure that is designed to be independent of city and time
variables.
1 4 Measured by whether the ln(real income) is below a linear trend.
" The property tax estimate in the pre-1990 and post-1990 periods are 0.59 (0.06) and 0.38 (0.07), respectively.
The sales tax estimates are 0.63 (0.10) and 1.12 (0.13). Standard deviations are in parentheses.
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2.3.3 Comparison to Previous Empirical Work
Most of the previous literature on tax elasticities uses state level rather than local level data.
While my use of city government data provides a unique window into the responsiveness of
revenues at that level of government, my estimates necessarily lack some of the nuance of the
estimates possible at a more macro level. In particular, because of data limitations at the
city level, I am unable to estimate the effect of changes in personal income or sales tax bases
rather than total tax revenues. This means that my estimates will incorporate any legislated
changes to the tax rates that occurred concurrently with the change in personal income. In
other words, if city governments tend to respond to a drop in revenues by increasing tax rates,
the elasticity estimates of the changeable components (such as property and sales taxes) might
be underestimates of the true elasticities.
One way to get a sense of the size of this problem is to compare my estimates to the existing
estimates in the literature. In one of the earliest estimates of short-run tax elasticities of state
government revenue components, Williams et al (1973) find that sales taxes had an income
elasticity of 0.81, while income tax had a higher elasticity of 1.08. While, for many years, this
empirical study fixed expectations about the relative elasticities of sales versus income taxes, a
later study on tax bases by Dye and McGuire (1991), found that a sales tax might actually be
as or more volatile than an income tax. Holcombe and Sobel (1996) confirm this finding using
national proxies for state tax bases, and estimate short-term tax base elasticities around 1 for
both personal taxable income and retail sales. More recently, Bruce et al (2006) measured
state-specific tax elasticities for income and sales taxes and found that the relative elasticities
largely depended on the specific tax structures within the state government. All in all, my
finding that local government sales and income taxes have roughly the same elasticities appear
to be consistent with the literature on state government taxes, although their levels are slightly
lower than previous estimates.
The literature on property taxes has generally found that they are a stable source of revenue
(Giertz, 2006). In an analysis that measured the elasticity of property tax with respect to
house prices, Lutz (2008) finds that only 40 percent of the fluctuations in house prices are
reflected in changes to property tax revenue and, even that, with a three year lag. Lutz et
al (2011) found that in the recent recession when house prices declined dramatically, property
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taxes nevertheless remained relatively stable. My estimate of 0.53 for the income elasticity of
property taxes seems to be slightly larger than the estimates in the literature would suggest.
However, because I measure the income elasticity of property taxes rather than the housing
elasticity, these estimates are not directly comparable. Certainly, my finding that the property
tax income elasticities fall below those of the sales and income taxes is consistent with the
literature.
Most of the studies on the cyclicality of intergovernmental transfers examine federal in-
tergovernmental transfers to state and local governments rather than state intergovernmental
transfers to local governments. Rodden and Wibbels (2010) find that federal grant policy in
the U.S. tends to be acyclical, which is consistent with my income elasticity estimate for federal
transfers. My finding that state intergovernmental transfers are highly procyclical is more con-
troversial in the literature. Hines (2010), for example, actually finds that state expenditures
are mildly countercyclical. However, as shown in Figure 1, my estimate is limited to be the
average across states; I find that there is significant variation across states in how they handle
their grant policy in recessions and booms.
2.4 The Effect of Revenues on Expenditures
As discussed in the last section, the factors that determined the revenue structure at the local
government level are multifold. It is certainly not the case that local governments chose based
solely on minimizing the amount that their revenues respond to the business cycle even within
the constraints of the state laws. Nevertheless, the elasticities of each revenue component vary
substantially (as seen in Table 3), amounting to the fact that there must be a large variation
in the elasticity of total revenues with respect to personal income due to the variation in the
revenue structure.
My goal is to understand how expenditures respond to the revenue "shocks" generated by
the variation in revenue structure. The equation that I want to estimate is:
In Eit =0 in Rit-1 + aXit + Rlt + ari + ret + pit (2.3)
where Eit is the real expenditures in city i and time t, Rit-1 are real revenues in city i and
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time t - 1, and Xit are city-level control variables that vary over time. I lag revenues by
one period in order to allow time for a legislated expenditure response. 16  The econometric
problem in estimating this equation is that expenditures and revenues are jointly determined.
Demand for government services, which may correlate with fluctuations in the business cycle
(and revenue), will have an independent impact on expenditures. Furthermore, legislatures will
change revenues and expenditures together for philosophical rather than economic reasons.
To overcome these econometric issues, I turn to the revenue structure to create a variable
that can instrument for ln Rit_1 in the above regression. In the next subsection, I will describe
the construction of the variable in which I rely only on the revenue structure of the city govern-
ments (i.e. the fraction of total revenues attributed to each revenue component). Furthermore,
I restrict to using the revenue structure from the first year of the sample, 1972, in order to
avoid the problem that revenue structure itself is somewhat related to the state of the business
cycle: i.e. those parts of the revenue that are highly elastic will disproportionately shrink in
bad times.
2.4.1 A "Total Elasticity" Measure
In this section, I use the elasticity measurements that I found above to construct a "total
elasticity" measurement for each city.
Consider that total revenues are the sum of all the revenue components.
Ri= ( R (2.4)
The natural logarithm of total revenues is therefore the weighted sum of the natural logarithms
of the components, where the sum is their share of total revenues. In equation form:
In Rit = Zst ln Rt (2.5)
where s is the share that revenue source j makes up of total revenue in city i in time t. In
1 6Furthermore, estimates in (Holtz-Eakin, 1989) find that expenditures respond to lagged revenue rather than
concurrent revenue.
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the previous section, we found that the natural logarithm of each revenue source is related to
the natural logarithm of personal income by the estimated elasticities. Thus, an estimate for
the growth rate of total revenue using the average estimated elasticities, el, is:
In Rit = i s I lnIst (2.6)
Intuitively, the elasticity of total revenue with respect to personal income is the weighted sum
of the elasticities of the revenue sources. It is the variation of the term Eit = Zj si across
cities that causes variation in the amount that their revenues respond to income shocks. It is
important to note, however, that the eit terms are not exogenous to the state of the business
cycle since the shares of the revenue components, si, will respond to fluctuations in the business
cycle. In order to capture the component of the variation that is not due to changes in the
business cycle, I use the elasticity term from 1972 in all of the analysis. This is possible because
et is persistent across time; the basic structure of revenues is not easy for a city legislature to
change. 17
By using the average elasticity estimates, si, rather than city-specific elasticity estimates, I
avoid the issue of that city-specific elasticities are endogenous to the cities' individual responses
to revenue shocks. In particular, we saw that the elasticities of state intergovernmental revenues
vary from state to state. I use the average elasticity in constructing the total elasticity measure.
Of course, this sacrifices some accuracy in the extent to which Equation (6) holds, but is needed
to skirt endogeneity problems. As long is the total elasticity variable still has predictive power
for revenues (which I will show it does), I am able to use it to complete the analysis.
Figure 4 shows a histogram of the distribution of Ei1972 for the cities in my sample. There
is a significant amount of variation; the total elasticity measure varies from 18 percent to 98
percent. What does this variation mean? Consider City A with an elasticity of 60 percent,
and City B with an elasticity of 80 percent. If both of these cities are hit with a negative
income shock that leaves income 10 percent below trend, City A's revenues will decrease by 6
percent and City B's revenues will decrease by 8 percent; a 2 percent difference. When we
consider that many of the cities were in counties that experienced personal income shocks of
1 The correlation coefficient of Ei1972 and Ei2002 is 0.32 with a p-value less than 0.01%.
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10 percent or greater throughout this period, this example demonstrates how the difference in
elasticities can cause a substantial difference in the revenue shock faced by the city government.
The scatterplot in Figure 5 plots the deviations of personal income from trend against the same
variable multiplied by the total elasticity variable, 6i1972. As one can see from the scatterplot,
for the same drop in personal income, the difference in the revenue response caused by the
elasticity differences can be as large as 5 percent of revenues (i.e. the thickness of the "line" in
the figure is roughly 0.05).
2.4.2 Revenue Shocks
The total elasticity variable is only useful to the extent that it actually predicts changes in
revenue. The reason that it may not is that it is possible that the elasticities of the tax rates
depend on how much a city government relies on the tax source. For example, suppose that
sales taxes become more elastic as the tax base broadens. Then cities that have a high reliance
on sales taxes will actually have sales tax revenues that are more responsive to fluctuations in
personal income than the elasticity variable would predict.
In order to check the predictive power of the constructed elasticity variable, I regress ln Rit
against the Ej1972 In it, which I will from now on refer to as the "elasticity-income measure".
The baseline regression is:
In Rit = -' + #3 i1972 ln it + 1 In Ist + 2 (In It) 2 + qit + Oi + nt + pit (2.7)
As before, I include city and city-specific time trends. In the baseline, I also include
year-fixed effects. It is important to note that in the above regression, the inclusion of a
flexible polynomial of ln lit is essential. My goal is to use the differential revenue structures
as an "exogenous" reason that there are different government revenue shocks in cities that face
similar personal income shocks. My claim is that ei1972 In lit is plausibly exogenous only after
controlling for ln 1it. Table 5 shows the results of this regression.
In the first column of Table 5, I show the results from running the baseline regression in
Equation (7) without year fixed effects. I show the baseline regression in Column (2), and
in Column (3) 1 interact the elasticity-income measure with an indicator for whether there is
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a downturn in time t, as measured by whether real personal income is below trend.1 8 I find
that the elasticity-income measure is a good predictor of the percent deviation of total revenues
from trend; the coefficient in the baseline regression with year fixed effects (Column (2)) is
1.17, with a standard deviation of 0.34 using robust standard errors. This implies that for a
one percent increase in the elasticity-income measure, revenues increase by 1.17 percent. The
expected coefficient of 1 (see Equation (6)) is well within any reasonable confidence bounds
of the coefficient estimation. In Column (3), I interact the elasticity-income measure with
an indicator for whether there is a downturn, measured by whether real personal income is
below trend. I find that there may be an asymmetry as to how much revenues respond to
the elasticity-income measure. During downturns, the coefficient is 0.26 below the coefficient
during upturns, although the difference is only significant at the 10 percent level. The difference
may derive from the fact that the highest elasticity revenue component, charges and fees, tends
to have a lower elasticity during downturns (see Table 3).
To get a sense of how large these revenue shocks can be, consider Boise City, ID which has a
low total elasticity variable of 49 percent due to a high reliance on property taxes, and Spokane
City, WA which has a total elasticity variable of 73 percent, due to a higher reliance on sales
taxes and state intergovernmental transfers. Both cities suffered income shocks of roughly 10
percent of income in the 1980s. Given a 10 percent income shock, had the two cities swapped
revenue structures, Boise's revenue shock would have been 2.4 percent greater than it was and
Spokane's would have been 2.4 percent less than it was. In both cities, this amount corresponds
to roughly 20 to 30 (2005) dollars per capita and 3,000 dollars per government employee. 19 This
is certainly a large enough difference to have a substantial effect on government budgets.
2.4.3 The Effect on Expenditures
Now armed with an instrument for total revenues, I can turn to the question of how revenues
affect expenditures. I want to understand how revenue shocks affect expenditure decisions in
the following year, and the estimation equation is:
1 8The "trend" is defined as a trend line fitted to in IAt for each city.
"These are 2005 dollars and are calculated by using the revenue, population, and employment figures from
1985.
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(2.8)
As detailed above, I will use Ei1972 In Ijt_1 as an instrument for In Rit_1. The validity of the
instrument relies on including In It_I and (In it_1)2 as controls. The previous subsection
was devoted to exploring the first-stage of the IV regression, and in this section, I present the
second-stage results.
In Table 6, I show the results of running both the OLS regressions and the IV regressions.
Column (1) does not include year fixed effects, Column (2) represents the baseline regressions
with year fixed effects, and Column (3) includes the log of total revenues interacted with an
indicator for whether the time period is a downturn. Columns (4)-(6) mirror the specifications
of the OLS regressions, but represent IV regressions in which 6i1972 In it- instruments for
In Rit_1 in Columns (4) and (5), and in which there is an additional instrument of Ei1972 In it_1*
I(downturn) and an additional endogenous regressor of In Rit 1 * I(downturn) in Column (6).
The OLS baseline regression produces a coefficient of 0.58, i.e. for a one percent increase of
revenues, expenditures increase by 0.58 percent. However, as seen in the baseline IV regression
in Column (5), a one percent increase in revenues produces a 1.14 percent increase in expendi-
tures in the following period. The OLS coefficient does appear to be biased downward. There
are two reasons that could contribute to the bias. First, in the time series dimension, there
may be an omitted variable of people's demand for government services. If demand rises in
economic slumps as revenues fall, the fi coefficient would be biased downward. Second, in the
cross-sectional dimension, the existence of both "profligate" legislatures (that tend to increase
spending and decrease taxes at the same time), and "thrifty" legislatures (that do the opposite)
could also produce a downwards bias in 0. The results from the IV regression suggest that
the balanced budget rules appear to be binding. Certainly, the regressions in Table 6 show
that the revenue structure not only has a large impact on revenues, but also a large impact on
expenditures.
In Table 7, I explore the impact of a revenue shock on the components of expenditures. In
Columns (2)-(5), I show the response of the basic components of expenditures:
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In Eit = 0 In Rit-i +Tr11 In -it_1 I+ r/2 (In Ist-1)2 + r/it + (Pi + Kt + pit
Expenditures = CapitalOutlays + CurrentOperations
+InsuranceTrustFunds + Other (2.9)
where Other includes intergovernmental transfers, interest payments, and total assistance and
subsidies. In Column (6), I show the impact of a revenue shock on salaries and wages which
may be distributed throughout the other components (but are mostly concentrated in current
operations). The bottom rows of the table show the percent that each of these components
contributed to expenditures in both 1972 and 2002. Current operations made up the largest
part of expenditures at a little under seventy percent in both years shown. Capital outlays
made up 18 percent of expenditures in 1972, and 16.5 percent in 2002. Salaries and wages
made up between 30-45 percent of expenditures, depending on the year.
The coefficients shown in Table 7 are the results of IV regressions of the expenditure
components against the logarithm of revenues as in Equation (8). To interpret the coefficients,
I consider that if a revenue shock were spread across all expenditures in a proportional way,
the coefficient should be the same across components. A coefficient higher than 1.14 signals
that that the component is extra affected by the change to revenue, and a coefficient less than
1.14 signals that the component is less affected than average. Capital outlays, contributions
to insurance trust funds, and the "other" category are the components that are the most
(relatively) affected by the shifts to revenue. Current operations are the least relatively affected.
While the standard errors are large, the hypothesis that all of the coefficients are the same can
be rejected at the five percent level.
I further probe the impact of revenues on expenditures by looking at expenditure functions
in Table 8, in which I split expenditures into ten functions: protection, education, transit,
sanitation, buildings, health and hospitals, welfare, administration, parks and recreation, and
other. Again, the coefficients shown are the estimates from IV regressions of the natural
logarithm of the expenditure function against lagged revenues. As in Table 7, Table 8 shows
the percentages that each function contributed to expenditures in 1972 and 2002.
Again, a coefficient above 1.14 in Table 8 signals an expenditure function that is especially
87
sensitive to changes in revenue. The most sensitive components are spending on transit (most
of which is on highways) and spending on health and hospitals (most of which is hospitals).
For a one percent increase in revenue, spending on transit will increase by 3.97 percent, and
spending on health and hospitals will increase by 3.70 percent. Also significant are the large
responses of buildings and administration to fluctuations in revenues. The responsiveness of
transit, hospitals, and buildings is consistent with my finding that capital expenditures are
especially responsive to movements in city revenue.
2.5 Estimating Local Fiscal Multipliers
In this section, I attempt to use the variation in the revenue structure of the city governments
as an instrument to estimate the impacts of a balanced budget shock. Imagine the following:
A negative shock occurs to both City A and City B. City A has very responsive revenues, and
is forced to cut expenditures substantially in response to the initial shock. City B, on the other
hand, does not have very responsive revenues, and does not have to cut expenditures to the same
degree. In the following period, the economies of City A and City B may respond differently
because of the difference in local government expenditures and revenues. If these differences
are somewhat randomly assigned, we can learn about the effects of a balanced budget change
to local government expenditures on employment. Given the analysis that I did in Section
4, I argue that I can use the elasticity-income variable to instrument for a balanced budget
expenditure shock in a regression of government expenditures on total private employment:
In Empit = a + In Expit + m1 ln Ist-1 + r 2 (lnIt_1)2 + Tit + Pi + Kt + p1it (2.10)
where Empit is total employment in the county that contains the city government. Because
the employment data are at the county level rather than the city level, I need to limit to cities
that make up a substantial part of their counties so that it is plausible that their actions would
have an effect on total county employment. Also, because there is evidence that the multiplier
might be larger in recessions (Christiano et al, 2011), it is useful to interact expenditures with
an indicator for whether there is a downturn. As usual, in these fiscal multiplier analyses, the
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key of estimating Equation (10) is to find an instrument for expenditures. In the analysis laid
out above in the paper, we have found one (for balanced budget government spending shocks)
in the elasticity-income variable. In Table 9, I show the results from the first-stage for the two
endogenous variables, Expit and Expit * I(downturn).
Since the regressions shown in Table 9 are the reduced form of the analysis done in Section
4.3, it should come as no surprise that the elasticity-income variable predicts expenditures. In
the first column, I show the baseline regression for all city governments. In columns (2) -
(4), I limit the sample to cities that make up more than 80 percent of their counties. Even
in the limited sample, it appears that the income-elasticity variable appropriately predicts
expenditures (albeit with wider standard errors).
Table 10 shows both the OLS and the IV results in estimating Equation (10). The dependent
variable in all of these regressions is total county level employment, as measured by the BEA.
In Columns (2), (3), (5), and (6), I limit to the cities that make up more than 80 percent of
their counties so that their governmental actions could plausibly have an effect on the aggregate
county employment. I present Columns (1) and (4) to show the mapping from the previous
analysis.
In the OLS baseline regression in Column (2), I find a very small (although significant)
positive response of total employment to expenditures. When expenditures are increased by
one percent, I find that total county employment is increased by 0.02 percent. In the IV results,
the point estimates jump substantially (for the regressions that limit to those cities that make
up a large percent of their counties). In the baseline regression I find that a one percent
increase in expenditures leads to a 0.35 percent increase in employment. Since the average
employment to expenditure ratio is about 0.0002, 0.35 corresponds to an average measurement
of 14,000 dollars per job-which is a smaller measurement than the estimates in Chodorow-Reich
(2012), Wilson (2012), and Shoag (2011).2( However, the standard errors are too large to draw
conclusions about this point estimate. Furthermore, the standard errors in Column (6) are too
large to distinguish between the multiplier difference in downturns versus upturns.
Because of the imprecision of the results, my contribution in this section is not a precise
2 dIn_____ dEmp (Exp~
"To convert the elasticity coefficient to a level coefficient, consider that d = I n Exmp dEx (Empp so that
dExp Exp
dEmp *Emp
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estimate of the balanced budget multiplier, but rather a new approach to measuring a multiplier
that deserves more attention in the literature. The analysis of this paper suggests that to
understand the private sector implications of the recent state and local government budget
cuts, the multiplier of interest is the balanced budget multiplier rather than the deficit-financed
fiscal multiplier. In future analysis, I believe that the variation in revenue structure of local
governments could be used to achieve a more precise estimate of this variable. In particular,
given the magnitude of the cuts in the recent recession, there may be success in applying this
methodology to recent years when the local government data becomes available. 2 1
2.6 Caveats and Concerns
In Sections 4 and 5, I have argued that ei1972 ln it can be used as an instrument for ln Rit and
balanced budget shocks, and showed that the first stage holds. However, to be a successful
instrument, it also has to be independent of pit in Equation (3) and Equation (10). The
primary concern with this instrument is that some of the determinants of the revenue structure
may also affect the short-term movements of personal income. Recall that the determinants of
the revenue structure are related to state-level laws, the preferences of voters, the preferences
of legislators, and the previous legislation. By fixing the year in which the revenue structure is
taken (to be 1972), I avoid the problem that the revenue structure also responds to the state of
the business cycle (in which the more elastic components move more). Because the state laws
are not exogenous, it could be that the voter preferences that lead to the state laws will also be
correlated with cyclical polices that affect personal income. In order to test this possibility, I
look to see whether the Ei1972 is correlated with the political beliefs of a state as measured by
whether there is a democratic or republican governor elected to office. Specifically, I run the
regression:
Ei1972 = 01(dem-goViI972) + vi (2.11)
I find a coefficient tightly estimated around zero. When I use the share that voted for a demo-
cratic governor, or the share of the legislature that is democratic, I find a similarly negligible
2 1 Currently, the individual government finance data are available only through 2006.
90
correlation.
Perhaps the most troublesome concern is that the cyclicality of state intergovernmental
transfers may be correlated to the revenue structure of the local government. This would
occur if cities were able to choose a more elastic revenue structure precisely because their state
government increased transfers during recessions. This might happen, for example, if the
revenue structure of the state government counterbalanced the revenue structure of the local
government in terms of short-term elasticity. I test this possibility using two methods. First,
I regress ei1972 against the equivalent "total elasticity" variable of the state government. I
find zero correlation. Second, as shown in Figure 1, on a state-by-state basis, I estimate the
elasticity of the state intergovernmental transfers for each state. I then regress Ci1972 against
that elasticity and, again, find a zero correlation. These tests suggest that the concern that
state intergovernmental transfers are correlated to the revenue structure of the local government
is unfounded.
Another concern is that the revenue structure choice may be correlated to elements of the
economic environment which are also related to the business cycle. This is especially concerning
for cities that rely on income taxes. If cities that have a financial sector and a lot of commuters
tend to rely more on individual income taxes in order to capture some of the income of their
wealthy workers in order to subsidize their less wealthy residents, there is a definite reason to
think that this could affect the response of the city to recessions. Because this is particularly
concerning for individual income taxes, I re-run the regressions excluding those cities that have
positive individual income taxes. I find that the results hold.
2.7 Conclusion
When a government can borrow countercyclically, having revenues that automatically fall during
recessions may be a good thing; while keeping expenditures constant, this automatic reduction
will leave more cash in the hands of the taxpayers at a time when money is tight. However,
when the government faces a balanced budget rule, the benefits of procyclical revenues can be
overshadowed by their impacts on expenditures. In the analysis of this paper, I find that in city
governments in the United States fluctuations in revenues lead to fluctuations in expenditures
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of roughly the same size leading to balanced budget spending shocks to the local economies.
Public sector expenditure volatility may have large impacts on both the short-term and long-
term outlook for private local economies. In the short-term, the balanced budget spending
cuts are likely to have negative effects on the economy through balanced budget multipliers. In
Section 5, 1 argued that the revenue structure of local governments may be used as an instrument
for balanced budget shocks. While my sample did not produce precise results, the strong first-
stage suggests that future research along these lines has the potential of producing illuminating
estimates. The balanced budget multiplier is distinct from other multipliers recently measured
in the literature, and estimating its size would not only aid in understanding the impacts of the
recent cuts at the local government level, but could also shed light on whether a deficit-neutral
fiscal stimulus might be possible at the federal level.
In Section 4, I showed some evidence that capital outlays might be disproportionately af-
fected by the revenue shocks at the city government level. Highways, other transit, and hospitals
are the components of expenditures that are the most responsive to fluctuations in revenue.
There is an existing literature that suggests that these components of public investment may be
integrally connected to aggregate productivity. Aschauer(1989) found that, of all infrastructure
spending, the "core" infrastructure of "streets, highways, airports, mass transit, sewers, water
systems, etc." had the most power in explaining the connection between aggregate productivity
and public investment. These are exactly the components of public infrastructure that are
implemented at the local government level. The Congressional Budget Office did an analysis
in the 1980s on highway spending and found a surprisingly high 35 percent rate of return to
projects that maintain current highway conditions (Congressional Budget Office, 1988). Other
estimates of the rates of return associated with public investment are reported in Gramlich
(1994). Although these studies focus on the level of public investment rather than its respon-
siveness to the business cycle, their findings suggest that cyclical disruptions to infrastructure
spending may have negative effects on productivity during vulnerable times. The long-term
effects that expenditure fluctuations have on productivity and growth through this channel are
well-worth exploring in future research.
Finally, the results in this paper highlight the potential importance of automatic stabiliz-
ers. While at the federal level automatic stabilizers can exist for both revenue and expenditure
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components of the budget (where in recessions revenues automatically fall and expenditures
automatically increase), the balanced budget rules at the local government levels suggest that a
better approach would be to find a way to automatically stabilize revenues in order to avoid ex-
penditure fluctuations. The federal government can have a role in smoothing local government
revenues by implementing a policy of countercyclical intergovernmental grants. In the late
1970s, the federal government passed a temporary countercyclical revenue sharing program in
which all local governments were awarded grants when their local unemployment rates reached
high enough levels. Although that program was too small to have significant macroeconomic
effects at the time, a similar program might successfully help to soften the impact of negative
revenue shocks at the municipal level. Furthermore, grants that were automatically distrib-
uted in response to local economic conditions would help to alleviate any revenue declines in a
timely fashion. Local governments could also work to stabilize their own revenue sources by
adjusting their revenue structures within the constraints of state level laws. In addition, they
could legislate revenue rate increases that are implemented automatically when revenues fall or
local economies deteriorate.
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2.8 Appendix
The sources of the data used are described below:
Local government finance and population data - These data are all from the Annual
Survey of Government Finance (ASG) as collected by the Census Bureau, in which all govern-
ments are surveyed every five years (in years ending in -2 and -5), and a sample of governments
are surveyed each year. The probability of being sampled is related to the population of the
city. By limiting my sample to cities with more than 25,000 in 1972, I construct a sample
that is close to being balanced. The ASG data are reported by the fiscal year of the local
government. Because my analysis relies on merging these data with macroeconomic variables,
I adjust the ASG data to match the calendar years. Details on how I do this can be found in
Feiveson (2012).
GDP deflators - I deflate all the ASG finance data using the GDP state and local deflator,
and the macroeconomic level data using the GDP deflators. Both deflators come from the BEA
National and Income Product Accounts, Table 1.1.4.
County level income, employment, and population data - These data are from the
BEA regional accounts. In particular, the income and population data are from the series
CA05, and the employment data are from the series CA25.
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Tables
Table 1: City Revenue Decomposition: Percent of Total Revenues
1972 2002
Standard Standard
Revenue Source Mean Dvation Minimum Maximum Mean Dvation Minimum MaximumDeviation Deviation
Property Taxes 29 18 0 96 20 13 0 81
Sales Taxes 6 9 0 56 8 10 0 45
Individual Income Taxes 2 8 0 63 2 8 0 47
State Transfers 14 9 0 57 16 14 0 73
Federal Transfers 7 7 0 63 4 4 0 30
Charges and Fees 18 12 1 79 25 11 4 74
Utilities 14 15 0 73 14 15 0 68
Other 9 7 0 38 10 9 -52 56
Table 2: Top 20 City Revenue Decomposition
Percent of Revenues Coming From:
City State Population Property Sales Individual State Federal Charges
Taxes Taxes Income Transfers Transfers and Fees Utilities 
Other
Taxes
NEW YORK CITY NY 7,895,563 21 5 8 39 3 9 7 9
CHICAGO CITY IL 3,369,359 31 6 0 9 11 11 6 25
LOS ANGELES CITY CA 2,809,596 17 7 0 7 5 14 31 18
PHILADELPHIA CITY PA 1,950,098 15 0 32 12 14 16 3 9
DETROIT CITY MI 1,512,893 21 0 13 11 22 13 11 10
HOUSTON CITY TX 1,232,802 34 14 0 1 11 17 12 1I
BALTIMORE CITY MD 905,759 21 0 4 48 9 8 2 7
DALLAS CITY TX 844,401 37 10 0 1 5 15 20 11
WASHINGTON DC DC 756,510 13 9 13 0 43 8 1 14
CLEVELAND CITY OH 750,879 16 0 19 9 12 19 24 1
INDIANAPOLIS CITY IN 748,056 47 0 0 23 12 17 0 2
MILWAUKEE CITY WI 717,372 32 0 0 28 7 13 8 12
SAN FRANCISCO CITY CA 715,674 24 4 0 23 11 16 9 13
SAN DIEGO CITY CA 697,027 18 10 0 12 15 20 15 11
SAN ANTONIO CITY TX 654,153 13 6 0 0 10 14 54 3
BOSTON CITY MA 641,071 54 0 0 17 9 12 2 6
HONOLULU CITY HI 630,528 45 0 0 8 13 13 9 12
MEMPHIS CITY TN 623,530 10 0 0 18 3 10 36 22
ST LOUIS CITY MO 622,236 16 7 16 8 13 14 4 22
NEW ORLEANS CITY LA 593,471 15 17 0 13 18 21 6 10
Notes: Revenue decomposition from 1972.
95
Table 3: Elasticity Estimates
Property Individual State Federal Charges andProer Sales Taxes Income Tate Feder Caes Utilities OtherTxs Taxes Transfers Transfers FeesTaxes
ln (real income) 0.53*** 0.78*** 0.70** 0.71*** -0.13 1.11*** 0.59*** 0.59***
(0.05) (0.09) (0.30) (0.08) (0.15) (0.06) (0.07) (0.10)
Notes: Robust standard errors are shown in parentheses. Regressions are the natural logarithm of the revenue source against the
natural logarithm of county-level personal income and include city fixed effects and a city-specific time trend. All variables are
deflated by the gdp price deflator.
* p<0.10, **p<0.5, ***p<0.01
Table 4: Elasticity Estimates in the Business Cycle
Property Individual State Federal Charges and
Proer Sales Taxes Income Tate Feder Caes Utilities OtherTxs Taxes Transfers Transfers FeesTaxes
ln(income)* 0.58*** 0.69*** 0.45 0.59*** -0.45* 1.37*** 0.83*** 0.55***
(1-I(downtum)) (0.08) (0.16) (0.36) (0.14) (0.27) (0.12) (0.11) (0.18)
ln(income)*I(downturn) 0.47*** 0.90*** 1.00 0.86*** 0.28 0.78*** 0.30** 0.64***
(0.11) (0.15) (0.74) (0.17) (0.25) (0.11) (0.14) (0.19)
Difference -0.12 0.21 0.55 0.27 0.73* -0.59*** -0.53** 0.09
(0.17) (0.27) (0.96) (0.26) (0.43) (0.20) (0.22) (0.31)
Notes: Robust standard errors are shown in parentheses. Regressions are the natural logarithm of the revenue source against the
natural logarithm of county-level personal income and include city fixed effects and a city-specific time trend. All variables are
deflated by the GDP price deflator. A "downturn" is defined by whether the log of real income is below its linear trend.
* p<0.10, **p<0.5, ***p<0.01
Table 5: Total Revenue Regressions
(1) (2) (3)
Elasticity * In (real income) 1.10*** 1.17*** 1.28***
(0.35) (0.34) (0.33)
Elasticity * In (real income) * I(downturn) -0.26*
(0.14)
In (real income) 1.54*** 1.08*** 1.11***
(0.41) (0.36) (0.38)
In (real income) ^ 2 -0.04*** -0.03*** -0.03***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Year Fixed Effects X X
Observations 23,996 23,996 23,996
Notes: Robust standard errors are shown in parentheses. The dependent variable of the
regressions is the natural logarithm of total city government revenues. All regressions
include city fixed effects and a city-specific time trend. Specification (2) and (3)
includes year fixed effects. Specification (3) also includes the elasticity variable
interacted by an indicator for whether the ln(income) is below its linear trend value.
Variables are deflated by the gdp price deflator.
* p<0.10, **p<0.5, ***p<0.01
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Table 6: Total Expenditure Regressions
OLS IV
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Lagged In (revenues) 0.57*** 0.58*** 0.57*** 0.86*** 1.14*** 1.26***
(0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.31) (0.33) (0.29)
Lagged In (revenues) * I(downturn) 0.03 -0.26
(0.03) (0.16)
Lagged In (real income) -0.44* 0.30 0.30 -1.14 -0.76 -0.81
(0.25) (0.28) (0.28) (0.78) (0.70) (0.69)
Lagged In (real income) ^ 2 0.03*** 0.01 0.01 0.04** 0.02 0.02*
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01)
Year Fixed Effects X X X X
Observations 23,625 23,625 23,625 22,916 22,916 22,916
Notes: Robust standard errors are shown in parentheses. The first three regressions are OLS regressions with the natural
logarithm of total city government expenditures as the dependent variable. In the IV regressions in columns (4)-(6), the
elasticity variable multiplied by the lagged In (real income) instruments for the lagged In (total revenues). Finally, in column
(6), there is an additional endogenous variable of the lagged revenues times an indicator as to whether there is a downturn,
with an additional instrument of the total elasticity multiplied by lagged In (income) and interacted with the indicator for
whether there is a downturn. A downturn is indicated when the In (real income) lies below its linear trend. All regressions
include city fixed effects and a city-specific time trend. Variables are deflated by the GDP price deflator.
* p<0.10, **p<0.5, ***p<0.01
Table 7: Expenditure Components
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Total Capital Current Insurance Other 
Salaries and
Outlays Operations Trust Funds Wages
Lagged ln (revenues) 1.14*** 2.39** 0.64** 3.27** 3.20*** 0.83**
(0.33) (1.14) (0.26) (1.64) (1.18) (0.37)
% of Expenditures, 1972 100.0 18.1 67.9 3.6 10.4 44.0
% of Expenditures, 2002 100.0 16.5 68.3 6.1 9.1 31.3
Observations 22,916 22,797 22,915 11,629 22,879 22,868
Notes: Robust standard errors are shown in parentheses. Regressions are IV regressions where the elasticity variable
multiplied by the lagged In (real income) instruments for lagged In (revenues). The dependent variables are the natural
logarithms of the expenditure component. All regressions include city fixed effects, city-specific time trends, year fixed
effects, and control for lagged ln(income) and lagged ln(income) square. Variables are deflated by the gdp price deflator.
* p<0.10, **p<0.5, ***p<0.01
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Table 8: Expenditure Functions
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Protection Education Transit Sanitation Buildings Health and Welfare Admin- Parks and Other
(Police, (Highways, (Sewerage (Housing, Hospitals istration Recreation
Fire, Subways, and Solid Public
Correction) Air, Water) Waste) Buildings,
Libraries)
Lagged in (revenues) 1.35*** -1.10 3.97*** 1.16 2.61*** 3.70** -0.26 2.44*** 0.54 1.02*
(0.39) (1.95) (1.22) (0.76) (0.99) (1.72) (1.45) (0.73) (0.71) (0.56)
% of Expenditures, 13.9 14.2 6.7 6.5 5.8 6.5 7.8 3.0 3.5 38.9
% of Expenditures, 16.1 13.0 8.6 7.3 6.0 5.2 4.9 4.1 4.0 45.2
Observations 22916 23,958 4,896 23,968 23,475 23,776 17,543 8,851 23,966 23,427
Notes: Robust standard errors are shown in parentheses. Regressions are IV regressions where the elasticity variable multiplied by
the lagged In (real income) instruments for lagged In (revenues). The dependent variables are the natural logarithms of the
expenditure component. All regressions include city fixed effects, city-specific time trends, year fixed effects, and control for
lagged ln(income) and lagged ln(income) square. Variables are deflated by the gdp price deflator.
* p<0.10, **p<0.5, ***p<0.01
Table 9: First Stage
(1) (2) (3) (4)
In (expenditures) In (exp) *
I (downturn)
Elasticity * In (real income) 1.19*** 1.15** 1.36** 0.08
(0.34) (0.59) (0.59) (0.33)
Elasticity * In (real income) * I(downturn) -0.43 1.29***
(0.40) (0.35)
City/County Cutoff None 0.80 0.80 0.80
Observations 22,916 1,525 1,525 1,525
Notes: Robust standard errors are shown in parentheses. All regressions include city fixed effects, city-
specific time trends, year fixed effects, and control for lagged In(income) and lagged ln(income) squared. In
Specifications (2)-(4), the observations are limited to city's that make up more than 80 percent of their
containing counties. Variables are deflated by the gdp price deflator.
* p<0.10, **p<0.5, ***p<0.01
Table 10: Total Expenditure Regressions
OLS IV
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
In (expenditures) 0.01*** 0.02** 0.02 -0.00 0.35 0.40*
(0.00) (0.01) (0.02) (0.10) (0.25) (0.22)
In (expenditures) * I(downturn) 0.01 -0.08
(0.02) (0.12)
City/County Cutoff None 0.80 0.80 None 0.80 0.80
Observations 23,625 1,525 1,525 22,916 1,525 1,525
Notes: Robust standard errors are shown in parentheses. All regressions include city fixed effects, city-specific time trends,
year fixed effects, and control for lagged ln(income) and lagged ln(income) squared. Specifications (1)-(3) are OLS
regressions with the natural logarithm of total county employment as the dependent variable. Specifications (4) - (6) are IV
regressions where the elasticity multiplied by lagged ln(real income) instruments for ln (expenditures). Variables are
deflated by the gdp price deflator.
* p<0.10, **p<0.5, ***p<0.01
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Figures
Figure 1: Municipal Tax Authority
Property or Sales Only
Property + Sales or Income
Property + Sales + Income
Notes: Data are from Hoene and Pagano (2008).
Figure 2: Tax and Expenditure Limits
Bindfg property tax lmit + general limit
Binding property tax limit
Non-binding property tax limit
No TELs
Notes: Data are from Hoene and Pagano (2008).
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Figure 3: State-Specific Elasticity of Intergovernmental Revenue
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Figure 4: Total Elasticity Variable
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Figure 5: The Size of the Elasticity-Income Shocks
E0
~4 e0
w*
-.4 -.2 0 .2 .
% Dev. of Income from Trend
101
Chapter 3
Does State Fiscal Relief During
Recessions Increase Employment?
Evidence from the American
Recovery and Reinvestment Act1
3.1 Introduction
The federal government enacted the approximately $800 billion American Recovery and Rein-
vestment Act (ARRA) in February 2009 to provide a countercyclical impulse during the worst
economic downturn in the United States in at least sixty years. At the same time, state govern-
ments, almost all of which have balanced budget requirements that restrict borrowing across
fiscal years, had already begun to lay off employees, cut spending and transfer programs, and
raise taxes. Rather than concentrate the stimulus in direct federal government purchases of
output, the ARRA's authors chose to mitigate this sub-national contractionary fiscal impulse
by routing roughly a third of the total through state and local governments. The largest of these
programs was the increase in the federal match component of state Medicaid expenditures.
Countercyclical intergovernmental transfers to support sub-national budgets have occurred
Co-authored with Gabriel Chodorow-Reich, Zachary Liscow, and William Woolston.
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previously in the U.S. and in other countries around the world. Yet, this form of stimulus has
received little attention in the academic literature, compared with the large number of studies
of direct government purchases or tax reductions.2 A priori, transfers could have a small or
zero immediate impact on economic outcomes if states simply use them to bolster their rainy
day funds, effectively shifting money between government accounts without affecting the overall
stance of the general government sector. On the other hand, states may use the money to reduce
tax increases or avert budget cuts, allowing the money to enter the economy more quickly than
direct federal purchases that require project selection and approval. Reflecting this theoretical
uncertainty, views on the effectiveness of state aid prior to the ARRA's passage ranged from
then-House Minority Leader John Boehner, who predicted that "direct aid to the states is not
going to do anything to stimulate our economy," to the Obama Administration, which predicted
that the state relief would save or create more than 800,000 jobs in the fourth quarter of 2010.3
Even well after the ARRA's passage, disagreement continued, with many Republicans and some
economists claiming that no jobs had been created, while the White House continued claiming
large job gains.4
This paper aims to fill the gap in our understanding of intergovernmental transfers by
empirically assessing the impact of the ARRA's Medicaid match program. The program has
a number of features that make it attractive for study. First, the total amount of money
distributed through this program is large enough to plausibly generate a detectable effect on
employment. Out of a total of $88 billion dedicated to an increase in the Medicaid matching
funds, states had received $61.2 billion by June 30, 2010, the end of our period of study. Second,
because state Medicaid programs operate on a mandatory basis, increasing the federal share
of costs effectively transfers money into state budgets that states can then use for any purpose
they choose - the money is fungible. Indeed, many states reported that they had allocated the
money quickly to areas that otherwise would have undergone deeper budget cuts (Government
2There is a large literature on the extent to which federal grants crowd out local government spending which
was spearheaded and summarized by Gramlich (1977).
3See http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/28841300/ns/meet the_ press/t/meet-press-transcript-jan/ and Romer
and Bernstein (2009).
4See http://www.factcheck.org/2010/09/did-the-stimulus-create-jobs/ for a list of quotes from Republicans
claiming that the ARRA created no jobs. Also, a survey by the National Association for Business Economics
showed that 69% of business economists they surveyed reported that the ARRA had no impact on employment
(http://www.jsonline.com/business/82657582.html).
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Accountability Office 2009; National Association of State Budget Officers 2009b). Third, the
level of additional money received by states as of June 2010 per person aged 16 or older (16+)
varied greatly, from a low of $103 in Utah to a high of $507 in DC, with an interquartile range
of $114. This variation makes possible a cross-sectional econometric strategy. We focus our
analysis on the effect on employment because the public debate on the effectiveness of the
ARRA has centered largely on this outcome. Furthermore, high-quality monthly state level
employment data makes it possible to obtain more precise estimates of fiscal multipliers than
what is possible with the existing state-level income data.
The primary challenge to a cross-sectional study is that the amount of aid a state receives
is endogenous to the state's economic conditions. Because states that were in worse economic
shape received more aid, the OLS relationship between the level of state fiscal transfers and
changes in employment understates the true effect of state fiscal relief. We address this con-
cern by using an instrument that isolates the component of the Medicaid transfers unrelated to
changes in economic circumstances. The ARRA increased the percentage of Medicaid expen-
ditures that the federal government pays for all states by 6.2 percentage points and increased
the match rate by more for states that experienced especially large increases in unemployment.
Thus, the level of ARRA Medicaid transfers to each state is the result of four factors: the
amount of Medicaid spending in the state prior to the recession; the change in the number
of beneficiaries during the recession; the change in the average spending per beneficiary; and
whether the state qualified for an additional match increase based on the change in the state's
unemployment rate. The heart of our identification strategy lies in exploiting only the cross-
sectional variation from the first of these factors, that is, the variation in ARRA Medicaid
transfers that results from variation in Medicaid programs from before the recession.
Another set of reasons why a state may have both received more Medicaid funding and had
different employment outcomes-omitted factors related to both state Medicaid program rules
and economic changes-is not solved by the instrument. For example, more liberal coastal and
Midwestern states both had larger downturns and have more generous Medicaid programs. We
present several pieces of evidence that suggest that our results are not driven by underlying
differences between high and low spending Medicaid states. First, to ensure that time-invariant
differences between high and low Medicaid spending states are not driving our relationship,
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our empirical strategy considers changes, rather than levels, of employment. Second, in our
baseline specification we exploit only differences in Medicaid spending within census divisions
rather than between them, and include a number of variables that help predict how a state's
employment would have changed absent the ARRA. Finally, we present falsification tests by
running our baseline specification on pre-ARRA data and show that in the decade before the
ARRA passed, states with high and low Medicaid spending experienced similar employment
outcomes.
An important caveat to our analysis is that a cross-state approach forces us to ignore general
equilibrium effects, which could alter our interpretation of the overall effect of stimulus spending
on jobs and prevents us from tying down the aggregate fiscal policy multiplier. For example,
spending in one state may increase demand in other states, which would lead us to under-state
overall job increases. 5 On the other hand, investment could decrease across the country in
response to increased government borrowing, though this effect is likely to have been especially
muted during the low policy interest rate environment of 2009-10. Likewise, to the extent that
people believe that their taxes will be raised in the future due to the increased government
borrowing, spending may decrease throughout the country.
With this caveat in mind, we find that the ARRA transfers to states had an economically
large and statistically robust positive effect on employment. Assuming that employment does
not persist beyond the time during which it is funded, our preferred specification suggests that
a marginal $100,000 in Medicaid transfers resulted in 3.8 net job-years (i.e., one job that lasts
for one year) of total employment through June 2010, of which 3.2 are outside the government,
health, and education sectors. The effect is precisely estimated, and we can reject the null
hypothesis that the spending had no effect on employment with a high degree of confidence.
For this result to be economically plausible, states must have used the funds to avoid spending
cuts or tax increases. Hence we also provide evidence that the transfers do not appear to have
increased the states' end of year balances. In connecting our estimates to the implicit changes in
government spending or taxes, our paper also adds to the recent literature on the employment
effects of state spending (e.g., Shoag 2011; Wilson 2011; Suarez-Serrato and Wingender 2011;
5 Moretti (2010) notes that, through labor mobility, cross-state spillovers can also be negative. However, labor
mobility is likely small over a period of time as short as that considered here.
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Clemens and Miran 2011), as well as the fiscal effects of government spending generally (e.g.,
Nakamura and Steinsson 2011).
The paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2, we describe the institutional details of Medicaid
grants and the ARRA stimulus package. Section 3 contains our econometric methodology and
describes our baseline specification. In Section 4, we describe our data. Sections 5 and 6 present
our main results and robustness checks, respectively. Section 7 provides an interpretation of our
results and relates them to the existing literature. Section 8 discusses evidence of a budgetary
transmission mechanism, and Section 9 concludes.
3.2 Institutional Details of the ARRA and Medicaid Grants
The ARRA became law in February 2009 at an estimated 10-year cost of $787 billion. Through
December 2010, it had distributed $609 billion.' As Cogan and Taylor (2010) point out, only
$30 billion of this total got recorded in the national income accounts as federal government
consumption or investment. A little more than half ($350 billion) went to individuals or business
in the form of tax reductions or transfer payments. The rest, more than $200 billion, went
through state and local governments, including $88 billion through the Medicaid match program
designed especially to alleviate the strain on state budgets. 7 State fiscal relief had the added
advantage of getting out the door quickly: in the first quarter of 2009, more than three-fourths
of total ARRA outlays and tax expenditures took the form of Medicaid outlays.
Medicaid is a state-run program that provides health insurance for certain individuals and
families with low incomes and resources. Both the eligibility requirements and the scope of the
insurance coverage vary across states. The federal government reimburses states for between 50
and 83 percent of their Medicaid expenditures, as determined by the Federal Medical Assistance
Percentages (FMAP). Many states require that local governments share in financing the non-
federal portion of the program. Each federal fiscal year, states' FMAPs are recalculated based
on the three-year average of each state's per capita personal income relative to the national
6 Data in this paragraph come from the Bureau of Economic Analysis Recovery Act data program at
www.bea.gov/recovery.
7 Another $38 billion went through the State Fiscal Stabilization Fund (SFSF), part of a $48.6 billion appro-
priation that apportioned the money according to a mix of population of persons aged 5-24 (61%) and total
population (39%).
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average, with poorer states receiving higher reimbursement rates. Thus, states that have lower
average incomes, more recipients of Medicaid per capita, or more generous benefits receive
larger per capita matching funds from the federal government.
The ARRA made three changes to the baseline FMAP calculation for October 2008 through
December 2010. First, the baseline FMAP could not decrease. Second, the FMAP was increased
by 6.2 percentage points above the baseline for every state. 8 The additional match applied
retroactively from passage in mid-February back to October 2008, making part of the transfer
purely lump-sum. Finally, through December 2010, each state received a further increase in its
FMAP based on the largest increase in its unemployment rate experienced between the trough
three-month average since January 2006 and the most recently available 3-month average. 9 To
qualify for the ARRA changes, states had to, at a minimum, maintain the eligibility standards,
methodologies, and procedures of their Medicaid programs that existed on July 1, 2008. Pro-
gram benefits could, however, change. The law also forbade states from increasing the share of
the non-federally financed portion of Medicaid spending borne by local governments, in effect
extending the fiscal relief to local governments as well.
There appear to have been two main rationales for the FMAP increases. First, unlike direct
federal spending, state fiscal relief through changes to the FMAP could be implemented almost
immediately; the first ARRA Medicaid reimbursements recorded by the Department of Health
and Human Services occurred during the week ending on March 13, 2009, only a few weeks after
the ARRA was signed into law. Second, the changes to FMAP were intended to boost the level
of discretionary funds available to states, and not only to relieve Medicaid burdens. Because an
increase in the FMAP reduces the state portion of mandatory payments, the additional funds
are completely fungible - states can use them however they wish. Congress recognized the
fungibility of the funds during the legislative debate. Indeed, the legislative text of the ARRA
says that the first purpose of the section containing the FMAP increases is to "provide fiscal
8 Under the ARRA, the 0.83 cap on FMAP was also removed.
9 1n the fourth quarter of 2008 and the first quarter of 2009, the extra amount was actually based on the
largest increase between the trough 3-month average unemployment rate since January 2006 and the average
unemployment rate from October 2008 to December 2008. In the third and fourth quarters of 2010, the cal-
culation was based on the difference between the same trough average rate and the larger average of the two
3-consecutive month periods beginning with December 2009 and January 2010, respectively. Furthermore, there
was a maintenance of status clause which legislated that any increase in FMAP made for a quarter on or after
January 1, 2009, would be maintained through the second quarter of 2010.
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relief to States in a period of economic downturn." Section 8 discusses the empirical evidence
on how states used the extra FMAP funds.
Congress began discussions with state governors on a stimulus bill that would include signifi-
cant aid to state governments as early as December 2008.10 The House appropriation committee
draft released on January 15, 2009 included an increase in the FMAP of 4.8 percentage points,
and both the original House and Senate versions, passed on January 28 and February 10, re-
spectively, had the same $88 billion allocated to Medicaid as the final bill. Hence our analysis
should begin no later than December 2008 if state governments incorporated the likelihood of
additional federal relief into their budget plans.
3.3 Econometric Methodology and Baseline Specification
3.3.1 Instrumental Variables Motivation
We begin with a simple framework that relates state fiscal relief to total employment. The
change in the ratio of employment to potential workers in a state, s, depends on the state
fiscal relief that the state receives, a series of controls that capture differential trends, and a
state-specific shock:
Es - Eo AidS
Ns o + 1 Ns + 0 2Controls" + E' (3.1)
where Es is the seasonally-adjusted employment in state s in period i, N' is the 16+ population
in state s, 00 is a national-level shock, Aid" is the state fiscal relief received by state s, Controls'
are state level controls in state s, and e' is a state-level mean-zero shock.
If the state fiscal relief per potential worker, d , were uncorrelated with the error term, Es,
then (xxx) could be estimated with bivariate OLS. However, this assumption is almost certainly
not valid. The ARRA Medicaid transfers to each state reflect four factors: the amount of
Medicaid spending in the state prior to the recession; the change in the number of beneficiaries
during the recession; the change in the average spending per beneficiary; and whether the state
"For example, House Speaker Nancy Pelosi met with a group of governors on December 1st to dis-
cuss the contours of a stimulus bill that would include state aid. See: Cowan, Richard. 2008.
"House to Push $500 Billion Stimulus Bill." Reuters, December 1. Retrieved on August 10, 2010.
http://www.reuters.com/article/idJSTRE4B05QP20081201.
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qualified for the additional match increase based on the change in the state's unemployment
rate. These last three factors, and especially the fourth, share the concern of reverse causality
with respect to the outcome variable. Hence we use an instrument that restricts the cross-state
variation to only that part of Medicaid transfers related to pre-recession Medicaid spending.
Specifically, we implement a two-stage least squares estimation strategy, using 2007 Medicaid
spending as an instrument for the FMAP transfers. We normalize all relevant variables by the
number of individuals age 16+ in a state in 2008.
We also include a number of state-level controls that are potentially correlated with both
2007 Medicaid spending and changes in employment. These controls are detailed in Section 4
and include the lagged change in employment to capture pre-existing trends between high and
low Medicaid spending states.
3.3.2 Other Aspects of the Baseline Specification
We focus on two primary outcome variables: change in seasonally adjusted total nonfarm em-
ployment and change in seasonally adjusted employment in the state and local government,
health, and education sectors. We focus on total nonfarm employment because it is the most
comprehensive measure of employment available in our primary data. We also consider govern-
ment, health, and education workers since the direct effects of state spending are likely to be in
these sectors, which contain state government employees, employees of local governments which
may have received direct fiscal relief from lower required Medicaid payments and which depend
heavily on state transfers for revenue, and employees of many of the private establishments that
receive transfers or grants from state and local governments. To ensure that changes in federal
employment are not driving our results, we exclude federal workers from this measure.
Although we show how our estimates evolve over time in Section 5, we focus on employment
changes from December 2008 to July 2009 for our robustness checks and our summary statistics.
We begin our period in December 2008 because, as described above, it is the last month before
which the details of the ARRA, including the FMAP extension, became clear to the public.
We end in July 2009 for three reasons. First, almost all states have fiscal years that run from
July 1 to June 30.11 Thus, employment through the middle of July reflects any changes to
"All states other than Alabama, Michigan, New York, and Texas have fiscal years that begin on July 1.
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government employment that occurred at the beginning of the first full fiscal year after the
ARRA was passed. Second, employees in education tend to remain on the payroll through
the end of the school year, so July is the first month that would fully reflect changes in the
number of jobs in education. This is important because of the large fraction of state and local
government spending that goes to education.
Historic aggregate time series confirm that employment changes are especially large in July.
In regressions reported in an online appendix, we compared the historical mean of the absolute
value and square of state and local government employment changes for each month.1 2 For
both measures, the average July change was larger than that of every other month, and the
difference was statistically significant for every month but September and October.
The third reason to end in July 2009 stems from efficiency considerations. For example, if
the component of state employment orthogonal to our regressors is i.i.d. with variance o2 at
a monthly frequency, then the residual variance in a regression with employment change taken
over k months will equal ka 2 . That is, standard errors may increase with the duration of the
employment change. This is confirmed in Section 5 where we explore how the effect evolves
over time. To generate precise estimates for the baseline specification, it is therefore preferable
to restrict the time-window to be as short as possible.
The endogenous variable in our baseline specification is total FMAP outlays to a state
through June 30, 2010, normalized by a state's 16+ population. This choice of endogenous
variable is crucial to the interpretation of our results. If the state distribution of non-FMAP
ARRA spending were correlated with the instrument, we would misestimate the true value of
the coefficient on spending if we did not include the correlated component of spending in the
endogenous variable. However, a regression of all non-FMAP ARRA outlays to states against
the instrument (both normalized by 16+ population) and our baseline controls cannot reject
the null that the instrument is uncorrelated with other spending (p-value = 0.413).13
Our final decision concerns the time covered by the endogenous variable. Since states tend
to budget in yearly cycles, Medicaid transfers from the federal government received during
Alabama and Michigan's start on October 1 (as does the federal fiscal year), New York's fiscal year begins on
April 1, and Texas's fiscal year begins on September 1. See National Association of State Budget Officers (2008a).
1 2 Note that the employment data are seasonally adjusted, but only for levels, not higher-order moments.
"
3 The ARRA state outlays are from Recovery.gov and exclude tax reductions.
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a fiscal year could have an effect on employment at any point within that year. Borrowing
restrictions make transferring funds across fiscal years difficult. With these facts in mind,
we set the endogenous variable equal to the total FMAP transfers through June 2010, which
corresponds to the end of fiscal year 2010 for nearly all states. We use this endogenous variable
in all of our timing regressions which cover employment changes between December 2008 and
each month through June 2010. Because the amount of Medicaid spending in a state exhibits
a high degree of serial correlation, the precise end date barely affects the statistical significance
of our results.
3.4 Data and Summary Statistics
Outcome variables: Our primary outcome variables are derived from the seasonally adjusted
state-level employment series available at a monthly frequency from the Current Employment
Statistics (CES).' 4 For each state for which the CES has data, we obtained monthly data from
January 2000 to June 2010 on employment in total nonfarm, government, health, education,
and education and health (a series that is reported separately and is available for a wider
group of states than either the health or education series). The latest available vintage of CBS
data contains benchmarks to unemployment insurance (UI) records through September 2010,
meaning that employment for each month is based on data from the UI program (adjusted
for coverage using other CES sources) and therefore contains minimal sampling error. We
normalize employment by a state's 16+ civilian non-institutional population as estimated by
the Bureau of Labor Statistics from Census data.
Endogenous variables: Our primary endogenous variable is a state's total ARRA FMAP
outlays as of June 30, 2010, normalized by a state's 16+ population. These data are available
from recovery.gov (U.S. Recovery Accountability and Transparency Board 2009-2010).15
1 4 Because seasonal adjustment differs significantly across states, our baseline specification focuses on seasonally
adjusted data. However, in Table 5, we present year-over-year changes in employment using non-seasonally
adjusted employment changes from the QCEW.
5 The agency Financial and Activity Reports available on Recovery.gov report outlays at the Treasury Account
Financing Symbol (TAFS) level. The TAFS for FMAP is 750518. A payment to a state is recorded as an outlay
when money is transferred from the U.S. Treasury to the state as reimbursement for a Medicaid payment the
state has already made. Our data exclude about $3 billion provided through application of the ARRA FMAP
increase to state contributions for prescription drug costs for full-benefit dual eligible individuals enrolled in
Medicare Part D because the Financial and Activity Reports do not show a state-by-state breakdown of this
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Instrument: The instrument is a state's Medicaid spending in fiscal year 2007, normalized
by the 16+ population. 16 ,17 Figure 1 demonstrates the considerable cross-state variation in the
instrument. To ease interpretation, the figure shows the instrument scaled by 6.2% because
ARRA increased the FMAP by 6.2 percentage points, and inflated by 21/12 because from
October 2008 (the month after which the FMAP increase was retroactively increased) through
the end of June 2010 (the end of our sample), states received a cumulative 21 months of Medicaid
reimbursements. Note that some states that are similar across many other dimensions have very
different values; Medicaid spending is roughly twice as high in New York as in California, in
Vermont as in New Hampshire, and in New Mexico as in Colorado.
Control variables: Our choice of control variables is motivated primarily by the threat
to identification that states that received different amounts of Medicaid funding in 2007 were
on different employment trends during the time period studied. Figure 2 shows on a map
the value of the instrument, scaled as described above; states are grouped into six groups of
spending per capita. One potential concern is there is substantial regional variation in Medicaid
spending. For example, the map shows that New England has high Medicaid spending. Because
the employment effects of the recession were distributed unevenly across regions, differences in
employment between high and low Medicaid spending states could reflect regional differences
in underlying economic conditions rather than the effect of state fiscal relief. To address this
concern, in our preferred specification, we include categorical variables for the nine census
divisions, isolating the variation in the instrument that comes from within regions rather than
between them.
In our preferred specification, we also control for pre-existing economic conditions using
lagged employment change (from May to December 2008, the seven months prior to the begin-
ning of our sample period). Adding this control is potentially important because empirically,
employment changes are highly persistent. Moreover, while we cannot reject the null that our
instrument is uncorrelated with employment changes from May to December 2008, the point
estimate for this correlation is non-trivial in magnitude, raising the possibility that high and
spending during our period of study.
16Data on 2007 Medicaid spending by state are available from the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services
(2008).
1 7Per capita Medicaid spending is highly correlated over time. For example, the correlation between our
instrument using 2007 Medicaid spending per capita and 2001 Medicaid spending per capita is 0.95.
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low Medicaid spending states might have been on different employment trends prior to the
ARRA. 18 In Section 6, we explore the robustness of our results to controlling for alternative
measures of past economic conditions. In our baseline regression, we also control for GDP per
potential worker and the employment manufacturing share.
To help address concerns about differential cyclicality of state spending related to the instru-
ment through common political factors, we control for the 2007 share of workers in a union and
the vote share for Senator Kerry in the 2004 presidential election. If cyclicality differs between
states with different amounts of Medicaid spending (in ways not captured by a lag) because
more liberal or unionized states have more Medicaid spending, as well as stronger safety nets
and weaker balanced budget requirements, these controls would alleviate that concern. Finally,
we control for the 2008 state population. Further details are in the appendix.
Table 1 presents summary statistics for the main variables used in the paper. All relevant
variables are normalized by a state's 16+ population. The average total ARRA outlay through
June 2010 was approximately $1,000 per person age 16+ (excluding tax benefits and spending
not tracked at the state level). Of this, approximately one-quarter came through FMAP outlays,
and more than one-third came through FMAP outlays plus the other large state fiscal relief
program, the State Fiscal Stabilization Fund. There is considerable variation in both total
ARRA and FMAP outlays across states, with the coefficients of variation at 0.32 and 0.36
respectively. During the period considered, average total nonfarm employment changes were
sharply negative. However, there is also considerable cross-state variation in this pattern. For
example, normalized employment changes were more than 5 times more negative for the state
at the fifth percentile of the total employment change distribution (Indiana) than the state at
the 95th percentile (Alaska). There is broadly similar variation in the change in employment
in the government, health, and education sectors.
1 The correlation between the change in per capita total nonfarm employment during the seven months prior to
the beginning of our sample period (May and December 2008) and the instrument is 0.23 (p-value = 0.10). During
this period, the correlation between the change in per capita government, health, and education employment and
the instrument is -0.20 (p-value = 0.17). In contrast, during the main period of interest (December 2008 to July
2009), the correlation between the instrument and these outcome variables is larger and precisely estimated. For
the change in employment, the correlation is 0.55 (p-value < 0.01), and for total nonfarm, the correlation is 0.40
for government, health, and education (p-value < 0.01).
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3.5 Baseline Results
3.5.1 First Stage
In Table 2, we present results from several first-stage regressions. The outcome variable is total
FMAP outlays as of June 30, 2010, normalized by a states' 16+ population and measured in
$100,000 increments.
To interpret Table 2, it is useful to divide the instrument coefficient by 0.062 to reflect
the ARRA FMAP increase of 6.2 percentage points, and to further divide by 21/12 to adjust
for the cumulative 21 months of Medicaid reimbursements through the end of June 2010 (the
end of our sample), yielding a cumulative multiplicative scaling factor of 9.2. This scaled first
stage coefficient would be 1 if the FMAP outlays simply represented 6.2% of Medicaid spending
at 2007 rates. However, there are two reasons why we would expect the scaled coefficient
to be larger than 1. First, FMAP ARRA outlays are based on current Medicaid spending,
not 2007 spending. Due to the rapid growth in nominal Medicaid expenditures since 2007,
if all states' Medicaid expenditures simply increased at the nominal national rate, we would
expect a scaled coefficient substantially above 1.19 Second, as described above, FMAP outlays
also include FMAP increases for states that experienced sufficiently large changes in their
unemployment rate. If high and low Medicaid spending states experienced identical changes in
their unemployment rates, these FMAP expansions would mean that a larger number of dollars
would flow to high Medicaid spending states, as a given FMAP increase translates into more
dollars for these states. As a consequence, the average difference in Medicaid matching outlay
for a high and low Medicaid spending state would be larger.
Model (1) presents a simple bivariate regression. The coefficient on our instrument is 0.18,
and it is precisely estimated, with an F-statistic above 260. The instrument alone explains more
than 80% of the variation in FMAP outlays. In Model (1), we can strongly reject the hypothesis
that the scaled coefficient (0.18 divided by 0.062 and 21/12 = 1.68) is 1. Specifications (2) -
(4) show that this positive and precisely estimated relationship between the instrument and
our main endogenous variable is robust to including a large number of covariates. Model (2)
"The Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) reports that in 2008, Medicaid spend-
ing increased 4.7%. CMS projected that Medicaid spending would increase 9.9% in 2009. See
http://www.cms.gov/NationalHealthExpendData/25_NHEFactSheet.asp.
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includes our basic set of controls, including region fixed effects. Model (3) adds a control for
lagged total employment change from May - December 2008, while Model (4) augments (2)
with lagged change in government, health, and education employment over the same period.
Overall, the first stage is very strong.
3.5.2 Baseline Results through July 2009
In this section, we present baseline results where the outcome variable is change in employment
in a sector from December 2008 to July 2009. Table 3 presents baseline results for total employ-
ment. Models (1) - (3) report OLS regressions. The OLS regressions with controls (Models (2)
and (3)) indicate a small positive correlation between a state's FMAP outlays and its change
in total employment, although the effect is not statistically significant.
Models (4) - (6) present the baseline IV results. There is a precisely estimated positive
relationship between instrumented FMAP outlays and a state's change in total employment.
In the bivariate IV regression [Model (4)], the coefficient on total FMAP outlays per person 16+
is 4.72. While the large difference between the IV and OLS estimates may appear surprising
given the strength of the first stage, recall that the first-stage residual should be strongly
negatively correlated with employment growth due to the unemployment triggers in the FMAP
increase, biasing the OLS results downward.
Adding a wide variety of control variables [Model (5)] changes the estimate little. Including
the lagged employment control [Model (6)] reduces the point estimate by approximately 40%
but has little effect on the statistical significance of the result, as the standard error also shrinks.
The fact that adding a control for lagged employment influences the point estimate suggests
that high and low Medicaid spending states were on different employment trends prior to the
ARRA, a hypothesis that we explore in the robustness section.
The coefficient in (6), the preferred specification, suggests that for every $100,000 in FMAP
outlays per individual 16+ that a state received by June 30, 2010, that states' total employment
increased by 2.83 per individual 16+ from December 2008 to July 2009. Section 7 provides
further discussion of how to interpret this magnitude.
Table 4 parallels the results from Table 3, using the change in government, health, and
education employment as the outcome variable. The OLS coefficients [Models (1) - (3)] are
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positive, relatively small in magnitude, and not statistically significant. The IV results [Models
(4) - (6)], in contrast, suggest a positive relationship between FMAP transfers and change in
employment in these sectors. For the IV specifications, the control variables have very little
influence on the point estimates, but they do substantially reduce the standard errors. The
coefficient on (6) suggests that for every $100,000 in FMAP outlays per individual 16+ that
a state received by June 30, 2010, that states' employment in the government, health, and
education sectors increased by 1.17 per individual 16+ over the period considered.
The coefficients in Table 4 are less than half of the magnitude of those in Table 3, suggesting
that the "indirect" employment gains in the non-government-related sectors were substantial.
To see this more explicitly, we re-estimate our preferred specification, changing the dependent
variable to be the change in total employment excluding the change in employment in the
government, health, and education sectors. This regression yields a coefficient of 1.86 (95% CI:
0.32, 3.41).
3.5.3 Timing Results
The previous section presented results where the outcome variable was the change in employ-
ment from December 2008 until July 2009. This section explores how our estimates evolve as we
change the month that marks the end of our sample. Specifically, we re-run the cross-sectional
regression for changes in employment from December 2008 until every month from January
2009 to June 2010 and report the second stage coefficients on total FMAP outlays from our
preferred specification with the full set of control variables. That is, we re-run the estimate
from December 2008 to January 2009, December 2008 to February 2009, December 2008 to
March 2009, etc. and report each of these 18 coefficients.
Figure 3 presents these results for total nonfarm employment. The solid line represents the
point estimate, and the dashed lines indicate the 95% confidence interval. These timing results
suggest three main patterns. First, while there appears to be a positive relationship between
FMAP outlays and change in employment before July 2009, the relationship is small and not
precisely measured. Second, starting in July 2009, the coefficient jumps in magnitude, varying
from a low of 2.16 (September 2009) to a high of 4.44 (February 2010). Finally, as expected,
the standard errors tend to widen over time, although all of the coefficients remain statistically
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significant at the 95% level.
Figure 4 parallels the results from Figure 3, using employment in the government, health,
and education sectors. The broad patterns present in Figure 3 are also present in Figure
4. Again, the coefficient increases for July 2009, and the standard errors increase over time.
However, the ratio of the standard errors to the point estimate is larger than for total employ-
ment. Comparing the magnitudes between the two timing figures shows that in all months,
the estimates for total employment are larger than those for government employment, with the
gap increasing through 2009 and peaking in early 2010. This pattern is consistent with the
government employment results reflecting the relatively immediate direct effect of states and
state-funded establishments not having to lay off workers, while the total employment results
include the lagging induced effects of households responding to higher disposable income.
3.6 Robustness Checks and Extensions
3.6.1 Falsifications Tests
Our identifying assumption is that, conditional on our control variables, states that had higher
pre-recession Medicaid spending would not have experienced different employment outcomes
from states that were lower spenders in the absence of the increase in FMAP. One way of
assessing this assumption is to consider if the effects we estimate are larger than the relationship
between Medicaid spending and employment growth that existed prior to the period of interest.
Figure 5 reports the second stage coefficients for placebo tests using data that begin in Jan-
uary 2000 and end in December 2008. To parallel our baseline specification, we consider seven-
month changes in both total nonfarm employment and employment in government, health, and
education. We then run our IV estimates on each overlapping seven-month period, for a total
of 101 regressions. We rank the coefficients based on their magnitude and report the empiri-
cal CDF. For comparison, we also show the second stage estimate run on the baseline period,
December 2008 to July 2009, with a vertical line.
The results show two key patterns. First, the estimates are centered around 0; the em-
pirical median of the estimate is 0.00 for total nonfarm and 0.11 for government, health and
education. That is, in the years before the ARRA was passed, there is little evidence to suggest
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that high and low Medicaid spending states experienced systematically different employment
trends. Second, our baseline estimates of both total nonfarm and government, health, and
education employment are large relative to the coefficients in the period before the ARRA. For
total employment, our result is larger than all but seven of the 101 pre-ARRA estimates. For
government, health, and education, our estimate is larger than all but three of the pre-ARRA
estimates. Both pieces of evidence increase our confidence that the estimates reported above
are capturing the effect of the ARRA rather than underlying differences between high and low
Medicaid spending states.
3.6.2 Other Robustness Checks
Our baseline specification allows for the possibility that high and low Medicaid spending states
were on different pre-existing employment trends by controlling for a linear lag of the change
in employment. This subsection addresses the concern that a linear lag may not be a suffi-
cient statistic for pre-existing employment trends. Specifically, we report results allowing for
a more flexible pre-existing trend and using a state's pre-treatment industry composition and
the change in employment by industry in other states to impute employment change during
the treatment period, following Bartik (1991) and Blanchard and Katz (1992). The latter re-
quire detailed industry data from the QCEW, a dataset that is not available on a seasonally
adjusted basis and that does not have representative coverage of the government sector. 20 We
therefore present results for the change in total nonfarm employment, and for December 2008
to December 2009 in the specifications that use the imputed employment predictor. 2 1
Model (1) of Table 5 shows the second stage coefficient when we re-run our baseline specifi-
cation, replacing the linear lag of employment change with an autoregressive model estimated
using 18 years of data prior to the sample period to forecast a state's employment change from
December 2008 to July 2009.22 The second stage coefficient is 2.89, essentially unchanged from
2 (According to Bureau of Labor Statistics (2008), 5% of total state and local government workers are not
covered by the QCEW.
21We perform the imputed employment calculation at the four-digit level because of disclosure limitations that
eliminate observations at higher levels of detail.
2 2 Specifically, the logarithm of total employment was regressed against a time variable and nine monthly lags
of itself. The coefficients were then used on data through December 2008 to forecast employment from January
2009 through July 2009. Note that this control variable is helpful if the patterns of employment changes over the
18 years prior to our sample period remained unchanged during our sample period. Because our period involves
118
the value of 2.83 in the specification with the linear lag presented in table 3. Models (2)-(3)
add a quadratic and cube of the lagged employment change to account for the fact that the
serial correlation in changes in per capita employment may be non-linear, again with essentially
no effect on the coefficient of interest. The next three columns shift the end-month to Decem-
ber 2009 in order to accommodate our measure of imputed QCEW employment change based
on pre-ARRA industrial composition. The appendix contains further details of this variable's
construction. As a benchmark, column (4) gives the baseline result that appears in Figure
3. Column (5) adds the imputed employment change, with very little effect on the FMAP
coefficient. Column (6) replaces the outcome variable with QCEW data and again finds essen-
tially the same result. In sum, the relationship between FMAP transfers and employment
growth appears very robust to our alternative methods of generating an employment change
counterfactual. 24
3.7 Discussion
3.7.1 Job-years
Our results indicate a positive and robust relationship between receiving FMAP transfers and
relative employment outcomes. To interpret the magnitude of the estimates, we can translate
the regression coefficients into the increase in job-years from $100,000 of marginal state fiscal
relief. This requires two assumptions. First, we assume that FMAP outlays received through
June 2010 have no employment effects beyond June 2010. If instead the employment effects
linger beyond June 2010, then our estimate of job-years is a lower bound. Second, we assume
that transfers to states after June 2010 do not influence employment changes before June 2010.
This assumption is likely to be valid (at least for state employment) if states are unable to shift
the most severe recession since World War II, this assumption may not be valid.
23 The closeness of the coefficients in columns (5) and (6) reflects the benchmarking of the CES to the QCEW.
2 4 In results reported in an online appendix, we also experimented with other possible control variables that
might capture channels similar to those discussed in the text. These include the generosity of states' unem-
ployment insurance systems and the presence of a Democratic governor in February 2009 as proxies for political
factors, an index of budget restrictiveness from the Advisory Committee on Intergovernmental Relations to ad-
dress the concern that the 2007 Medicaid spending levels might be correlated with state budget rules, and the
degree of house price appreciation during the mid-2000s as a proxy for economic conditions. The results reported
in Tables 3 and 4 are robust to the inclusion of these additional controls.
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money across fiscal years.
Under these assumptions, the increase in job-years from $100,000 of FMAP outlays can be
calculated by taking the integral under the timing charts (Figures 3 and 4) and dividing by
12 to convert job-months to job-years. Our point estimates suggest that $100,000 of marginal
state fiscal relief increases state employment by 3.8 job-years, 3.2 of which are outside the
government, health, and education sectors. The associated p-value for this calculation is 0.018
for total employment, while the p-value for total employment excluding the government, health,
and education sectors is 0.010. Dividing $100,000 by 3.8 job-years yields a cost per job of
$26,000.
When considering the generalizability of the results, it is important to consider both the
intended and apparently realized fungibility of the funds. As noted above, the text of the bill
made clear that the funds were for general obligations, and states reported using them for this
purpose. Indeed, results disaggregating the government, health, and education employment
results suggest that only about a quarter of the increase in employment was in the health
sector, with another quarter in education and the other half in state and local government. 2 5
In the context of our broader understanding of the costs and benefits of fiscal stimulus,
state fiscal relief, in particular, may be a particularly low-cost means of supporting employment
during a recession. Furthermore, the jobs increases were rapid, perhaps because "shovel-ready"
projects were often not necessary; in many cases, state and local governments only needed to
avoid cuts.
3.7.2 Comparison to the Literature
This paper contributes to a literature which uses cross-state variation to estimate fiscal multipli-
ers. We do this using the most recently-available evidence in a context in which the parameter
being estimated has direct relevance to a policy question: how much is employment increased
by state fiscal relief during a recession? Although estimated in quite different settings, Suarez-
Serrato and Wingender (2011) and Shoag (2011) find estimates which are remarkably similar
2 5 When using the change from December 2008 to July 2009 in state and local government employment as
the dependent variable in our baseline regression, we estimate a coefficient of 0.65 (SE = 0.26) on the FMAP
transfers, while changes in health and education employment yield coefficients of 0.21 (SE = 0.10) and 0.29 (SE
= 0.11) respectively.
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to our estimate of cost per job, at $30,000 and $35,000 per year respectively.26
While the political debate has focused on the effect of fiscal stimulus on employment, the
academic literature more commonly estimates the government purchases multiplier for output.
Also using cross-state variation, Nakamura and Steinsson (2011) find an open-economy gov-
ernment purchases multiplier of 1.5, and Shoag (2011) finds an output multiplier of 2.1. Our
findings are consistent with this range. We roughly map our results to an output multiplier as
follows: in 2008 average compensation in both the total economy and state and local govern-
ment was $56,000 per employee. If total compensation equals the marginal product of labor and
workers affected by state fiscal relief have this same average compensation, this result would
imply an output multiplier for a dollar of transfers of about 2.27 Given that the results from
this cross-state approach do not incorporate general equilibrium effects, cross-state multipliers,
or the response of a monetary authority, we interpret this multiplier as only suggestive of the
national multiplier of policy interest. 28
A few other papers have also studied parts of the ARRA. Wilson (2011) and Feyrer and
Sacerdote (2011) report costs per job of $114,312 and $170,000, respectively, but their numbers
are not directly comparable to the 3.8 jobs per $100,000 reported above because they do not
account for the timing of job creation, and they cover other portions of the stimulus. 29 Sahm
et al. (2010) find a relatively modest impact from the Making Work Pay tax cut. Mian and
Sufi (2010) find that the relatively small ($3 billion) "Cash for Clunkers" program (which was
separate from the ARRA but implemented concurrently during the summer of 2009) had little
net effect on purchases.30
2 6See also Neumann et al. (2010) and Fishback and Kachanovskaya (2010) for studies using cross-sectional
variation during the Great Depression.
2 7 This calculation assumes that capital stays fixed. Data on average compensation per employee come from
the Bureau of Economic Analysis GDP-by-Industry accounts. The output multiplier equals the jobs multiplier
multiplied by value-added per job (equivalent to a workers marginal product), or (3.8/$100,000)*$56,000=2.13.
2 8Ramey (2011) surveys the literature on national output multipliers. Our estimate is at the upper end of her
preferred range, consistent with recent empirical work on state-dependent output multipliers that finds higher
multipliers occur during depressed demand conditions such as prevailed during our period of study (Auerbach
and Gorodnichenko forthcoming). Nakamura and Steinsson (2011) and Shoag (2011) explore the theoretical
mapping from these estimates of local fiscal multipliers to the national multiplier in an open economy setting.
2 9 Wilson's results for total job creation are closest to ours. This is not surprising, since his paper adopts our
instrument, along with using simulated instruments for highway and education spending. The Feyrer-Sacerdote
number corresponds only to "direct jobs" funded by the ARRA. Conley and Dupor (2011) find a positive effect
of ARRA transfers on government employment, but no positive effect on employment outside of government.
3 
"The Obama Administration (Council of Economic Advisers 2010), Congressional Budget Office (2010) and
private forecasters and academics (Blinder and Zandi 2010) have all evaluated the ARRA using a multiplier
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3.8 Mechanism
The ARRA transfers reached states in dire fiscal condition. During the 2009 fiscal year, 43 states
faced budget gaps totaling more than $60 billion (National Conference of State Legislatures
2009). Almost all states have balanced budget requirements. 31 Thus, the large budget gaps
necessitated that they take action by cutting expenditures, raising revenues, or drawing from
their "rainy day" funds or end of year balances, which are used to smooth revenue across years. 3 2
Indeed, by December 2008, 22 states had made or announced cuts to their expenditures totaling
$12 billion.3 3 By July 2009, 42 states had made cuts to their expenditures totaling more than
$30 billion, and 30 states had increased taxes or fees to boost their revenues. 3 4
There are essentially only three ways in which states could use the ARRA state fiscal relief
funds: to alleviate program cuts, to prevent or lower tax and fee increases, or to contribute to
their end of year balances (which include their rainy day funds). As long as the states did not
respond to the federal transfers by completely siphoning them to their end of year balances,
the observed employment responses could come from multipliers on the states' spending or tax
actions. The results in Section 5 suggest that the ARRA funds were at least partially used to
avoid program cuts, since a concentration of the employment effects appears to have occurred
in sectors (government, health, and education) which are reliant on state funds. That total
employment beyond those sectors is also affected positively by the federal fiscal relief suggests
that there is a source of spillovers, arising from higher disposable income due to either the wages
of the direct hires or lower net taxes because of fewer tax or fee increases.3 5
We can directly test the necessary condition that FMAP outlays affected spending or tax
model based on historical relationships between government spending, output and employment. These studies
tend to find effects similar to or slightly smaller in magnitude than those in the current study for state fiscal
relief. However, they are all calibrated models, whereas the current study uses empirical estimation. Council of
Economic Advisers (2009) reported preliminary results of those in the current paper.
3 All states, except for Vermont, have some version of balanced budget requirements as reported by the National
Association of State Budget Officers (2008a). Poterba (1994) gives an overview of the varying requirements.
3 2 From National Association of State Budget Officers (2008a). Kansas and Montana do not have budget
stabilization (or "rainy day") funds. However, they, like other states, may use surpluses from the prior fiscal year
to cushion any fiscal difficulty in the next.
3 3 From National Association of State Budget Officers (2008b).
3 Budget cuts from the National Association of State Budget Officers (2009a). The $32 billion figure refers to
the expenditure cuts in fiscal year 2009 alone. Tax increases from Johnson, Nicholas, and Pennington (2009).
35 Several recent empirical studies have found a positive effect of lower taxes or higher transfers on economic
outcomes (Johnson, Parker and Souleles 2006; Sahm, Shapiro and Slemrod 2009; Romer and Romer 2010).
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actions by regressing the change in end of year balances from 2008 to 2009 on instrumented
FMAP outlays and controls. Models (1) - (3) of Table 6 summarize the results of these regres-
sions. All else equal, if states that received more FMAP money decreased their balances less, we
would expect a positive and significant coefficient on FMAP outlays, with the extreme case that
if all of the money were saved we would expect a coefficient of 1. Instead, the estimates in (1)
- (3) are small in magnitude, negative in all three of the specifications, and never significantly
different from 0.36 Furthermore, the models allow us to reject the null that half of transfers
were saved by states at the 99% confidence level for two regressions and at the 95% confidence
level for the third, confirming that at least some of the funds were used to slow either budget
cuts or tax increases. Models (4) - (6) of Table 6 repeat the same exercise, using the change
in end of the year balances from 2009 to 2010 as the dependent variable, and yield similar
results.3 7 In summary, although the regressions have wide standard errors, the point estimates
provide no evidence to suggest that states are retaining the transferred money in the form of
end of year balances or rainy day funds. 38
To determine if states that received more transfers cut their budgets less, we ran specifica-
tions that parallel those in Table 6 where the outcome variable was the change in expenditure
(normalized by a state's 16+ population) between 2008 and 2009 and between 2009 and 2010.
Unfortunately, the results from this regression are quite noisy, and we can neither reject the
null that all of the money was spent on reducing budget cuts (which would imply a coefficient
of one) nor the null that none of the money was spent on reducing budget cuts (which would
3 6 We exclude Alaska, a state that experienced a per 16+ population decline in its end of year funds that
was more than ten times larger than that of the next largest states. When we include Alaska, we also cannot
reject the null that the coefficient on total FMAP outlays per person is equal to 0 (p-value for the bivariate
IV regression is 0.435 for changes from 2008 to 2009 and is 0.311 for changes from 2009 to 2010). In addition,
because the National Association of State Budget Officers does not provide data on DC, we exclude it from our
regressions.
3 7Poterba (1994) and Alt and Lowry (1994) examine how the states' balanced budget rules affect their responses
to deficits and find that, in response to a positive deficit shock, states cut expenditures or raise taxes within
either the current or the following fiscal year. This is consistent with the findings that a federal transfer (a
negative deficit shock) would impact expenditures or taxes.
38These results contradict those of Cogan and Taylor (2010), who find using aggregate time-series data that
ARRA Medicaid spending increased aggregate state net lending as measured in the National Income and Product
Accounts. Given the unusual nature and length of the 2007-09 recession and its effect on state budgets, it is
possible that aggregate time-series regressions misattribute the effect of the worsening recession and the eventual
binding of state balanced budget requirements on net lending to the introduction of the FMAP expansion.
Alternatively, it is possible that all states increased their saving in response to the FMAP transfers by the same
dollar amount per capita, regardless of the amount of FMAP transfers actually received.
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yield a coefficient of zero). 39 Results using changes in a state's revenue are similarly noisy, and
thus do not provide conclusive evidence about the use of funds to reduce tax or fee increases.
Further research into how states optimize over the margins of tax and spending when faced
with an altered budget constraint would be a worthwhile area of future study.
3.9 Conclusion
This paper estimates the employment effects of a relatively unstudied form of government
macroeconomic intervention that took center stage in the recent ARRA: fiscal relief to states
during a downturn. We exploit cross-state variation in transfer receipts that comes from pre-
recession differences in Medicaid spending. All else equal, states that spent more money on
Medicaid before the recession received more money from the federal government. We confront
the major threat to identification-that states that spent more money on Medicaid may be on
differential employment trends from states that spent less-in several ways, including adding
regional fixed effects and other control variables as well as conducting placebo tests. Our
baseline specifications suggest that $100,000 of marginal spending increased employment by 3.8
job-years, 3.2 of which are outside the government, health, and education sectors.
The fact that state fiscal relief may be an effective tool to cushion employment losses in
recessions raises two questions. First, if the employment effects of state fiscal relief are sub-
stantial, should the federal government play a larger role in providing revenue to states during
recessions? When designing state fiscal relief, federal planners face a tradeoff between providing
relief to states experiencing critical budget situations and minimizing perverse incentives for
state policy makers. If states expect to receive federal aid during recessions, they may not
save sufficiently during boom times. This moral hazard is compounded if federal aid targets
states with larger budget shortfalls, which might be desirable because aid distributed using a
non-need-based formula would likely produce smaller employment effects. An important area
of future research is to determine the extent to which these tradeoffs limit the potential for
state fiscal relief to be an effective tool for cushioning job losses during recessions.
"
9Fiscal year 2008 expenditure data and the enacted tax and fee data are from the National Association of
State Budget Officers (2009b). Fiscal year 2009 and 2010 expenditure data are from the National Association of
State Budget Officers (2010).
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Second, why are states unable to save money during economic booms and use this savings
during recessions? Because most states have adopted balanced budget legislation, states cannot
borrow money during recessions to smooth fluctuations. As a substitute, most states have a
"rainy day" fund that allows them to avoid the requirement of literally balancing their budget
every fiscal year. However, political economy considerations make saving difficult for democratic
governments (Alesina and Tabellini 1990; Amador 2003), and most states have essentially no
restrictions on when they must contribute to their rainy day fund.4 0 For example, during the
1990s economic boom, states increased spending and cut taxes rather than contributing to their
rainy day funds. 4 '
To help solve these political economy problems, some states have considered adopting rules
that would require the state to contribute to their rainy day fund during healthy economic
times. For example, a state could be required to contribute to its fund when the unemployment
rate in the state falls below a given threshold, and be permitted to tap into its fund when
the unemployment rate rises to a sufficiently high level. These regulations have the advantage
of constraining politicians, while helping to alleviate some of the fiscal strain induced by a
recession. The evidence presented in this paper, though it concerns funding from the federal
government, also informs the impact of additional state resources on state-level employment,
and suggests that these and other rules may help states boost employment during recessions.
Future research could focus on additional benefits, as well as costs, from state fiscal relief and
state budgetary rules.
4 The majority of states have requirements that they contribute to their rainy day funds only if the budget
has a surplus. However, because states determine when they have a surplus by setting the level of taxes and
spending, in practice such requirements impose few restrictions on states' contributions to their rainy day funds.
4 1See Zahradnik and Ribeiro (2003) and the National Conference of State Legislatures (2004).
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3.10 Appendix
3.10.1 Sources and Descriptions of Baseline Control Variables
e Region effects: We include dummy variables for each of the 9 census defined divisions.
Definitions are given at http://www.census.gov/geo/www/usregdiv.pdf.
Lagged change in employment: We control for the lagged value of the outcome
variable. Specifically, if the outcome variable is change in total (government, health, and
education) employment from month m to month m', the lagged change in employment will
be the change in total (government, health, and education) employment from month m - 7 to
month m. In our baseline specification where the outcome variable is change in employment
from December 2008 to July 2009, the lagged change in employment is the change in employment
from May 2008 to December 2008. This 7 month lag was chosen to follow the 7 month period
used for the outcome variable in our baseline specification.
0 GDP per potential worker: We use a state's 2008 GDP, normalized by a state's
16+ population, from the Bureau of Economic Analysis. 42
* Employment manufacturing share: From the Census Bureau, we also control for
the share of the civilian employed population 16 years and older that is in the manufacturing
sector. Data are from the American Community Survey and are averaged over 2005 - 2007 to
reduce measurement error.
0 State 2008 population and 2008 16+ population: Data are from the US Census.
* 2004 Kerry share: The state's share of voters who cast ballots for Senator Kerry in
the 2004 United States presidential election.
* Union share: Share of workers in a union, from the Bureau of Labor Statistics.43
3.10.2 Description of Imputed Employment
As a robustness check, we control for a measure of imputed employment that uses information
on the change in employment in each industry in the rest of the country and the initial industry
distribution in each state to impute an expected employment change. Specifically, for state j
42See http://www.bea.gov/newsreleases/regional/gdpstate/2009/pdf/gsp6O9.pdf.
4From http://www.bls.gov/news.release/pdf/union2.pdf.
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and industry k define the percent change in employment in industry k in all other states as:
-j,k - Z8 $i, Ets,k(32%A E-' -- Ela (3.2)
__ E2 1- 1
The imputed employment change for industry k in state j is then:
%Ajk - Ejk - %AE-kt_1 (3-3)
The total imputed employment change for state j is the sum over all industries:
>Zj= jk (3.4)
We implement (3.2)-(3.4) using the QCEW December 2008 and December 2009 state-level
flat files.4 4 The QCEW provides employment by NAICS code and ownership status (private,
federal government, state government, and local government). The QCEW suppresses output
for state-industry-ownership rows where the number or concentration of firms does not surpass
a minimum disclosure threshold. Letting o E {private, federal, state, local} define ownership
status, we set Ejk" = I for any state-industry-ownership row with suppresscd output. In
practice, missing the disclosure threshold correlates well with small size, so this assumption is
quite mild. Nonetheless, we define industries using four digit rather than six digit NAICS codes
in order to minimize disclosure limitations. Using six digit industries yields very similar results.
Since we are interested in industry variation, we collapse the QCEW data on ownership status
before implementing (3.2)-(3.4).
"The files can be downloaded from ftp://ftp.bls.gov/pub/special.requests/cew/yyyy/state for
yyyy={2008,2009}.
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Tables
Table 1: Summary Statistics
Mean Std. Dev. Minimum Median Max
Outcome Variables, Per 1,000 People 16+
Change in total nonfarm employment, Dec. 2008 --* July 2009 -18.76 7.15 -38.84 -18.23 3.11
Change in govt, health, & education, Dec. 2008 -- July 2009 0.97 2.06 -2.13 0.53 9.11
Payout Variables and Instrument, Per Person 16+
Total ARRA outlays through June 2010 $1,002 $323 $586 $960 $2,940
Total FMAP outlays through June 2010 $250 $90 $103 $235 $507
Total FMAP and SFSF outlays through June 2010 $373 $88 $176 $358 $583
2007 Medicaid spending (instrument) $1,328 $454 $624 $1,227 $2,854
Control Variables
Employment in manufacturing, percent 11.03 4.28 1.40 11.00 20.30
Vote share Kerry (2004), percent 46.52 10.38 26.00 47.02 89.18
Union share, percent 11.16 5.49 3.00 10.40 25.20
GDP per person 16+ ($1,000) 49.20 17.20 31.91 46.28 154.89
Population 16 and older (millions) 4.60 5.13 0.41 3.32 27.85
Change in total nonfarm employment, May 2008 -+ Dec. 2008 -11.04 6.91 -33.42 -11.25 2.60
Change in govt, health, & education, May 2008 --* Dec. 2008 1.73 1.27 -1.44 1.75 6.30
Notes: See text and data appendix for sources. Note that "government" excludes federal government employees. All employment data are
seasonally adjusted and reported per 1,000 people 16+.
2007 Medicaid spending
Table 2: First Stage Regressions
(1)
(instrument) 0.18*** 0.
(0.01) (
Region fixed effects? X X X
Vote share Kerry X X X
Union share X X X
GDP per person 16+ X X X
Employment in manufacturing X X X
State population X X X
Lagged total employment diange
May 2008 to Dec 2008 X
Lagged govemment, health, and education
employment diange May 2008 to Dec 2008 X
Observations 51 51 51 51
R-squared 0.84 0.93 0.93 0.93
Mean of dependent variable 250.23 250.23 250.23 250.23
Notes: The outcome variable for each regression is total FMAP outlays per individual 16+
in a state, through June 30, 2010. The variable is measured in $100,000 per person 16+. See
text and data appendix for sources. Note that "government" excludes federal government
employees. Robust standard errors are in parentheses.
* significant at the 10% level. ** significant at the 5% level. *** significant at the 1% 0 level.
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(2)
15***
0.01)
(3)
0.16***
(0.01)
(4)
0.15***
(0.01)
Total FMAP payout per
person 16+ ($100,000)
Table 3: Total Employment Baseline Res
OLS
(1) (2) (3)
2.94** 1.88 0.82
(1.35) (1.83) (1.06)
Vote share Kerry (2004),
percent/10,000
Union share, percent/10,000
GDP per person 16+ ($1,000,000)
Employment in manufacturing,
percent/ 10,000
State population 16+, billions
0.28 2.1
(2.02) (1.57)
-4.26 -2.93
(3.60) (2.17)
0.01 -0.03
(0.07) (0.06)
-10.05*** -6.61***
(3.05) (2.39)
-0.43*** -0.33***
(0.12) (0.08)
-0.79 1.14
(1.59) (1.14)
-6.00** -4.29**
(2.91) (2.01)
-0.01 -0.04
(0.06) (0.05)
-9.75*** -6.83***
(2.82) (2.12)
-0.46*** -0.36***
(0.10) (0.08)
Lagged total employment change 0.42* 0.37**
May 2008 to Dec 2008 (0.21) (0.17)
Region fixed effects? X X X X
Observations 51 51 51 51 51 51
Mean of dependent variable * 1,000 -18.76 -18.76 -18.76 -18.76 -18.76 -18.76
Note: The outcome variable for each regression is the seasonally adjusted change in total non-farm employment per individual 16+
in a state, from December 2008 to July 2009. The main variable of interest is total ARRX FMAP payouts through June 30, 2010.
Specifications (4) - (6) instrument total ARRA FMAP payouts with pre-recession Medicaid spending as described in the text. See
text and data appendix for sources. Robust standard errors are in parentheses.
* significant at the 10% level. ** significant at the 5% level. *** significant at the 1% level.
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(4)
4.72***
(1.31)
IV
(5)
4.61 ***
(1.57)
(6)
2.83***
(1.01)
Total FMAP payout per
person 16+ ($100,000)
Vote share Kerry (2004),
percent/10,000
Table 4: State and Local Government, Health, and Education
OLS
(1) (2) (3) (4
0.43 0.34 0.30 0.9
(0.53) (0.44) (0.40) (0.5
Union share, percent/10,000
GDP per person 16+ ($1,000,000)
Employment in manufacturing,
percent/10,000
State population 16+, billions
IV
(5)
1.19***
(0.37)4)
-0.76* -0.64
(0.39) (0.39)
0.16 0.33
(0.95) (0.96)
0.07*** 0.07***
(0.02) (0.02)
-1.93** -1.84*
(0.89) (0.96)
-0.11*** -0.10**
(0.03) (0.04)
(6)
1.17***
(0.36)
-1.10*** -1.01***
(0.30) (0.32)
-0.38 -0.26
0.76 0.8
0.06*** 0.06***
(0.02) (0.02)
-1.84** -1.77**
(0.84) (0.88)
-0.12*** -0.11***
(0.03) (0.03)
Lagged government, health, and education 0.18 0.14
employment change May 2008 to Dec 2008 (0.18) (0.17)
Region fixed effects? X X X X
Observations 51 51 51 51 51 51
Mean of dependent variable * 1,000 0.97 0.97 0.97 0.97 0.97 0.97
Note: The outcome variable for each regression is the seasonally adjusted change in total employment in state and local government, health, and
education per individual 16+ in a state, from December 2008 to July 2009. The main variable of interest is total ARRA FMAP payouts through
June 30, 2010. Specifications (4) - (6) instrument total ARRA FMAP payouts with pre-recession Medicaid spending as described in the text. See
text and data appendix for sources. Note that "government" excludes federal government employees. Robust standard errors are in parentheses.
significant at the 10% level. ** significant at the 5% level. *** significant at the 1% level.
Table 5: Total Employment Robustness Checks
Dec 2008 to July 2009 Dec 2008 to Dec 2009
CES CES QCEW
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Total FMAP payout per 2.89** 2.80*** 2.79** 2.92** 2.74** 2.81**
person 16+ ($100,000) (1.23) (0.95) (1.29) (1.44) (1.34) (1.27)
Baseline controls X X X X X X
Forecased emp ch, Dec 2008 to July 2009, CES X
Lagged total emp ch, July 2008 to Dec 2008, CES X X X X X
Lagged total emp ch squared, July 2008 to Dec 2008, CES X X
Lagged total emp ch cubed, July 2008 to Dec 2008, CES X
Imputed emp ch, Dec 2008 to Dec 2009, QCEW X X
Observations 51 51 51 51 51 51
Mean of dependent variable * 1,000 -18.76 -18.76 -18.76 -21.81 -21.81 -22.17
Note: In (1) - (3), the outcome variable is the change in total employment from December 2008 to July 2009 from the CES. In (4) and (5), the outcome
variable is the change in total employment from December 2008 to December 2009 from the CES. For (6), the the outcome variable is the change in total
employment from December 2008 to December 2009 from the QCEW. The main variable of interest is total ARRA FMAP payouts through June 30, 2010.
The construction of the instrument is described in the text. "Baseline controls" are vote share Kerry, union share, GDP per person 16+, employment in
manufacturing, state population, and region fixed effects. Sources of control variables are detailed in the data appendix. See the text for the construction of
forecasted and imputed employment change. Robust standard errors are in parentheses.
* significant at the 10% level. ** significant at the 5% level. *** significant at the l% level.
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Table 6: Transmission Mechanism
Rainy Day Fund, change 2008 to 2009 Rainy Day Fund, dange 2009 to 2010
(IV) (IV)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Total FMAP payout per -0.26 0.01 -0.14 -0.04 0.08 0.04
person 16+ ($100,000) (0.18) (0.23) (0.21) (0.09) (0.18) (0.17)
Region fixed effects? X X X X
Indudes lagged employment? X X
Exdudes Alaska? X X X X X X
Missing DC? X X X X X X
Observations 49 49 49 49 49 -17.84
Mean of dependent variable
(*100,000) -29.22 -29.22 -29.22 -17.84 -17.84 -17.84
Note: The outcome variable for (1) - (3) is change in a state's rainy day fund, in $100,000, per person 16+, from fiscal year 2008 to
fiscal year 2009. The outcome variable for (4) - (6) is the change in a state's rainy day fund, in $100,000, per person 16+, from fiscal
year 2009 to fiscal year 2010. Data are from the National Association of State Budget Officers (NASBO) Fiscal Survey of the States.
The fiscal 2008 rainy day fund data come from the Fall 2009 Fiscal Survey, and the fiscal 2009 and 2010 rainy day fund data come
from the Spring 2010 Fiscal Survey. All specifications exclude DC due to missing data. They also drop Alaska, an outlier in terms
of the change in the state rainy day fund. Robust standard errors are in parentheses.
* significant at the 10% level. ** significant at the 5% level. *** significant at the 1% level.
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Figures
Figure 1: Value of Scaled Instrument
Dollars, per person 16+
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See text for full details. Data are from the Center for Medicaid Services, Data Compendium, Table V21.
Figure 2: Value of Scaled Instrument
Scaled instrument (dollars, per 16+)
*(188,310]U(157,188]
*(136,157]
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(104,120]j[67,104]
Note: The value of the scaled instrument is 0.062 * state's fiscal year 2007 Medicaid spending (per
person 16+) * 21/12. See full text for details. Data are from the Center for Medicaid Services, Data
Compendium, Table VI1.1.
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Note: The value of the scaled instrument is 0.062 state's fiscal year 2007 Medicaid spending * 21/12.
Figure 3: Total Nonfarm Second Stage Coefficients
Value of coefficient on FMAP outlays
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Note: This chart displays the second stage coefficient for regressions where the outcome
variable is the change in seasonally adjusted employment between December 2008 and
the month indicated on the x-axis. The variable of interest is total FMAP outlays. Regressions
include the full set of controls. The 95% confidence interval, derived from robust standard
errors, is plotted in dashed lines.
Figure 4: Government, Health and Education Second Stage Coefficients
Value of coefficient on FMAP outlays
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Note: This chart displays the second stage coefficient for regressions where the outcome
variable is the change in seasonally adjusted employment between December 2008 and
the month indicated on the x-axis. The variable of interest is total FMAP outlays. Regressions
include the full set of controls. The 95% confidence interval, derived from robust standard
errors, is plotted in dashed lines.
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Figure 5: Placebo Results
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Note: Plots results of second stage regressions, where the outcome variable is seasonally
adjusted change in employment for each overlapping 7 month period, starting in Jan
2000 and ending in Dec 2008. All regressions include the full set of control
variables. Coefficient from Dec 2008 to July 2009 is indicated with the vertical line.
Note that government excludes federal government employment.
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